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I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, several antitrust cases have involved the following scenario: A supplier, for example, a relatively small clothing manufacturer, sells to
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a variety of different dealers,' recommending that its product be sold at a
particular price to consumers.2 Among its dealers are full-price retailers,
such as major department stores or upscale boutiques. In addition, at least
one of its dealers is a discount outlet that advertises prices below the manufacturer's suggested retail prices ("MSRP") and probably provides less pleasant retailing space, less pleasant changing facilities, less product display, and
fewer service personnel than one might expect to find at the department
store or boutique. At some point in time, one of the manufacturer's fullprice retailers becomes aware that the discounter is competing for business
by selling the product below MSRP. The retailer contacts the manufacturer
and indicates that it will continue to retail the manufacturer's product only if
the discounter is either brought into line-made to raise its prices-or terminated completely. The manufacturer responds by assuring the full-price retailer that it will resolve the matter. Subsequently, the manufacturer
3
terminates the discounter after the discounter refuses to charge the MSRP.
On its face, this "upward coercion" scenario seems to constitute precisely the type of anticompetitive activity with which the antitrust laws are
concerned. 4 One firm succeeds in eliminating a competing firm from part of
1. The terminology that seems to be in common usage is that a "distributor" sells products
to other entities in the distribution chain, while a "dealer" sells to consumers. See John R. Allison, An Analysis of the Vertical Price-Nonprice Dichotomy, 21 AKRON L. REV. 131, 132 n.6
(1987). For convenience, I will refer to both categories as "dealers" unless referring to specific
distributors in a particular case. Similarly, I will refer to both manufacturers and upstream distributors generically as "suppliers" in cases and examples when they are acting as the upstream
entity in a transaction.
2. Often, this price is 200% of the wholesale price, commonly referred to in the industry as
the "keystone" price. E.g., The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir.
1988); Garment Dist., Inc. v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc., 799 F.2d 905, 907 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); Robert F. Springer & H.E. Frech III, Deterring Fraud: The Role of
Resale Price Maintenance, 59 J. Bus. 433, 444 & n.12 (1986); Robert L. Steiner, The Nature of
Vertical Restraints, 30 ANTITRUST BULL 143, 163-64 (1985). This industry rule-of-thumb may
come about because retailers do not find it to be cost-effective to try to estimate consumer
demand more precisely, but it also tends to stabilize high retailer margins by making tacit collusion easier. See Steiner, supra, at 164.
3. For examples of cases that analyze this scenario, see The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans,
Inc., 849 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1988); Garment Dist., Inc., v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc., 799 F.2d 905
(4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 728 F.
Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse v. Belk Bros. Co., 621 F. Supp.
224 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
4. The relevant statute is 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1994), which provides in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ... is declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony....
Typically, courts and commentators view the broad phrasing of the statute as providing a wide
grant of authority to the federal courts to develop a kind of common law relating to restraints of
trade. See, e.g., 7 PILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTrrrusT LAW
1501 (1986) (arguing that statutory
language requires federal courts to "develop, refine, and innovate in the dynamic common law
tradition"); William F. Baxter, Separationof Powers, ProsecutorialDiscretion,and the "Common
Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1982) (Congress adopted "a common-
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a market, thus relieving some of the downward pressure that competition
placed on the complaining firm's prices. Consumers appear to suffer because
the lower prices are no longer available. The complaining firm has triumphed over its rival not by convincing consumers its own products or serv5
ices are superior, but by coercing its supplier.
Despite the anticompetitive appearance of the upward coercion scenario, the federal courts that have addressed this issue in recent years have not
treated it as though it raised especially serious concerns to consumers or to
the competitive process. The Supreme Court held, in Business Electronics
Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. ,6an upward coercion case, that absent some
agreement on a specific price or price levels an agreement between a manufacturer and a dealer to terminate a competing price-cutting dealer will be
judged under the rule of reason. 7 In practice, courts ruling on upward coercion cases seldom have found sufficient evidence of the type of specific price
agreement that Sharp requires. 8 Once a court chooses to apply the rule of
reason, the terminated dealer must establish the scope of the market in which
it does business and prove that its termination harmed competition in that
market.9 In practice, the terminated dealer is very unlikely to win a rule of

law approach," delegating "much of its lawmaking power to the judicial branch."); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTrrRusT L.J. 135, 136-38
(1984) (arguing that courts correctly read Sherman Act as giving them authority to create common law of antitrust). Thus, the analysis in this article will focus almost exclusively on cases
interpreting the statute, rather than the statutory language itself.
5. There are also procompetitive interpretations of this scenario. For example, the supplier
could have terminated the price cutter because it determined, based on the full-price retailer's
threats, that the discounter was providing an insufficient level of services to support sales of its
product and to help it effectively compete with other similar products. Part VI will address ways
to resolve the ambiguous competitive effects of the upward coercion scenario.
6. 485 U.S. 717 (1988). I will refer to this case as Sharp after the defendant and also in
honor of the fine precision of the line-drawing that Justice Scalia utilizes in the case.
7. Id. at 735-36.
8. See The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148, 1160 n.10 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding no evidence that alleged agreement included some agreement on price or price levels); Toys
"R" Us, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 728 F. Supp. 230, 234-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same). Sharp itself
involved a dealer terminated after threats to the manufacturer by a competitor. Sharp, 485 U.S.
at 721.
9. See infra part II.A.
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reason case' ° and the difficulty of meeting these burdens may well discourage
terminated dealers from bringing suit at all."
In addition, several federal courts have characterized the manufacturer's
termination of the price-cutter in the upward coercion scenario as an "independent business decision" to favor one retailer over another. 12 Because
Section 1 of the Sherman Act only applies to concerted action, and not to
independent termination decisions, this determination virtually precludes any
antitrust scrutiny of the full-price dealer's threats. 13 To the extent one be10. Commentators have noted that plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail in vertical rule of reason
cases. E.g., Stuart Altschuler, Sylvania, Vertical Restraints,and Dual Distribution,25 ANTIrRUsT
BULL 1, 31 & n.86 (1980); William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75
CAL. L. REV. 933, 936, 948-49 (1987); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60 ArrruTsr L.J. 67, 67-68, 76 (1991); Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1487, 1489 (1983); Steiner, supra note 2, at 144; see also Allison, supra note 1, at 164 (suggesting that current tests treat vertical non-price restraints too leniently). In part, this is because
most courts require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant has market power in order to prevail in a rule of reason case. E.g., Kevin J. Arquit, Market Power in Vertical Cases, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 921, 924 (1992); John J. Flynn, The "Is" and "Ought" of Vertical Restraints After
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1095, 1145-46 (1986); William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 937
(1981); David L. White, Antitrust Enforcement: Enhancement Through a Sharpened Rule of Reason, 20 ARiz. ST. L.J. 749, 759 (1988). "Market power" is the ability to increase profits by
reducing output and charging a supra-competitive price. E.g., United States v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1, 20 (1984). Proving market power is likely to be difficult in a retail market where
there often are many participants and low entry barriers. See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v.
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 727 n.2 (1988) ("Retail market power is rare, because of the
usual presence of interbrand competition and other dealers, and it should therefore not be as1604 (1989)
sumed but rather must be proved."); 8 PMLLIP E. AREEDA, AN-rixusT LAW
("Dealer power might seem rare in view of the large numbers of wholesale and retail dealers and
the relatively easy entry into distribution .... "); Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 141-42 (retail
cartels unlikely because large number of small participants and low entry barriers).
11. See Dennis Doherty, Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.: Monsanto's Progeny and the CongressionalProposal To Codify the Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price
Fixing, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 963, 989 (1989) ("The complexity and expense of a rule of reason
); Thomas
case will deter terminated dealers from bringing actions against manufacturers ....
A. Piraino, Jr., Reconcilingthe Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S.
CAL. L. REV. 685, 702-03 (1991) (antitrust plaintiffs "will not want to risk the significant costs of
a rule of reason case on an uncertain outcome" and so "will bring fewer cases"); see also Richard
A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: PerSe Legality, 48
U. Cm. L. REV. 6, 15 (1981) (plaintiffs will bring fewer cases under rule of reason).
12. E.g., The Jeanery, Inc., 849 F.2d at 1159; Garment Dist., Inc. v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc.,
799 F.2d 905, 908-11 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); see also Kyle M.H. Jones,
Note, Dealer Termination, Resale Price Maintenance,and the Evidentiary Standardfor Sherman
Act Conspiracy: When Is Enough Enough?, 66 U. DET. L. REV. 713, 729 & n.118 (1989) (noting
cases finding no evidence of conspiracy in upward coercion scenario and characterizing them as
"dangerous").
13. It still would be possible to allege that the full-price retailer was violating § 2 of the
Sherman Act by monopolizing or attempting to monopolize a particular retail market. See 15
U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1994). However, to sustain such a claim, a plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the full-price retailer had significant market power. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuil-

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

lieves that the upward coercion scenario sometimes may lead to real competitive harms, this seems a peculiar result.
The cases in the past decade that analyze the upward coercion scenario
and other vertical arrangements (those involving supplier-dealer relations)
have relied on two important Supreme Court decisions: Continental TV.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,14 ("Sylvania") and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Service Corp. ("Monsanto").1 5 The thesis of this article is that the "progeny"
of these two cases have gone astray in ways that leave the law too lenient
toward arrangements that potentially harm competition. 16 This article suggests some doctrinal changes and refinements that should increase the scrutiny of supplier-dealer relations, while still allowing room for suppliers to
arrange their distribution chains in an efficient manner.
This article begins with some general background for those readers unfamiliar with the extensive antitrust literature. Part II first places Sylvania and
Monsanto in context by laying out the fundamental doctrinal dichotomies
that govern antitrust law and then discusses the intellectual and judicial trend
toward less restrictive antitrust policies.
Part III examines the existing case law to try to divine the purpose of the
concerted action requirement in the context of vertical arrangements. It concludes that although the cases do not provide clear guidance, it is possible to
glean from the cases an understanding that the purpose of the requirement,
in vertical restraints cases, is to protect a supplier's right to organize its distribution chain efficiently. Essentially, the concerted action requirement establishes a minimum threshold of evidence that an antitrust plaintiff needs to
offer before the courts will allow a jury to decide between its account of illegal conduct and the supplier's account of legitimate termination. Part IV
examines the post-Monsanto concerted action cases in light of this purpose
and the Supreme Court's precedents, and concludes that the lower federal
courts need to be reined in or they will virtually eliminate antitrust liability
for vertical restraints.
Although the problematic decisions discussed in Part IV may stem from
the lower courts' broad reading of the Supreme Court's concerted action
precedents, they may also arise out of a concern that the continued per se
lan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 892 (1993); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2072, 2090 (1992); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 5.2
(1985). Given the large number of participants in, and ease of entry into, most retail markets,
such a showing will often be difficult.
14. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
15. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
16. For the purposes of this article, I generally accept the view of those commentators who
believe that enhancement of consumer welfare, as defined by economists, is the only important
goal of antitrust. E.g., ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
7 (1983); ROBERT H. BORK, Thm ANTITRUST PARADoX: A POLICY AT WAR wrrH ITSELF 69 (2d ed. 1993); Baxter, supra note 4, at 693-94; EasterVERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL

brook, supra note 4, at 138. However, I believe that commentators who are also concerned
about such goals as protecting the independence of small business and preventing the concentration of economic power will be favorably inclined toward a number of my substantive proposals.

1995]

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

illegality of vertical price-fixing is inappropriate. 17 This concern may stem
from the Supreme Court itself. As a number of commentators have noted,
the broad language in Sylvania, describing the beneficial 18uses of vertical nonprice restraints, arguably applies to price-fixing as well.
In order to examine whether the lower courts are justified in expanding
the concerted action requirement to protect vertical price-fixing, the article
then turns to the question of the proper standard of liability for that conduct. 19 Part V lays out the weaknesses in using either the rule of reason or
the per se rule to evaluate the legality of vertical price-fixing. It first examines the precedents softening the dichotomy between the per se rule and the
rule of reason and explains that existing law does not mandate adherence to
either standard. 20 It then demonstrates the complexity of the retail markets
that provide the context for most vertical restraints and shows that this complexity makes the use of either the per se rule or the rule of reason
problematic.
Part VI searches for a new form of analysis to best accommodate the
empirical uncertainty about the costs and benefits of vertical minimum pricefixing, also known as resale price maintenance ("RPM"). It analyzes the
market power screen suggested by some commentators and finds it both expensive and uncertain. It then lays out a new standard for liability: Vertical
price-fixing will be illegal unless the supplier can show that it actually and
reasonably believed it had procompetitive reasons for fixing prices and/or for
terminating a price-cutting distributor. It then argues that Sharp draws the
line between price and non-price restraints incorrectly, and that all agreements to terminate price-cutters because of their discounting should be
treated under the new standard.
The "wayward children" of Sylvania and Monsanto-Sharp and the
cases described in Part IV-may result in part from legitimate fears that
overbroad antitrust standards encourage wasteful and frivolous lawsuits and
over-deter efficient business behavior. Courts certainly need to consider the
efficiency-enhancing aspects of the business arrangements they scrutinize and
17. Thus, they would find no concerted action in vertical price-fixing cases to prevent the
almost certain liability that would follow if the cases were to proceed.
18. E.g., 8 AREEDA, supra note 10, i 1600; Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 68; Richard A.
Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approack Reflections on the Sylvania Decision,
45 U. Cmi. L. REv. 1, 7 (1981); see also Mark E. Roszkowski, The Sad Legacy of GTE Sylvania
and Its "Rule of Reason": The Dealer Termination Cases and the Demise of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 22 CoNN. L. REv. 129, 134 (1989) (Sylvania leads to "toothless" dealer termination law).
19. The discussions of price-fixing in this Article are intended to address only minimum
price-fixing. Most commentators view vertical maximum price-fixing as having largely procompetitive effects. E.g., 8 AREEDA, supra note 10, 1600; BLAr & KASERMAN, supra note 16, at
156-57; HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, § 9.4. However, the Supreme Court continues to view these
arrangements as per se illegal. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884,
1890 (1990). While the analysis presented here certainly suggests that per se treatment is inappropriate, the proper contours of the legal treatment of vertical maximum price-fixing are beyond the scope of this article.
20. See infra part II.A for a description of this dichotomy.

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

should avoid spending scarce judicial resources on counter-productive litigation. However, to justify their decisions, the courts appear to rely heavily on
possible procompetitive effects that may not exist in particular cases. 2 1 Overreliance on possible benefits surely can under-deter in the same way that
overemphasis on possible harms can over-deter.
Obviously, sorting out the competitive impact of particular practices is
difficult. However, the difficulty of determining the precise effects of an arrangement should not be used as an excuse to give up attempting to develop
more thoughtful and sophisticated approaches to sorting out the helpful from
the harmful. Courts interpreting the Sherman Act's broad grant of authority
should be responsible for developing mechanisms that focus inquiry on the
realities of market conditions in particular cases, without requiring complex
analysis well beyond the competence that reasonably can be expected of
judges and jurors. This article proposes doctrinal refinements which are intended to serve this purpose.
Vertical restraints are likely to continue to be the focus of extended discussion. The Justice Department recently abandoned its 1985 guidelines that
determine when it will bring actions challenging vertical restraints.2 2 These
guidelines, developed during the Reagan administration, were quite skeptical
of the possibility that vertical restraints cause competitive harm.2 3 Indeed,
the Justice Department brought no legal challenges whatsoever to vertical
restraints under the guidelines during the Reagan and Bush
24
administrations.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court, in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. ("Kodak"),25 addressed Kodak's practice of requiring purchasers of its equipment to use Kodak personnel to service the equipment.
The Court allowed the case to go to the jury despite the defendant's argument, adopted by the dissent, that no possible harm to competition could
arise from the practice. 2 6 The Court, instead,
relied on what it perceived to
27
be actual evidence of competitive harm.
Kodak has already spawned much discussion about the proper role of
economic theory in antitrust law, particularly regarding suppliers' attempts to
21. See infra part V.C.2.c.
22. See Peter Passell, The Justice Department Is Trying To Spread the Antitrust Blanket,
N.Y. Timas, Aug. 19, 1993, at D2 (discussing Justice Department's renewed efforts to enforce

antitrust laws in vertical restraint cases).
23. See, e.g., Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Vertical Restraints and the "Efficiency" Influence-Does
Any Room Remain for More Traditional Antitrust Values and More Innovative Antitrust Policies?, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 483, 500-01 (1987) (describing attitude toward vertical restraints embodied in Guidelines); William S. Comanor, Vertical Arrangementsand Antitrust Analysis, 62 N.Y.U.

L. REv. 1153, 1162-63 (1987) (same).
24. 64 ANTrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 286 (1993); Passell, supra note 22, at D2.
25. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).

26. Id, at 2081-82, 2094-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Several commentators have since agreed.
E.g., BoRK, supra note 16, at 436-38; Is Antitrust Law Coming Alive?, CAL. LAW., Dec. 1992, at
33, 34.
27. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2083, 2085, 2088 n.26, 2089 n.29.
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control the distribution of their products. 28 Attempts by the Justice Department to prosecute more vertical restraints cases should create similar controversy. This article hopes to contribute to the discussion by focusing on
approaches that address both the range of potential competitive effects of
vertical restraints and the ability of players within the legal system to evaluate those effects.
II.

SYLVANIA AND MONSANTO:

SOME BACKGROUND

To better analyze the issues involved in vertical restraints doctrine, it is
helpful to examine the context in which the courts decided Sylvania, Monsanto, and their progeny. This section discusses first, the doctrinal structure
of the law of vertical restraints and, second, the trend toward more lenient
antitrust scrutiny of business.
A. The Dichotomies of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
The judicial elaboration of Section 1 of the Sherman Act largely consists
of a series of doctrinal dichotomies. 29 The most important of these dichotomies is that between the per se rule and the rule of reason, the two modes of
analysis courts most commonly use when applying Section 1. Literally, the
statute forbids every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade. 30 However, early in the history of the statute, the Supreme Court rejected a literal reading and determined that the act prohibited only unreasonable restraints of trade.3 1 The rule of reason and per se analysis "are but two
methods of determining whether a restraint is 'unreasonable,' i.e., whether its
32
anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive effects."
Under a per se analysis, the plaintiff merely has to prove that the conduct in question occurred. 33 The court will then conclusively presume that
the conduct is anticompetitive. The defendant is allowed no defenses based
34
on procompetitive effects of its conduct or on its lack of market power.
28. E.g., sources cited supra note 26; Stephen Calkins, Supreme Court 1991-1992: The Revenge of the Amici, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 269, 297-310 (1993); Laurence T. Festa, III, Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.: The Decline and Fall of the Chicago Empire?, 68
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 619, 619 (1993); Joseph Kattan, Economic Theory as a Substitute for
Evidence in Antitrust. The Difficulty of Erecting Rules of Law on Theory After Kodak, 23 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. (No. 3), at 13, 14 (1992); Thomas E. Kauper, Antitrust in 1992: The Year

of the Storyteller, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 347, 353-60 (1993). One author referred to the case as "a
bitter setback for friends" of the Chicago School. Calkins, supra, at 306.
29. See supra note 4 for the text of the relevant portion of the statute.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1994).
31. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988).
32. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S.Ct. 1884, 1893 (1990).

33. See BORK, supra note 16, at 18 ("Behavior is illegal per se when the plaintiff need only
prove that it occurred in order to win his case, there being no other elements to the offense and
no allowable defense.").
34. Id.; see Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982) (procom-

petitive justifications not relevant in per se case). Thomas G. Krattenmaker has argued persuasively that "per se" is a misnomer today. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Per Se Violations in
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The Supreme Court states that it applies the per se rule when it feels that its
experience with a particular restraint enables
it "to predict with confidence
35
that the rule of reason will condemn it."
The contours of rule of reason analysis are less clear. 36 The purpose of
the analysis is to determine whether a particular business arrangement, on
balance, helps or harms competition. 37 "Typical antitrust instructions in effect tell the jury to balance the pro- and anticompetitive tendencies of the
restraint before it. ''38 Thus, in theory, any evidence relevant to competitive
conditions should be admissible and must be weighed
by the jury. 39 Obvi40
ously, balancing these tendencies is very difficult.
Antitrust Law: Confusing Offenses with Defenses, 77 GEo. L.J. 165, 170-79 (1988). Particularly
in light of the softening of the per se rule, see infra part V.A, he argues that the "rule" really is a
conclusion reached after some analysis that certain defenses should be forbidden. Id. at 170-77.
He argues therefore that the misleading term "per se" should be avoided. Id. at 177-79.
Although this is a helpful way to view the per se rule, this article will employ the traditional
terminology because the Supreme Court continues to use it.
35. Atlantic Richfield Co., 110 S. Ct. at 1893.
36. See BoRK, supra note 16, at 25 (arguing that nobody has worked out "a completely
consistent and fully articulated" rule of reason).
37. Justice Brandeis, in Chicago Board of Trade, provided an elaboration that "is often
quoted as the quintessential expression of the rule of reason." BORK, supra note 16, at 43.
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test,
as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not
because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse;
but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). As is clear from its language, this
"test" provides a list of relevant factors without much guidance as to how a decision-maker
should take them into account. See BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 16, at 191 (test is unhelpful;
judiciary has "failed to provide a truly manageable rule-of-reason standard" that would allow
prediction of court decisions); St. John Barrett, Restrictive Distribution and the Assault of the
"Free Riders," 7 J. CoR. L. 467,468 n.9 (1982) ("The practical application of this rule is still very
uncertain."); Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 12 ("These formulations are empty.").
38. Phillip Areeda, The Rule of Reason-A Catechism on Competition, 55 ArTrrRusT L.J.
571, 582 (1986).
39. See Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (weighing of all
factors necessary in deciding whether restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing unreasonable restraint on competition); see also Altschuler, supra note 10, at 34-35 (early history
of courts interpreting Sylvania suggested that they pursued "the kind of open-ended inquiry that
takes all possible factors into account").
40. See, e.g., BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 16, at 192 (determining net effect of restraint
would make trials "extremely complex"); Areeda, supra note 38, at 582 (no basis is given to jury
for balancing pro- and anticompetitive tendencies of restraint); Arquit, supra note 10, at 921-24
(theorizing balancing methods for courts to use); William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing,Ver-
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In practice, courts have employed simplifying devices that tend to obviate the need for anyone to do the complex balancing.4 1 Most importantly, in
a rule of reason case, courts generally require that the plaintiff show that the
defendants have market power.4 2 This usually requires the plaintiff to define
the relevant market.4 3 Plaintiffs who fail to offer evidence of the relevant
market, or who fail to show that the defendant's market share is sufficient to
suggest market power, regularly lose summary judgment motions. 44
tical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HAv. L. REV. 983, 1001 (1985) (discussing difficulty of determining whether particular results increase or decrease efficiency);
Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 12 (discussing difficulty of applying rule of reason).
41. For example, courts that have found some procompetitive benefits of a particular restraint tend to find for the defendants without attempting a genuine balance. Areeda, supra
note 38, at 582. Courts also ignore effects on intrabrand competition, assuming that if a restraint
is shown to have positive effects on interbrand competition, consumers must benefit. Arquit,
supra note 10, at 923. Another simplifying device is "naked restraint" analysis. See infra text
accompanying notes 366-67. Commentators have suggested other possible simplified forms of
the rule of reason. See Altschuler, supra note 10, at 30 & n.85 (citing examples).
42. See supra note 10. For cases requiring a threshold showing of market power under the
rule of reason, see, e.g., TV Communications Network v. Turner Network Television, 964 F.2d
1022, 1027-28 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 601 (1992); Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,
952 F.2d 715, 727-28 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3034 (1992); Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352, 359-60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982 (1990); James M. King &
Assocs. v. G.D. Van Wagenen Co., 717 F. Supp. 667, 675 (D. Minn. 1989); Winter Hill Frozen
Foods & Servs., Inc. v. Haagen-Dazs Co., 691 F. Supp. 539, 547 (D. Mass. 1988); Machine Maintenance & Equip. Co. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1112, 1119 (E.D. Mo. 1987). For a
discussion of the narrow range of cases where the Supreme Court apparently applies rule of
reason analysis yet does not require proof of market power, see infra text accompanying notes
366-67.
43. E.g., Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 531 (7th Cir. 1986); Videocipher v. Satellite Earth Stations SeSe, Inc., No. CV88-2815, 1992 WL 208037, at *15 (W.D. La. July 30, 1992);
HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, § 3.2; Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 938; Pitofsky, supra note
10, at 1489; Posner, supra note 11, at 16; Donald F. Turner, The Durability,Relevance, and Future
of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CAL. L. REV. 797, 801 (1987) (presence of market power "rests
on market definition").
Some courts will allow a rule of reason case to go forward without proof of market definition where the plaintiff can show actual harmful effects on competition. See FTC v. Indiana
Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (detailed market analysis not fatal to finding
violation of rule of reason); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984) ("As a
matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does not justify a naked restraint on price
or output."); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir.) (determining whether
practice is unreasonable on balance), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 617 (1991); Thurman Indus., Inc. v.
Pay 'N Pak Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1989) (avoiding need for elaborate market
analysis requires claimant to show actual detrimental effects on restraint). However, in vertical
cases, price increases by themselves are not enough to show harm to competition, since such
increases often accompany potentially procompetitive non-price restraints.
44. See, e.g., Northeastern Educ. Television v. Educational Television Ass'n, 758 F. Supp.
1560, 1568 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (insufficient market share); Manufacturer's Supply Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 688 F. Supp. 303, 307 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (insufficient market share);
Thurman Indus., Inc. v. Pay 'N Pak Stores, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 985, 990 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (insufficiency of evidence of relevant product market); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 998,
1022 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (insufficient evidence of relevant market), aff'd, 929 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 617 (1991).
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Compared to the per se rule, the rule of reason significantly increases
the burdens on the plaintiff and allows more room for the defendant to introduce exculpatory evidence. Thus, the decision between these two modes of
analysis is often the most important step in antitrust litigation. Not surprisingly, the courts have developed a series of categories to aid them in making
this decision, and the stark dichotomy between the45two modes of analysis has
in turn spawned a number of other dichotomies.
The first of these is the dichotomy between horizontal and vertical restraints. The Supreme Court makes the following distinction: "Restraints
imposed by agreement between competitors have traditionally been denominated as horizontal restraints, and those imposed by agreement between
firms at different levels of distribution as vertical restraints."'46 This distinction can be a bit tricky in practice, particularly since agreements between
firms at different levels often have anticompetitive effects in the horizontal
market of one of the participants. 47 For our purposes, however, we can employ the Supreme Court's somewhat arbitrary bright-line rule: A restraint is
vertical where no agreement between firms on the same level of distribution
is part of the arrangement.48
This article focuses on the proper legal treatment of vertical restraints.
The typical vertical restraint case is brought by a dealer claiming that its dealto an illegal conspiracy between its supplier
ership was terminated pursuant
49
and competing dealers.
45. See Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929, 942-44 (1988) (discussing how legal dichotomies often lead to
more dichotomies).
46. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988).
47. See Altschuler, supra note 10, at 1 (line between vertical and horizontal restraints is
"elusive"); Betty Bock, An Economist Appraises Vertical Restraints, 30 ANTrrRusT BuLL. 117,
121 (1985) (distinction between horizontal and vertical restraints "neither so plain nor so significant as current legal decisions and writings suggest"); see also Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA
dissenting) (noting difficulty distinguishPetroleum Co., 110 S.Ct. 1884, 1900 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
ing vertical and horizontal restraints); Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet
Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 590-94 (8th Cir. 1987) (discussing whether dealer-coerced restraints
should be treated as horizontal or vertical), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988).
48. See Sharp, 485 U.S. at 730, 734; see also id. at 742 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting arbitrary effects of applying this rule).
49. See PHILLIP K. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1024 (Supp. 1992)
(suits frequently involve dealer's claim that dealer was terminated by manufacturer because of
price cutting); Allison, supra note 1, at 143 (most vertical cases are brought "by terminated
dealers or distributors claiming that their termination resulted from their non-compliance with
illegal vertical restraints"); Rudolph J.Peritz, A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 511, 511 (1989) ("recurring plot" in vertical cases is claim by terminated dealer
"that its manufacturer is in league with rival dealers... who want to restrain competition in the
product"). As noted, the Department of Justice brought no vertical cases at all during the Reagan and Bush administrations. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
A number of other recent cases have involved alleged conspiracies between hospitals and
groups of doctors aimed at eliminating competition from other doctors in the same field or from
non-M.D. medical specialists. See, e.g., Boczar v. Manatee Hosps. & Health Sys., Inc., 993 F.2d
1514 (11th Cir. 1993) (obstetrics and gynecology physician) ; Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth.,
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Analyzing vertical restraints involves two further dichotomies. The first
of these is the distinction between price and non-price restraints. This distinction is important because, since Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co.50 in 1911, vertical price restraints are per se illegal. 5 1 By contrast,
since Sylvania, vertical non-price restraints are analyzed under the rule of
reason. Sylvania was a landmark decision because it reached this conclusion
using an efficiency analysis. 52 Parts V and VI will examine the appropriateness of the continuing application of the per se rule to vertical price-fixing.
Price and non-price restraints can be difficult to distinguish because
agreements that do not explicitly involve setting prices often affect prices and
may be intended to do so. 53 Thus, plaintiffs' attorneys will claim that a particular restraint should be treated as a price restraint if it was intended to
affect prices. 54 In Sharp, the Supreme Court fixed the line between the two
types of restraints: A vertical arrangement, even if it incorporates an explicit
agreement to terminate a price-cutter, is not a "price" restraint unless it includes an agreement as to a specific price or price level. 55 Part VI.D argues
that there is no good economic justification for this line.
921 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1991) (radiology technicians); Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891
F.2d 810 (11th Cir.) (medical staff physician), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 924 (1990); Anesthesia Advantage, Inc. v. Metz Group, 759 F. Supp. 638 (D. Colo. 1991) (certified registered nurse anesthetists); Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Ctr., 709 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (certified
nurse-midwife). These cases arise in the same manner as dealer termination cases: Some doctors complain to the hospital (supplier) about practices of a competing medical professional.
The hospital terminates or refuses privileges to the competitor, who then sues. The concerted
action issues in these cases are similar to those in dealer termination cases as well: Did the
hospital have an independent reason for terminating the competitor? Did the doctors conspire
with the hospital? Because of these similarities, I will include these cases in my analyses of
concerted action issues. However, the economics of the medical industry is complex and beyond
the scope of this article. Thus, I will not consider the hospital cases in my discussion of the
appropriate analysis of the reasonableness of the alleged restraints of trade.
50. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
51. While Dr. Miles itself does not use the "per se" terminology, it has since been read to
hold that vertical price-fixing is per se illegal. See, e.g., Diane Wood Hutchinson, Antitrust 1984:
Five Decisions in Search of a Theory, 1984 Sup. Cr. REv. 69, 112-13 (argument between manufacturer and its dealer on sale price condemned as vertical price-fixing); Posner, supra note 18, at
1 (resale price maintenance held per se illegal under § 1 of Sherman Act); David F. Shores,
Vertical Price-Fixingand the Contract Conundrum: Beyond Monsanto, 54 FoRDHAM L. REV.
377, 377 (1985) (same).
52. E.g., Cann, supra note 23, at 494; Peter M. Gerhart, The "Competitive Advantages"
Explanationfor IntrabrandRestraints: An Antitrust Analysis, 1981 DuKE L.J. 417, 419; Wesley J.
Liebeler, Intrabrand 'Cartels' Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1982); M. Laurence Popofsky, Sylvania-Fifteen Years After from the Perspective of a (Sometimes) True Believer, 60 ANTITrusT L.J. 27, 31-32 (1991); Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Vertical Restraints
Law: Has Economics Mattered?, 83 AM. ECON. Ass'N PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 168, 168 (1993).
53. See TIler A. Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the Section
One Labyrinth: Is Sylvania a Way Out?, 67 VA. L. REV. 1457, 1467 (1981) (justifications in
Sylvania assume indirect effect on price); Bock, supra note 47, at 123 (price and non-price terms
for transactions are interrelated); see also Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 14 ("Every restricted
dealing arrangement is designed to influence price.").
54. Baker, supra note 53, at 1467.
55. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1988).
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The final relevant dichotomy is between concerted and independent action. The courts consistently have concluded that the language of Section 1
does not reach independent business behavior but rather requires proof of
concerted action by two or more separate entities. 56 In the context of vertical restraints, the significance of the concerted action requirement has been
primarily laid out in two cases: United States v. Colgate Co. 5 7 and Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.58 Colgate, decided in the early days of antitrust interpretation, held that a manufacturer did not violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act if it announced a policy of doing business only with those who
resold its product at a certain price, and subsequently refused to do business
with those who failed to comply with the policy. 59 The Court distinguished
cases in which the supplier used contractual provisions to force sellers to use
60
their suggested prices.

Monsanto, decided in 1984, reaffirmed Colgate6 ' and examined the type
of evidence of concerted action a plaintiff needs in a vertical price-fixing
case. 62 The Court held that evidence that a supplier terminated a dealer,
following complaints from other dealers about the terminated dealer's low
prices, was not sufficient, standing alone, to allow the terminated dealer to
bring a price-fixing case to a jury.6 3 Courts that have found insufficient evidence of concerted action in the context of the upward coercion scenario
have relied on Colgate and Monsanto.64 To better understand Monsanto and
Sylvania, and why they have led to the courts' recent lenient treatment of
upward coercion, it is helpful to turn to a brief overview of some intellectual
trends in antitrust law.
B. The Chicago School and the Supreme Court's Recent Antitrust Decisions
From the end of World War II to the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court's
antitrust jurisprudence was decidedly anti-big business. The Court used the
per se rule broadly in a wide range of cases and was notably hostile to all

56. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tbbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). See infra part
III.B for a discussion of Colgate and its progency.
57. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
58. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
59. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307.
60. Id. at 307-08.
61. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761.
62. Id. at 762-65.
63. Id. at 764.
64. See, e.g., The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148, 1153-55 (9th Cir. 1988)
(explaining distinctions emerging from earlier cases); Garment Dist. v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc.,
799 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir. 1986) (detailing Court's analysis in Monsanto), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1005 (1988).
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forms of merger. 65 By the late 1960s, almost all vertical restraints were
illegal. 66
The cases of this period were widely criticized, particularly by the Chicago School of Law and Economics. 67 These critics complained that the
Court had improperly focused on certain goals, such as the preservation of
small businesses, which were not appropriate concerns of antitrust law.68 Instead, they argued, the Court needed to focus exclusively on "consumer
welfare. "69
Robert Bork, one of the more important Chicago School critics, began
his book, The Antitrust Paradox, with an introduction entitled "The Crisis in
65. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606-12 (1972) (invalidating
horizontal territorial division by group of small grocery chains regarding jointly marketed products); Fortner Enters., Inc., v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501-06 (1969) (invalidating
merger between shoe manufactures that left them with 2.3% of retail shoe outlets in U.S.);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 345-46 (1962) (merger tended to question validity of "tying" financing of prefabricated homes to sale of homes although amount of commerce
involved was less than $190,000); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207,209-14
(1959) (alleged concerted refusal to deal with small appliance dealer would be per se illegal even
though hundreds of other dealers in city).
66. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968) (vertical maximum price-fixing
per se illegal); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967) (territorial and
customer restrainst on resold goods per se illegal); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 17
(1964) (vertical price-fixing in some consignment arrangements per se illegal).
67. Individuals commonly identified with the Chicago School include William Baxter, Robert Bork, Ward Bowman, Frank Easterbrook, and Richard Posner. Eleanor Fox, Consumer Beware Chicago, 84 MicH. L. REV. 1714, 1714 n.* (1986); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Economics and
More Humane Disciplines: What Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV.
1214, 1214 n.1 (1977). While the beliefs of the Chicago School authors are not uniform, one of
their major premises is that markets have the ability to regulate themselves in most circumstances, so government intervention tends to be unnecessary. See Eleanor Fox & Lawrence A.
Sullivan, Antitrust Retrospective and Perspective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We
Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 936, 957 (1987) (discussing Chicago school of thought); see also
William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization,Antitrust
Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1229-52 (1989) (describing Chicago
School models and theories).
68. E.g., BORK, supra note 16, at 7; Terry Calvani, What Is the Objective of Antitrust?, in
ECONOMIC ANALY IS ANDiANrrrRusT LAw 7 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds., 2d ed. 1988).
69. See, eg., BoRK, supra note 16, at 81-89 (advancing arguments supporting this position);
Cann, supra note 23, at 487-88 (for Chicago School, "basic goal of antitrust law is to maximize
'consumer welfare' "). Chicago adherents usually define "consumer welfare" in terms of maximizing the total wealth available to society, which is determined by adding consumer and producer surplus. Cann, supra note 23, at 488; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Chicago and Its
Alternatives, 1986 DuKE L.J. 1014, 1018 ("[Tlhe maximization of... the sum of consumers'
surplus and producers' surplus is conventionally stated as the Goal of Chicago School antitrust
policy."). As one commentator has pointed out, the term "consumer welfare" is somewhat misleading since it focuses on the total wealth available to society and not to consumers in particular. Harry S. Gerla, Discountersand the Antitrust Laws: Faces Sometimes Should Make Cases,
12 CORP.L.J. 1, 3 n.10 (1986). Chicago adherents generally examine increases or reductions in
output to determine whether consumer welfare has been improved. See Fox & Sullivan, supra
note 67, at 957 (listing beliefs of Chicago School world view); Wesley J. Liebeler, What Are the
Alternatives to Chicago?, 1987 DuKE L.J. 879, 880 (antitrust violation exists if challenged conduct created or increased ability to restrict output).
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Antitrust. ' 70 In Bork's view, the "crisis" resulted from the "paradox" of his
title: Antitrust law in the late 1970s punished a large number of business
arrangements which promoted efficiency and, therefore, harmed the consumers it was designed to protect. 71 He argued for major changes in antitrust
jurisprudence to insure that the courts did not punish or deter efficiencyenhancing business arrangements. 72
Another critic, Frank Easterbrook, has argued that it is extremely difficult to determine whether a practice is beneficial to the competitive process. 7 3 He believes the harms from deterring beneficial conduct are likely to

be substantially greater than those from allowing some anticompetitive practices to continue. 74 Thus, Easterbrook argues that the courts should intervene only in a narrow set of cases when they are fairly certain that
75
anticompetitive harm will result from the challenged activity.
Bork, Easterbrook, and other Chicago School critics have been very influential. 76 Since the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court's decisions in antitrust
cases have moved significantly in the directions they have suggested. 77 The
Court has softened the per se rule in several areas78 and has attempted to
apply economic theory and careful market analysis in a number of opinions. 79 Undoubtedly, the Court also has been influenced by the more probusiness political climate, post-Watergate distrust of government, and the ju70. BORK, supra note 16, at 3. See William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox RevisitedRobert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REv. 1413 (1990)
(examining effect of Bork's work on subsequent antitrust thinking).
71. BoRKe, supra note 16, at 4, 7.
72. Id.
73. Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 3.
74. Id. at 2-3. This is because supracompetitive prices attract entry and invite their own
demise.
75. Id at 39-40. Easterbrook also laid out this set of arguments in Frank Easterbrook,
Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law, 75 CAL L. REV.983 (1987).
76. See Page, supra note 67, at 1238, 1256-94 (discussing influence of Chicago School thinking on antitrust law and concluding that antitrust decisions and literature have "substantial[ly]
accept[ed] ... the Chicago models as.identifying the relevant effects of antitrust practices").
77. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 293-98 (1985) (not all boycotts per se illegal; courts should consider efficiency arguments in assessing legality of particular boycott); Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 1318 (1984) (not all tying arrangements per se illegal; per se status warranted only when seller has
market power in tying product market or forcing otherwise likely).
78. See infra part V.A.
79. See Atlantic Richfield, Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 339-40 (1990) (analyzing market impact to determine competitor has no standing to challenge vertical maximum
price-fixing restraint); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-93
(1986) (using economic analysis to assess plausibility of predatory pricing claim); United States
v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 497-504 (1974) (analyzing market structure to rebut
presumption of illegality of merger). In addition, the Court explicitly limited the scope of an
inquiry under § 1 to the effects of a restraint on "competitive conditions." National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 698 (1978). This may be read as a rejection of
non-efficiency goals. See also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (citing BORK,
supra note 16, at 66, for proposition that Congress intended Sherman Act as "consumer welfare
prescription"). But see Page, supra note 67, at 1254 (finding these pronouncements "too ambig-
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dicial appointments of recent conservative presidents. However, its citations
to Bork and others 80 suggest that the Chicago School has at least helped
channel the Court's conservative and pro-business tendencies into a particular rhetorical form. The change in the Court's direction had been so striking
that by the late 1980s one commentator could write that Chicago School
thinking had "become the dominant tool for... antitrust analysis." 8 1 Bork
himself would write early in 1993 that "antitrust has moved a long way in the
direction" that he and others had urged. 82
For our purposes, the most important manifestations of this trend were
the Sylvania and Monsanto decisions, both of which discuss the efficiencyenhancing aspects of vertical restraints and use these insights to limit potential liability for vertical restraints.83 Since the Court decided these cases, the
lower federal courts have become increasingly reluctant to impose on suppliers any liability for vertical arrangements. 84 These courts seem to read Sylvania and Monsanto to mean that vertical restraints require little antitrust
scrutiny because of their efficiency-enhancing potential. The remainder of
this article argues that these courts have read the two cases too broadly and,
as a result, they are failing to give sufficient scrutiny to business arrangements that may have harmful effects on consumer welfare.
III. THE

PURPOSE OF THE CONCERTED ACTION REQUIREMENT IN
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS CASES

The concerted action requirement in vertical restraints cases has proved
troublesome ever since the Supreme Court decided Colgate.8 5 Why should a
supplier's explicit contracts with its dealers setting resale prices be illegal,
while the same supplier's credible announcement that it will not do business
with price-cutting dealers be immune from antitrust scrutiny? The effects on
the market appear to be identical. s6
uous to justify the conclusion that the Court has adopted the Chicago conception of efficiency as
its sole standard in antitrust cases").
80. See Atlantic Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 339 n.13 (citing Robert Bork and Frank Easterbrook); Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726, 727 n.2 (1988) (citing
William Baxter and Richard Posner); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589, 592 n.16 (citing Bork and
Easterbrook); Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36. 48, 55, 56 (1977) (citing
Bork and Posner).
81. Harry S. Gerla, A Micro-Microeconomic Approach to Antitrust Law: Games Managers
Play, 86 MicH. L. REV. 892, 892 (1988).

82. BoRK, supra note 16, at ix.
83. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1984); Continental TV,
433 U.S. at 51-59.

84. See infra part IV.
85. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 53, at 1477 ("[T]he line between Dr. Miles and Colgate has
remained one of the enduring enigmas of antitrust law.").
86. See 7 AREEDA, supra note 4, 1 1441h (supplier can achieve same effects either way);
BLAiR & KASERMAN, supra note 16, at 160 (referring to line between Dr. Miles and Colgate as

"distinction without a difference"); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Case for Presuming the Legality
of Quality Motivated Restrictions on Distribution,63 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 11 (1988) (distinc-
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In the decade since the Supreme Court decided Monsanto, the lower
federal courts have decided hundreds of cases that have referred to the concerted action requirement, many of which include significant analysis of what
constitutes sufficient evidence of concerted action. 87 The courts of appeals
are in conflict over the application of Monsanto to several different types of
fact patterns, and they have not reached a consensus as to the meaning of the
case. 88 Interestingly, amidst all the confusion as to the meaning of the "concerted action" requirement, the courts have engaged in little discussion about
89
its purpose.
Part III seeks to uncover the purpose of the concerted action requirement in the context of vertical restraint cases. It first examines the rationale
for the requirement in the context of horizontal restraints and concludes that
this rationale does not apply well in the vertical context. It then surveys the
Supreme Court's discussions of the issue and concludes that the Court has
provided little guidance. Finally, it suggests a sensible reading of the requirement consistent with existing case law: To protect a supplier's right to order
its distribution chain in a procompetitive fashion, the concerted action requirement acts as an evidentiary barrier that requires antitrust plaintiffs to
have a certain quantum of evidence before taking their cases to a jury.
tion is "incongruous" and contrary to lay understanding of "agreement"); Steiner, supra note 2,
at 146 (line "often corresponds to no real-world difference").
87. See infra part IV.
88. As one commentator concluded, Monsanto is "controversial and confusing." Doherty,
supra note 11, at 981. See, e.g., Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 686
n.12 (4th Cir. 1992) (disagreeing with Ninth Circuit as to the application of Monsanto to tying
cases); Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, 878 F.2d 801,
806 n.4 (4th Cir. 1989) (disagreeing with Eighth and Eleventh Circuit position on evidentiary
value of supplier's assurances to dealers about taking care of problems with competing dealer).
In addition, the courts of appeals have developed different "tests" to determine whether plaintiff
has met the Monsanto and Matsushita standards. Compare Gibson v. Greater Park City Co., 818
F.2d 722, 723-24 (10th Cir. 1987) (creating two-part test) with Helicopter Support Sys. v. Hughes
Helicopter, Inc., 818 F.2d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir. 1987) (creating different two-part test).
The Ninth Circuit decisions that vertical price-fixing is subject to the rule of reason have
added to the confusion. See 49er Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 803 F.2d 1463, 146768 (9th Cir. 1986) (vertical price-fixing subject to rule of reason), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947
(1987); Taggart v. Rutledge, 657 F. Supp. 1420, 1440 (D. Mont. 1987) (same), aff'd without op.,
852 F.2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1988). These decisions are flatly at odds with clearly articulated Supreme
Court language. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1988)
(retaining per se rule for certain vertical price agreements). For more examples of peculiar readings of the Supreme Court's precedents and of inter-circuit conflicts, see infra part IV.
89. See 7 AREEDA, supra note 4, j 1445dl (Supreme Court never has developed or discussed theory of meaning of concerted action in vertical context); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Sharp
Dealing: The HorizontalVerticalDichotomy in Distributor Termination Cases, 38 EMORY L.J.
311, 322 (1989) ("courts have not developed logical economic rationale" for the distinction between independent and concerted action in vertical cases). The Ninth Circuit did discuss the
purpose for the requirement in one vertical restraints case, but relied entirely on the Supreme
Court's analysis of the requirement in a horizontal context. The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans,
Inc., 849 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984)).
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A. Concerted Action in Horizontal Cases
The Supreme Court has made clear its understanding of the purpose for
the concerted action requirement in the context of horizontal agreements:
Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk. It
deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands. In any conspiracy,
two or more entities that previously pursued their own interests separately are combining to act as one for the common benefit. This
not only reduces the diverse directions in which economic power is
aimed but suddenly increases the economic power moving in one
particular direction. Of course, such mergings of resources may
well lead to efficiencies that benefit consumers, but their anticompetitive potential is sufficient to warrant antitrust scrutiny even in the
absence of incipient monopoly. 90
In contrast, an aggressive competitor acting independently may appear to restrain trade by limiting its rivals' opportunities, yet in fact may be simply
competing vigorously. Thus, according to the Court, antitrust scrutiny of independent behavior is reserved for those entities that threaten monopolization. 9 ' Otherwise, the threat of antitrust liability might dampen "the
92
competitive zeal of a single aggressive entrepreneur."
Although this explanation makes sense with regard to horizontal restraints, its application to vertical restraints is unclear. Concerted activity between suppliers and dealers does not seem "inherently . . . fraught with
anticompetitive risk." Indeed, suppliers and dealers rarely can function as
purely independent economic entities. 93 Most businesses need some vertical
agreements in order to function, and society certainly has little interest in
requiring business entities to integrate their distribution networks completely. 94 Moreover, although well-designed restraints may augment the
market power of one or both of the participants, combinations between suppliers and dealers do not generally result in the aggregation of power in any
particular market. 95 By definition, vertical restraints involve entities operating in separate markets.
90. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768-69 (1984); see also 6
PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW I 1402a (1986) (giving similar rationales).

91. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767.
92. Id. at 768, 775.
93. See Bock, supra note 47, at 121-22 (discussing relationship between dealers and suppliers in vertical restraint cases).
94. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725 (1988) (calling encouragement of vertical integration through per se rules "perverse" and "hardly conducive to
fostering the creation and maintenance of small businesses"). The use of separate entities in the
distribution chain allows for efficiencies that occur with specialization and economies of scale.
For example, a thumbtack manufacturer should not need to obtain retailing know-how to engage
in its business. Nor would we expect to see it set up stores to retail only thumbtacks.
95. 7 AREEDA, supra note 4, 1437 (a "vertical restraint ordinarily does not increase any-

one's market power"); Jean Wegman Bums, Rethinking the "Agreement" Element in Vertical
Antitrust Restraints, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 11 (1990) (vertical arrangements do "not lead to an
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Most importantly, as the courts have recognized in the last two decades,
distribution arrangements and restrictions can create significant procompetitive effects, 96 including increasing efficiency through cooperation 97 and encouraging active promotion by dealers of the suppliers' products. 98 For our
purposes, the most significant procompetitive effect of vertical restraints is
the avoidance of free-rider problems: situations in which one firm takes a
"free ride" on the efforts of another. The most common example occurs in
the retailing of complex products. Suppose one computer dealer provides its
customers with information about the more complex features of its merchandise. It must pay to train its salespeople and, perhaps, to provide informational materials, so its prices reflect these costs. Another retailer advertises
the lower prices it can afford to charge because of the savings it reaps by not
providing information. Consumers may obtain information at the highpriced retailer, then purchase from the discounter. In the long-run, the highpriced retailer may not be able to continue selling the computers because it
loses sales to the discounter. Yet the supplier may want the high-priced retailer to provide information in order to convince shoppers to purchase its
computers, rather than others' or none at all. Thus the supplier may wish to
force the discounter to raise its prices, to provide information, or both. If, as
is quite possible, the total number of computers sold increases when dealers
provide information, the restraints the supplier employs to insure the dissemination of that information fall within the Chicago School's definition of
"efficiency."

99

increase in market power"); cf. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769 (making similar argument about
officers of single firm).
96. See generally BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 16, at 25-27 (discussing economic effects
of contractual vertical agreements).
97. See Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Co-

operation is the basis of productivity. It is necessary for people to cooperate in some respects
before they may compete in others, and cooperation facilitates efficient production.").
98. See, e.g., Isaksen v. Vermont Castings, Inc., 825 F.2d 1158, 1162 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner,
J.) (RPM "encourages dealers to provide necessary point-of-sale services"), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1005 (1988); Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAD. L.
REV. 1539, 1559 (1989) ("standard justification" for vertical price-fixing "is that dealers who are
unable to compete on the basis of price will increase their competitive efforts in areas such as

service or advertising"); BoRK, supra note 16, at 290 (vertical restraints "purchase increased
sales and service efforts by the reseller"); E. Raymond Corey, Fair Trade Pricing: A Reappraisal,
HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1952, at 51 (vertical price-fixing helps "enlist dealer support in
promoting ...product"); Gerhart, supra note 52, at 424; (one explanation for vertical restraints

is "that manufacturer restricts intraband competition to induce his dealers to undertake greater
nonprice competition); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the ClassicalTheory of Competition, 74 IowA L. REV. 1019, 1057-58 (1989) (vertical price-fixing sometimes used to force
retailers to engage in nonprice competition).
99. The seminal discussion of the free-rider problem is in Lester G. Tesler, Why Should
Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960). For other descriptions of free-riding,
see, e.g., Vermont Castings, 825 F.2d at 1161-62; Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec.
Contractors Ass'n., 814 F.2d 358, 369 (7th Cir. 1987); HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, § 9.2; Baxter,
supra note 4, at 697.
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Because of the possible procompetitive aspects of vertical restraints, the
rationale for the concerted action requirement in horizontal cases simply
does not apply. 100 We actively want to encourage some of these agreements
and certainly should not view them with uniform suspicion. Yet, without
some idea of the function of the concerted action requirement, determining
its proper scope in the vertical context will be difficult. However, as the following section demonstrates, prior to Monsanto, the Supreme Court never
articulated a clear purpose for the requirement. 0 1
B. Colgate and Its Progeny
The Supreme Court's first occasion to address the concerted action requirement in the context of a vertical restraint came in United States v. Colgate Co.102 Colgate, a manufacturer, announced that it would refuse to do
business with any dealer who did not utilize its MSRP. Subsequently, Colgate terminated a price-cutting dealer. The Court found no liability and distinguished Dr. Miles, its earlier vertical price-fixing case, because in that case
"the unlawful combination was effected through contracts which undertook
to prevent dealers from freely exercising the right to sell."'10 3 By contrast,
the Court found that Colgate's retailers had not agreed to sell at a particular
price and, in fact, could sell at any price they chose, although they were
aware they might "incur the displeasure of the manufacturer, who could re10 4
fuse to make further sales" to them.
The limited analysis in Colgate is not particularly compelling. The Court
never addressed the obvious claim that Colgate made resale price maintenance an implied term of its distribution contracts, a term retailers necessarily agreed to when they agreed to do business with Colgate, and that the
concerted action requirement was thus met. 10 5 The key passages in Colgate
100. See Bums, supra note 95, at 10-11 (unlike horizontal agreements, it is impossible to

assume "any [vertical] arrangement involving two independent firms is inherently suspect");
Glen 0. Robinson, Explaining Vertical Agreements: The Colgate Puzzle and Antitrust Method,
80 VA. L. REv. 577, 597 (1994) (agreements between competitors plainly anticompetitive; this is
"plainly not true of agreements between suppliers and dealers).
101. Professor Areeda argues that vertical conspiracies result in scrutiny because one economic entity surrenders decision-making to the other and because restraining the second entity
is necessary to carry out the restraint. 6 ARBEDA, supra note 90, i 1415b. However, these
reasons do not explain the distinction between Colgate and Dr. Miles; a Colgate-induced price

has the same qualities Areeda identifies as rationales for legal scrutiny of vertical conspiracy.
102. 250 U.S. 300 (1919). In Dr. Miles, the Supreme Court did not need to address the
concerted action requirement because the existence of a price-fixing agreement was undisputed:
A supplier was trying to enforce a contractual price-fixing term on a dealer. Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1911).

103. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307-08.
104. Id. at 306.
105. See generally Isaksen v. Vermont Castings, Inc., 825 F.2d 1158, 1164 (7th Cir. 1987)
(when dealer adopts suggested prices after Colgate-type announcement, realistically it has
agreed with supplier), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); 7 AREEDA, supra note 4, 1443b (verti-

cal agreement "might be deemed present" in Colgate scenario on ground that dealers implicitly
assent to price term); Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
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do not address the precise reasons either for a concerted action requirement
or for a ban on vertical price-fixing, and they certainly do not address their
intersection. The Court merely said:
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to prohibit monopolies,
contracts and combinations which probably would unduly interfere
with the free exercise of their rights by those engaged, or who wish
to engage, in trade and commerce - in a word to preserve the right
of freedom to trade. In the absence of any purpose to create or
maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized
right of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private
business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of course, he may announce
in
1 6
advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell. '
Although courts and commentators today generally view Colgate as requiring concerted, as opposed to independent, action,1 0 7 nothing in this passage strongly supports that position. The Court did not refer specifically to
the concerted action requirement as the basis for its decision.' 0 8 Tyler Baker
has suggested that the Court was emphasizing a supplier's "right" to choose
its customers, although that "right" has no clear source in the statute.' °9
Whatever the Court's initial rationale, Monsanto's reading of the concerted
action requirement as the source of the Colgate rule presently is dispositive." 0 In any event, Colgate provides little help in our search for the rationale for a concerted action requirement."'
On its face, the announce-and-terminate strategy that the Court approved in Colgate created a safe harbor for suppliers that wished to influence
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HAgv. L. REV. 655, 688-89 (1962) (suggesting
Colgate scenario be treated as tacit price-fixing agreement). By the time it decided Colgate, the
Court already had recognized that implied contracts could fall within the ambit of § 1. See
Baker, supra note 53, at 1474 (citing Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United
States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914)).
106. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307.
107. E.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775-76 (1984);
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984); Patrick J. Kaufmann, Dealer
Termination Agreements and Resale Price Maintenance: Implications of the Business Electronics
Case, 64 J. RETAILING 113, 117 (1988).
108. Baker, supra note 53, at 1473-74.

109. Id.; accord Shores, supra note 51, at 388 (Colgate rests on exercise of manufacturer's
freedom to trade). Baker notes that the lower court opinion affirmed in Colgate had used language that suggested that it was assuming the existence of an agreement and discussing the
legality of that agreement. Baker, supra note 53, at 1475.
110. In Monsanto, the Court reaffirmed Colgate and stressed that the holding of that case

was based on the need to protect independent action from antitrust scrutiny. Monsanto, 465
U.S. at 761.

111. Rudolph Peritz has argued thoughtfully and convincingly that the historical confusion
in vertical restraints doctrine, including the Colgate rule, is attributable to a tension between the
Court's simultaneous attempts to promote competition and to protect contract and property
rights of both suppliers and dealers. Peritz, supra note 49 passim. While his analysis explains
the continuing shifts in the doctrine and suggests further instability is likely, it does not provide a

framework to predict future results or suggest clarifying rules.
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their dealers' prices. Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court decided a
series of cases that, by defining implicit price-fixing agreements and pricemaintenance systems as concerted action, substantially narrowed the possible
reach of Colgate's safe harbor. 112 First, the Court indicated that the Dr.
Miles rule extended beyond express price-fixing agreements to those "implied from a course of dealing or other circumstances. 1" 3 However, it then
went on to clarify that no agreement would be implied under Colgate from
evidence that a manufacturer repeatedly pointed out its suggested prices to
14
dealers and many of the dealers adopted those prices."
In the decades following Colgate, the Court, without clearly explaining
its rationale, found concerted action in a sequence of cases, even in the absence of express price agreements. In FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.,115 the
Court found that a supplier had gone "far beyond" the Colgate safe harbor. 1 6 In addition to its policy of only selling to those who would follow its
suggested prices, the supplier reinstated terminated dealers if they made satisfactory assurances that they would adhere to suggested prices.1 17 The supplier also employed a complicated tracing and record-keeping system to
identify, track, and terminate distributors who cut prices or sold to price118
cutters.
In United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.," 9 the Court again
found that a supplier's extensive system to ensure resale prices constituted an
illegal conspiracy. The evidence demonstrated that the supplier sold only to
wholesalers who agreed to sell to retailers who had "licenses" to sell the
product. 120 It circulated price lists, which both wholesalers and retailers understood determined their prices. 12 1 Certificates were used to trace the
sources of lenses found in the hands of unlicensed retailers. 122 The Court
112. Interestingly, the supplier in Colgate engaged in monitoring behavior that later would
be held to go beyond the Colgate safe harbor. See William R. Andersen, The Antitrust Consequences of Manufacturer-SuggestedRetail Prices-The Case for Presumptive Illegality, 54 WASH.
L. REv. 763, 770 (1979) (allegations in Colgate would today be considered an "agreement").
113. Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208. 209-10 (1921); United States v.
A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99 (1920).
114. Frey, 256 U.S. at 210-11. The Court later called this holding into question. See United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 40 (1960) (active inducement of unwilling retailers to
abide by resale price policy constituted Sherman Act violation). However, it seems likely that it
remains a correct statement of the law after Monsanto. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763 ("[T]he
manufacturer's strongly felt concern about resale prices does not necessarily mean it has done
more than the Colgate doctrine allows.").
115. 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
116. Id. at 454.
117. Id. at 449.
118. Id. at 449-51. The Court stated that the facts showed "suppression of the freedom of
competition by methods in which the company secures the cooperation of its distributors and
customers, which are quite as effective as agreements express or implied intended to accomplish
the same purpose." Id. at 455.
119. 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
120. Id. at 714.
121. Id. at 715.
122. Id. at 714.
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gave a broad reading to the concerted action requirement: "Whether this
conspiracy and combination was achieved by agreement or by acquiescence
of the wholesalers coupled with their assistance in effectuating its purpose is
23
immaterial."1
In United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. ,124 the Court again invalidated a
manufacturer's system for trying to enforce its suggested prices. Here, the
evidence showed that a manufacturer had refused to sell to wholesalers or
retailers who would not abide by its suggested prices, and to wholesalers who
sold to non-compliant retailers.' 25 The wholesalers cooperated with the
manufacturer.' 26 There also was evidence of negotiations between the manufacturer and noncompliant retailers, which apparently resulted in understandings about prices and advertising and caused the manufacturer to renew
relations with retailers it previously had terminated. 27 The Court reviewed
the cases on vertical price-fixing combinations and concluded that together
they stood for the proposition that
an unlawful combination is not just such as arises from a price maintenance agreement, express or implied; such a combination is also
organized if the producer secures adherence to [its] suggested prices
by means which go beyond [its] mere declination to
28 sell to a customer who will not observe his announced policy.'
The Court then found that the manufacturer had created just such a combination by involving wholesalers in its efforts to induce retailers to adhere to
29
its prices.'
In subsequent cases, the Court read Parke, Davis to hold that a supplier
enters into an illegal price-fixing combination if it takes any steps beyond
merely announcing its policy favoring certain prices and refusing to deal with
those dealers who do not comply.' 30 In particular, the Court explained that
the case meant that an illegal combination existed in two specific situations.
First, an illegal combination would exist between a supplier and a dealer that
123. Id. at 723. The Court characterized the evidence in the case as showing more than
"mere acquiescence" to suggested prices, but rather the acceptance by the wholesalers "of a plan
of distribution by cooperating in prices, limitation of sales to and approval of retail licensees."
Id.
124. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
125. Id. at 33-34.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 35-36.
128. Id. at 43 (emphasis in original).
129. Id. at 45.

130. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Recent cases have disagreed as to
whether this remains the law despite the intervening Supreme Court cases. Compare Winter
Hill Frozen Foods & Servs., Inc. v. Haagen-Dazs Co., 691 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Mass. 1988)
(treating Parke, Davis holding as current state of law) with Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am.,

Inc., 618 F. Supp. 679, 689 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (rejecting formulation in text as "overly narrow reading of the case law" after Monsanto), aff'd in part and vacatedin parton other grounds, 788 F.2d
918 (3d Cir. 1986).
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unwillingly complied with the supplier's pricing policy. 13 1 Second, an illegal
combination would exist where a supplier "firmly enforced" a policy by
132
threatening termination and most of the dealers acquiesced to the threat.
In both of these situations, an illegal combination is formed when dealers
succumb to coercion from the supplier.
Parke, Davis and its immediate progeny were seen by some justices and
commentators as effectively eviscerating Colgate.133 Justice Harlan sarcasti-

cally restated the holding of Parke, Davis as: "[T]here is no 'combination'
when a manufacturer simply states a resale price and announces that [it] will
not deal with those who depart from it; there is a combination when the
manufacturer goes one inch further."' 34 The majority justified the narrow
gap between Parke, Davis and Colgate by focusing on the free will of the
affected dealers, rather than on the independence of the manufacturer's decision. The Court stated:
[A] seller's announcement that [it] will not deal with customers who
do not observe [its] policy may tend to engender confidence in each
customer that if he complies his competitors will also. But if a manufacturer is unwilling to rely on individual self-interest to bring
about general voluntary acquiescence which has the collateral effect
of limiting price competition.., the customers' acquiescence is not
then a matter of individual free choice prompted alone by the desirability of the product. The product then comes packaged in a competition-free wrapping-a valuable feature in itself-by
virtue of
135
the concerted action induced by the manufacturer.
The Court's emphasis, despite its protestations that agreements are unnecessary, seems to be on some sort of implied agreement, albeit one formed
under some duress, with "competition-free wrapping" as the consideration. 136 Yet the Court failed to explain why it drew the line it did between
this implied agreement and the agreements that might be implied in Colgate

131. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 142 (1968), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 476 U.S. 752 (1984);
Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 150 n.6.
132. Perma Life Mufflers, 392 U.S. at 142; Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 150 n.6.; see also United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372 (noting combination of these two situations),
overruled on other grounds by Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 49 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (majority overrules Colgate); BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 16, at 160 (Colgate narrowed "severely" by Parke, Davis and other cases); Andersen, supra note 112, at 773 ("many
feel" Colgate immunity "wholly eliminated" by subsequent cases); Victor P. Goldberg, The Law
and Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective,58 TEx. L. REV. 91, 105 (1979)
("virtually any active enforcement" of a Colgate policy "undermines the Colgate defense).
134. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 163 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
135. Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 46-47.
136. Tyler Baker argues that Parke, Davis supports the reading of Colgate laid out in the
text accompanying note 109. Baker, supra note 53, at 1479-83.
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situations. 137 As Justice Harlan suggested, the Court provided no real eco138
nomic justifications for its distinctions.
C. Concerted Action in the Modern Era of Antitrust: Monsanto and
Matsushita
Since the new era of antitrust began with Sylvania, the Court has decided two important cases addressing the standards for proving conspiracy in
Section 1 cases: Monsanto and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp.139 These cases have been viewed widely as quite radical shifts,
140
significantly redefining the concerted action requirement.
1. Monsanto
In Monsanto, a distributor complained that the defendant manufacturer
had terminated it pursuant to a vertical price-fixing conspiracy.' 4' The jury
agreed, and the manufacturer appealed, claiming the distributor had
presented insufficient evidence of concerted action. 142 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the verdict, holding that
evidence that the manufacturer terminated the plaintiff in response to price
143
complaints by competing distributors was sufficient to support the verdict.
This focus on the other distributors' complaints distinguished the case from
the Court's earlier vertical conspiracy cases, in which the primary evidence
consisted of actions taken by the supplier to insure that its distributors conformed to its suggested prices. The case required the Court to determine the
extent to which a competing distributor's complaints are evidence that the
supplier and the distributor agreed to fix prices.
In addressing this question, the Court stressed two of the dichotomies
this article laid out in Part II: the distinction between concerted and in137. See Baker, supra note 53, at 1478 (post-Colgate decisions "focused on the line and
largely ignored the rationale").

138. See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 162-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Court had not
attempted to analyze when concerted action should be implied from supplier dictating price to
dealer).
139. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
140. See, e.g., Cann, supra note 23, at 497 (noting that Monsanto Court established substantial burden of proof regarding vertical price-fixing conspiracies in dealer termination cases); Doherty, supra note 11, at 981-82 (same); Marcy J. Levine, Summary Judgment: The Majority View
Undergoes a Complete Reversal in the 1986 Supreme Court, 37 EMORY L.J. 171, 195 (1988) (Matsushita represented "complete reversal from the historical treatment of antitrust conspiracy
cases); Roszkowski, supra note 18, at 134 (Monsanto "significantly increased" burden of proof);
Randolph Sherman, The Matsushita Case: Tightened Concepts of Conspiracy and Predation?,8
CARDOZO L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1987) (Matsushita is "dramatically different" from earlier cases;
Sylvania and Monsanto "drastically narrowed" vertical cause of action); David F. Shores, Narrowing the Sherman Act Through an Extension of Colgate: The Matsushita Case, 55 TENN. L.
REV. 261, 304 (1988) (Matsushita is "sharp departure from prior decisions").
141. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 757 (1984).
142. Id at 757-58.
143. Id. at 758-59 (citing Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1238 (7th
Cir. 1982)).
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dependent action and the distinction between price and non-price restraints. 14 The Court noted that discussions between suppliers and dealers
about prices and marketing strategy often constitute legitimate behavior,
providing necessary information to a supplier concerned with the operation
of the market for its products. 145 Because it saw dealer complaints as a normal part of these discussions, the Court was concerned that if it allowed
plaintiffs to use complaints as their sole evidence of price-fixing agreements,
the result might be per se condemnation of either independent pricing decisions or of non-price restraints that have some effect on prices. "If an inference of such an agreement may be drawn from highly ambiguous evidence,
there is a considerable danger that the doctrines enunciated in Sylvania and
Colgate will be seriously eroded."' 146
To avoid this problem, the Court enunciated a new evidentiary standard.
147
Although it admitted that dealer complaints have some probative value, it
held that
something more than evidence of complaints is needed. There must
be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and the nonterminated distributors were acting independently.

. . The antitrust plaintiff should present direct or

.

circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the
manufacturer and others "had a conscious commitment to
a com148
mon scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective."'
In its oft-cited footnote nine, the Court went on to say that the concept of a
common scheme required the plaintiff to show more than that the non-terminated dealer conformed to the manufacturer's suggested prices. "It means as
well that evidence must be presented both that the distributor communicated
its acquiescence or agreement, and that this was sought by the
1 49

manufacturer."'

Monsanto's evidentiary requirements have been viewed as creating a
new and higher burden for antitrust plaintiffs.' 50 Nevertheless, the Court ultimately held that the terminated distributor had offered sufficient evidence
to support the verdict. 51 Indeed, the Court found "substantial direct evidence of agreements to maintain prices."'1 52 Monsanto, the manufacturer,
144. Id. at 761.
145. Id. at 762-64.

146. Id. at 763.
147. Id. at 764 n.8.

148. Id. at 764 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111
(3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)).

149. Id. at 764 n.9. The specific language the Court employed in the footnote has led courts
to suggest that agreements sought by dealers and acquiesced in by suppliers do not constitute
concerted action within the meaning of Monsanto. See infra notes 294.320 and accompanying
text for a discussion of these cases.
150. See sources cited supra note 140; see also Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.,
485 U.S. 717, 753 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing Monsanto as creating "high
hurdle" and "strict test").
151. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 765-68.
152. Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
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threatened its price-cutting distributors with supply cutoffs if they did not
raise their prices. In one instance, Monsanto even complained to the parent
company of a noncomplying distributor. The parent instructed its subsidiary
to comply, and the subsidiary then informed Monsanto that it would charge
the suggested price. 153 The Court also relied on a newsletter circulated by a
distributor to its retailers after the author had met with Monsanto officials.

The newsletter stated, among other things, that "every effort will be made to
maintain a minimum market price level," and strongly suggested that the
1 54
manufacturer and distributors were cooperating to maintain prices.
Once the Court found evidence of a price-fixing agreement,
the remaining question is whether the termination of [the plaintiff]
was part of or pursuant to that agreement. It would be reasonable

to find that it was, since it is necessary for competing distributors

contemplating compliance with suggested
prices to know that those
155
who do not comply will be terminated.
This passage suggests that once a plaintiff shows sufficient evidence of a
price-fixing conspiracy, it needs only minimal evidence to show that its termination was linked to that conspiracy. In Monsanto, the Court held there was
sufficient circumstantial evidence of that link. The manufacturer had specifi-

cally told the terminated distributor that price complaints were a cause of the
termination. 156 The distributor had been threatened with termination if it

did not raise its prices, and had never been told of the non-price reasons the
57

1
manufacturer later alleged were the cause of the termination.
Thus, when viewed in light of its actual resolution of its facts, Monsanto

is hardly a restrictive case. 158 In sum, the evidence of the conspiracy con153. Id.
154. Id. at 765-66. The key passage of the newsletter, as quoted by the Court, reads:
In other words, we are assured that Monsanto's company-owned outlets will not retail
at less than their suggested retail price to the trade as a whole. Furthermore, those of
us on the distributor level are not likely to deviate downward on price to anyone as the
idea is implied that doing this possibly could discolor the outlook for continuity as one
of the approved distributors during the future upcoming seasons. So, none interested
in the retention of this arrangement is likely to risk being deleted from this customer
service opportunity. Also, as far as the national accounts are concerned, they are sure
to recognize the desirability of retaining Monsanto's favor on a continuing basis by
respecting the wisdom of participating in the suggested program in a manner assuring
order on the retail level 'playground' throughout the entire country. It is elementary
that harmony can only come from following the rules of the game and that in case of
dispute, the decision of the umpire is final.
Id. at 766.
155. Id. at 767.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 767-68.
158. See Terry Calvani & Andrew G. Berg, Resale Price Maintenance After Monsanto: A
Doctrine Still at War with Itself, 1984 Duta L.J. 1163, 1195-96 (Monsanto's evidence of pricefixing is "speculative"); Hutchinson, supra note 51, at 122 ("[lIt is obvious that the Court [in
Monsanto] intended to give juries great latitude" on concerted action question.); W.B. Markovits, A Focus on Reality in Antitrust: An Analysis of the Kodak Case, 39 FED. BAR NEWS & J.
592, 593 (1992) (Monsanto does not justify wide use of summary judgment); Piraino, supra note
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sisted largely of Monsanto's attempts to coerce the plaintiff, and a few other
dealers, into compliance with its MSRP and of the distributor's statements in
the newsletter. These facts hardly suggest that huge amounts of evidence will
be needed to meet the Monsanto test. Indeed, the Monsanto evidence is
similar to the sort of coercion-based evidence of price-fixing the Court approved in Parke, Davis and its immediate progeny.
2. The Matsushita Gloss
While Monsanto clearly tried to set out a new evidentiary standard for
establishing concerted action, it provided little guidance as to the standard's
reach. Moreover, the case did little to elaborate the reasons for having a
vertical conspiracy requirement at all. It never directly addressed why cases
like Colgate are not treated as implied agreements, thus satisfying the language of Section 1.
Further hints as to the solution to these puzzles are found in Matsushita,
where the Supreme Court again addressed the amount of evidence of concerted action a plaintiff must present to take a Section 1 case to a jury. 1 59 In
Matsushita, the Court addressed a claim that a group of Japanese electronics
manufacturers had conspired to price their products below cost in the United
States to drive American competitors out of business. 160 The Court expressed concern that if plaintiffs could bring conspiracy claims too easily, the
fear of litigation would deter firms from lowering prices to increase their
sales, precisely the sort of behavior the Sherman Act is supposed to encourage. 161 As a result, the Court again restated the standards for finding
sufficient evidence of concerted action:
[A]ntitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a [Section 1] case. Thus, in [Monsanto], we
held that conduct as consistent with permissible competition as with
illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of
antitrust conspiracy. To survive a motion for summary judgment or
for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of
[Section 1] must present evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that the alleged conspirators acted independently. [Monsanto'] 465 U.S., at 764. [Plaintiffs]... must show that the inference
89, at 321 ("It is difficult to understand how allowing a terminated dealer to reach a jury on the
basis of such limited evidence could protect manufacturers from the undue application of the per
se rule .... "). Indeed, one lower court cited Monsanto for the proposition that federal courts
allow wide latitude in interpreting circumstantial evidence to find inferences of conspiracy.
Community Elec. Serv., Inc. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 869 F.2d 1235, 1246 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989).
159. As Matsushita implied by incorporating Monsanto's language, the standards for granting a directed verdict and a summary judgment motion are the same. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986) (standard for granting summary judgment mirrors that for directed verdict under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)). Thus, subsequent discussion will not distinguish between the two procedural postures.
160. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 577-78, 584.
161. Id. at 593-94.
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of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of
independent action or collusive action that could not have harmed
[plaintiffs].1 62

This language and other parts of Matsushita163 seem to have diminished the
reluctance of lower federal court judges to grant summary judgment in Sec162. Id. at 588 (some citations omitted).
163. Matsushita's other significant holding is that where a plaintiff's claim is economically
implausible, the plaintiff "must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their
claim than would otherwise be necessary." Id. at 587. The Court found the alleged conspiracy to
price below cost economically implausible because the participants would have had to be willing
to take losses that were difficult to recoup for a long period of time. See id. at 588-93 (discussing
rationale for predatory pricing and uncertainty of success as factor in assessing plausibility of
plaintiffs' claims).
The "implausibility" language in Matsushita has little relevance to most vertical restraints
cases. Almost everyone concedes that non-price vertical restraints have the potential to enhance
interbrand competition. Not only is it plausible that some suppliers would try to impose them,
but also it would be surprising if they did not. Suppliers and dealers have logical reasons to enter
vertical price-fixing arrangements. As Part V will elaborate, these arrangements can be used
both to end free-rider problems and to facilitate cartels. Given the extensive use of resale price
maintenance during the fair trade era, see infra note 172, courts should always view attempts to
fix resale prices as plausible. See Jones, supra note 12, at 736 ("Vertical price restraints are
rational, either as permissible corrections to free-riding, or as impermissible RPM restraints.")
Some have argued that suppliers have little incentive to try to maintain higher prices absent
market power because any increase in price will result in lost sales to interbrand competition.
E.g., MLC, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 671 F. Supp. 246, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 1026. However, unlike Matsushita, where in the short term the
alleged conspiracy necessarily reduced the conspirators' revenue, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 595,
the short-term effect of a minimum price-fixing agreement may actually increase revenue. If
demand proves sufficiently elastic and the price increase reduces profits, the conspirators easily
can lower prices again without significant damage to themselves. Unlike those who attempt
predatory pricing, price-fixing conspirators will know whether their scheme is successful quickly
enough to avoid serious harm. Moreover, suppliers in a less than perfect market may agree to
resale price maintenance because it may reduce pressure from dealers to lower their own prices.
See Corey, supra note 98, at 55 (if price-cutting is forestalled at retail level, manufacturer is
relieved of pressure to lower own prices to support efforts of retailers to compete pricewise);
Gerhart, supra note 52, at 426 (suppliers sometimes impose restraints to support "keeping their
prices to dealers higher than would otherwise be possible"); Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case:
Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1978) (RPM can
reduce dealer pressure on suppliers to depart from cartel prices); Shores, supra note 51, at 40608 (vertical price-fixing provides way to avoid reduced sales that normally accompany raising
prices by replacing free pricing at retail level with contract pricing, effectively sharing monopoly
profits with retailers).
Similarly, dealer-coerced agreements should always be considered plausible. No monopoly
profits or short-term losses are necessary to create benefits for the coercing dealer or distributor.
H.L. Hayden Co., Inc. v. Siemens Medical Sys., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 724, 733 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
aff'd, 879 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1989); see Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 820
(11th Cir.) ("If doctors in a hospital can exclude other doctors from practicing in that hospital,
then obviously the remaining doctors can charge a higher price for their services."), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 924 (1990). Moreover, if the purpose of the agreement is to eliminate a competitor, the
actual termination of the competitor is a pretty strong indication that the conspiracy makes economic sense. See Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 817 F.2d 639,
645-46 (10th Cir. 1987) (fact that goal of conspiracy actually is achieved means Matsushita standard met). The supplier may have a variety of reasons for acceding to the coercing dealer. See
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tion 1 cases. 164 The results of this increased willingness to grant summary
judgment will be discussed below.165 More significantly for our current purposes, the Court culled from Monsanto an emphasis on avoiding broad readings of antitrust law that may deter procompetitive conduct. 16 6 This
emphasis will form the basis of the following analysis regarding the purpose
of the concerted action requirement.
D. The Concerted Action Requirement as a Screening Device in PriceFixing Cases
Vertical restraints are not discrete agreements, but rather take place in
the context of an ongoing relationship. 16 7 The relationship between a supplier and a dealer is complex and shifting. They are simultaneously partners
in a project to sell the suppliers' goods and competitors fighting to get the
bulk of the available profits. 168 At times they may get along well, at other
times poorly. The supplier may be pleased with some aspects of the relationship and upset about others. 169 The supplier-dealer relationship often ends
after a long, unpleasant increase in friction between the parties that stems
170
from a variety of causes.
infra note 420. The relative frequency of upward coercion and the fact that boycotts have historically been the means used by high-price retailers to eliminate discounters, Gerla, supra note 69,
at 11, suggest that the Matsushita plausibility standard has little relevance to these cases.
164. See Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1362 (3d Cir. 1992)
(summary judgment is no longer disfavored procedural shortcut), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1262
(1993); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656, 659 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987)
(citing Matsushita for proposition that summary judgment not really disfavored in antitrust law),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 989 (lower courts
now more ready to grant directed verdicts or summary judgments against conspiracy claims
where evidence is merely consistent with existence of conspiracy); Jones, supra note 12, at 734
(under Monsanto and Matsushita,lower courts "have often improperly denied plaintiffs the opportunity to present their cases to the jury"); Popofsky, supra note 52, at 34 (marked increase in
summary judgment dispositions of vertical price-fixing cases was predictable result of
Matsushita).
165. See infra part IV.
166. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 593. The Court since has reiterated the significance of this
concern. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072,2088 (1992); Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988).
167. See generally Goldberg, supra note 133 passim (describing legal and economic nature
of vertical restraints).
168. See Steiner, supra note 2, at 158-60 (describing parallel adversarial and complementary nature of manufacturer-retailer relationship). As one commentator put it, in entering the
relationship, they "in effect buy admission tickets to a game of skill in which they attempt to
revise the rules in their favor without inducing the other party to quit." Goldberg, supra note
133, at 123-24.
169. See Regency Oldsmobile, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 723 F. Supp. 250, 252-57, 25960 (D.N.J. 1989) (describing manufacturer's attempts to reel in dealer who created substantial
profits but who became overaggressive in marketing techniques).
170. See, e.g., Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 38-40 (1977)
(describing gradually deteriorating relationship between manufacturer and dealer); Reborn Enters., Inc. v. Fine Child, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1423, 1430-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same), aff'd, 754 F.2d
1072 (2d Cir. 1985).
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For the moment, let us focus on price-fixing claims. 171 The complexity
of the supplier-dealer relationship tends to mean that when a supplier terminates a price-cutting dealer, the facts may support a number of different versions of the "cause" of what can usefully be thought of as a break-up. Given
the per se treatment accorded to price restraints, a price-cutting dealer will
naturally argue that the supplier terminated it because of its low prices. The
supplier will give other accounts of the break-up that focus on activities of
the dealer that harmed the supplier's ability to market its products.
Studies of suppliers' activities under the fair trade laws suggest that the
price-fixing account often is plausible. 172 However, evidence also supports
the suppliers' alternative accounts.1 73 Many cases involve scenarios that suggest genuine free-rider problems. For example, suppliers may decide to eliminate mail-order dealers, who have low overhead costs or who provide little
or no pre-sale information or post-sale service. 174 In addition, a variety of
business judgments by manufacturers, or bad behavior by dealers, can pres171. See infra notes 353-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proper application of Monsanto to non-price claims.
172. During much of the century, Congress allowed states to pass so-called fair trade legislation allowing vertical price-fixing. See THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, JR., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE" ECONOMIc THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 4-5
(1983) (describing legislation designed to remove federal antitrust obstacles to enforcement of
retail price maintenance contracts sanctioned by states). At the height of the fair trade era in the
middle of the century, over 40 states had enacted fair trade statutes. Id. at 4. Estimates of the
volume of retail products that sold under employed resale price maintenance agreements during
this period range from 4-10%. Id. at 113.
173. Obviously, where the price-cutter can afford to discount because it falls to provide
services, characterizing the motive of the supplier in terms of "price" or "non-price" concerns
will be hard. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Vertical Restraints and Monopoly Power, 64 B.U. L. Rv.
521, 521-22 (1984) (discussing this problem in context of Monsanto facts). The test proposed in
Part VI for analyzing vertical price-fixing should eliminate much of the significance of the distinction, by allowing the supplier to show that it imposed price restraints to address concerns
about dealer services.
174. See, e.g., H.L. Hayden Co., Inc. v. Siemens Medical Sys., Inc., 879 F.2d 1005, 1009 (2d
Cir. 1989) (supplier terminated relationship with mail-order dental equipment sales company
selling at 20-25% below full-service dealers); Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, 878 F.2d 801, 802-03 (4th Cir. 1989) (supplier terminated relationship
with mail-order furniture dealer discounting 30-40%); O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc.,
792 F.2d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1986) (manufacturer terminated mail-order dealers because they
could not provide necessary consumer services); National Marine Elec. Distrib., Inc. v. Raytheon
Co., 778 F.2d 190, 191-92 (4th Cir. 1985) (supplier terminated mail-order dealer that had no
service department); Computer Place, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 607 F. Supp. 822, 826-27
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (supplier deemphasized mail-order distribution in favor of local, full-service
dealers that could provide better support for customers), aff'd without op., 779 F.2d 56 (9th Cir.
1985); Moffat v. Lane Co., 595 F. Supp. 43, 45-47 (D. Mass. 1984) (furniture supplier terminated
relationship with mail-order dealer discounting 25-40%).
William Andersen has argued that the object of most dealer promotional services is product
differentiation, which in turn can undermine interbrand competition. Andersen, supra note 112,
at 782. However, this ignores the fact that, for some products, product differentiation represents
genuine differences in quality and features. Promotional activities connected with this kind of
differentiation may well provide consumers with information that they want and need.
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ent compelling reasons for termination. 17 5 Reported cases contain many examples of these reasons, including a supplier's decision to restructure its
distribution chain to eliminate certain dealers, 176 poor financial or sales performance by the dealer, 177 failure of the dealer to comply with non-price
restraints, 178 lies or fraud by the dealer, 179 or simply obnoxious behavior by
80
the dealer.'
The real question underlying the concerted action cases seems to be how
much evidence of the price-fixing version of the termination a terminated
price-cutter must show to get its story heard by a jury. As noted, both Monsanto and Matsushita express concern that allowing a jury to infer anticompetitive activity from ambiguous evidence will deter procompetitive
behavior.' 8 ' Reading Colgate through the lenses of these cases provides a
possible justification that makes sense of the Court's apparently arbitrary line
between independent and concerted action.
175. See Gerla, supra note 69, at 17, 25 & n.145 (manufacturers frequently have legitimate
non-price reasons for terminating relationship); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., DistributorTerminations
Pursuantto ConspiraciesAmong a Supplier and Complaining Distributors:A Suggested Antitrust
Analysis, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 297, 335-36 (1982) (courts frequently sustain termination of dis-

tributors for lack of diligence, inadequate service, dishonesty, poor financial condition, and low
standards of cleanliness and appearance).
176. See H.J., Inc. v. IT & T, 867 F.2d 1531, 1536 (8th Cir. 1989) (distributors eliminated in
order to market directly to dealers); Magid Mfg. Co. v. U.S.D. Corp., 654 F. Supp. 325, 328-29
(N.D. Ill. 1987) (dealer terminated in connection with supplier's restructuring of its distribution
network).
177. See Dunnivant v. Bi-State Auto Parts, 851 F.2d 1575, 1580, 1582 (11th Cir. 1988)
(dealer terminated by one supplier partly due to poor sales performance and by another partly
because of small size of market); Key Fin. Planning Corp. v. ITT Life Ins. Corp., 828 F.2d 635,
637-38 (10th Cir. 1987) (insurance agent terminated after selling just four policies in two months,
one to an employee); C. Pappas Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 610 F. Supp. 662,669-70 (E.D. Cal.
1985) (manufacturer appointed second distributor in region where concerned about first distributor's performance and financial stability), aff'd without op., 801 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1986); Gilchrist Mach. Co., Inc. v. Komatsu Am. Corp., 601 F. Supp. 1192, 1196-97 (S.D. Miss. 1984)
(terminated dealer suffering from severe financial problems achieved extremely poor financial
share).
178. See Adams Parker Furniture, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
68,606, at 61,196 (D. Kan. 1987) (dealer refused to comply with supplier-provided marketing
program).
179. See Landmark Dev. Corp. v. Chambers Corp., 752 F.2d 369, 371 (9th Cir. 1985) (per
curiam) (dealer set up paper corporation in order to purchase large quantities of goods to resell
in another dealer's exclusive territory); Cranfill v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 773 F. Supp. 943, 947-48
(E.D. Tex. 1991) (dealer submitted false reports to manufacturers); Computer Connection, Inc.
v. Apple Computer, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 569, 571 (E.D. La. 1985) (dealer sold product without
authorization and after being told not to by manufacturer).
180. See Reborn Enters., Inc. v. Fine Child, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1423, 1451-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(dealer continually threatened to sue supplier, surreptitiously recorded conversations with
dealer, and was generally difficult to do business with), aff'd, 754 F.2d 1072 (2d Cir. 1985).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46 and 161. Subsequent cases discussing Monsanto and Matsushita often focus on this idea. E.g., Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am.,
Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363-64 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1262 (1993); International
Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812 F.2d 786, 796 n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S.
915 (1987).
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To understand this justification, imagine what would happen if Colgate
were overruled. That is, suppose courts treated a supplier's simple announcement of a resale pricing policy and termination of noncomplying dealers as enforcement of an illegal implied contract. Even when the supplier
had terminated the dealer for a legitimate reason, the terminated price-cutter
would be able to get a price-fixing case to the jury on remarkably little evidence: the announcement, the price-cutting, and the termination. A jury
surely could infer the causal link from the manufacturer's policy itself.
As the Supreme Court noted in Sharp, the supplier may have trouble
convincing a jury that price was not its primary motivation for the termination. 182 Because the supplier does not have the added protection of rule of
reason analysis in a price-fixing case, this result would hamper a manufacturer's efforts to terminate a price-cutting dealer for legitimate reasons.
Moreover, it would strongly discourage a manufacturer from announcing
even suggested retail prices, limiting helpful exchanges of information between itself and its dealers about effective pricing strategies. Surely it makes

sense for a supplier to be able to collect information about the success of
information itpricing strategies from its often far-flung dealers, process the 183
self, and then reconvey it in the form of pricing suggestions.
Seen in this light, Colgate, at least as revived by Monsanto, is not really a
case about some metaphysical difference between concerted and independent action, but rather a substantive decision to limit price-fixing allegations
by insisting that a dealer produce a certain minimum quantity of evidencegreater than that normally required in a civil suit-in order to take its claims
to the jury. 18 The effect is to require more than just evidence of a pricing
182. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1988). Long before
Monsanto, Donald Turner suggested dealing with this problem by putting the burden on the
plaintiff or the government to establish "a clear policy or pattern of refusals to deal which have
in fact produced resale price maintenance by a substantial number of distributors." Turner,
supra note 105, at 690. In practice, this requirement might prove similar to Monsanto's. Such a
pattern or policy would likely leave behind the sort of evidentiary traces Monsanto requires.
183. A supplier-dealer relationship can be seen as a joint venture to sell products effectively
at maximum profit. As partners in the venture, the dealers should be allowed to use the supplier
as a clearinghouse of pricing information if it is efficient to do so. The information-sharing qualities of MSRP seem to be ignored by those who would forbid even suggested resale prices. See,
e.g., Andersen, supra note 112, at 776-91 (arguing that suggested prices should be presumptively
illegal for sake of predictability and doctrinal clarity); see also Steiner, supra note 2, at 197 (recommending that suppliers not be allowed to terminate dealers unilaterally for price-cutting).
Andersen, for example, argues that if MSRP is not mandatory, it can have no redeeming effects.
When dealers do not follow it, "no one benefits; the only effect is to create the illusion that the
dealer price is something of a discount-a form of consumer fraud." Andersen, supra note 112,
at 791. However, in addition to conveying information among the players in the distribution
chain, MSRP also provides information to consumers. Retail markets contain dealers who employ a wide variety of pricing and service strategies: some will employ MSRP and some will not.
Consumers, who may have difficulty obtaining information about the particular strategy a given
retailer employs, can use the relationship between actual price and MSRP as a signal conveying
that information.
184. Cf. Shores, supra note 140, at 272 ("Colgate [precludes], as a matter of law, the inference of an agreement from facts which in reality would plainly support such an inference.").
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policy and a subsequent termination, but also some other evidence, like that
adduced in Monsanto, suggesting that prices were genuinely the cause of the
termination. Thus, the case may not really constitute an endorsement of the
termination of price-cutting dealers as much as an acknowledgement of the
difficulty that may occur when sorting through the reasons for the termination in the shadow of the per se rule.18 5
This reading of Colgate also makes sense of the sequence of price-fixing
cases that preceded Monsanto. In each of them, the evidence provided additional reasons to believe that the supplier actually was enforcing its pricing
policies, either because it had set up an elaborate monitoring and enforcement system, or because it had repeatedly tried to influence its dealers' pricing decisions, or both. The pre-Monsanto reading of these cases was that any
activity of the supplier beyond simple announcement and termination was
actionable. Commentators saw this rule, known as the Colgate-plusdoctrine,
as effectively overruling Colgate. Instead, the evidence-based approach suggests the doctrine is perfectly consistent with Colgate: If we are protecting
non-price terminations rather than "independent" pricing decisions, any evidence beyond the Colgate threshold that clearly connects the termination to
price policies should be sufficient to get a case to the jury.
This approach also suggests that Monsanto should be read fairly narrowly. In Monsanto, the Supreme Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's position that a terminated dealer could take its price-fixing case to the jury
merely on a showing that it was terminated "in response to" competitors'
price complaints. Again, suppose the Court had affirmed the Seventh Circuit's test. The terminated dealer's prima facie case would consist of a suggested price, price complaints, termination, and some other evidence that
suggests a causal link, perhaps temporal proximity.
As the Supreme Court pointed out, this is not much evidence on which
to base a price-fixing claim. The relationship between suppliers and dealers,
as described in the case law, often resembles that between parents and children. Children complain constantly.' 86 Parents pay attention when they see
fit. To discourage a parent from punishing one child merely because another
had complained seems irrational. Yet "dealer expressions regarding their relations with the supplier and with other dealers often focus on price regardless of the underlying cause for the expressions.' 8 7 To allow an inference of
price restraints, merely from evidence of all-too-common price complaints
185. This concern is somewhat lessened in the burden-shifting approach proposed in Part
VI, despite its focus on motive, because the jury will specifically be instructed that a desire to
raise prices is not necessarily illegal.
186. Some cases, for example, describe evidence that virtually all of a particular supplier's
dealers were complaining about other dealers' prices. E.g., Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656, 661 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987); O.S.C. Corp. v.
Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274, 1288 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir.
1986).
187. Allison, supra note 1, at 164; accord George Hay, Vertical Restraints After Monsanto,
70 CORNELL L. REv. 418, 432 (1985) (complaints focus on price-cutting because of more direct
and noticeable threat); Hovenkamp, supra note 173, at 522 (dealers naturally complained about
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and subsequent termination, would make it very hard for a supplier to terminate a dealer for non-price concerns once a competitor complained about the
dealer's prices. A supplier that tried to enforce a non-price restraint in these
circumstances could be forced to explain to a skeptical jury that the prices
complained of were not the cause of its decision to terminate. 188 In addition,
fear of per se liability might discourage dealers from exchanging information
about the workings of the market, in the form of complaints or otherwise,
with their suppliers. Yet exchange of market information obviously allows
both suppliers and dealers to run their businesses better. On the other hand,
Monsanto hardly contains a sweeping condemnation of the Colgate-plus doctrine. The case does not overrule or even question the continued viability of
Parke, Davis and its progeny.
To understand what Monsanto does require, it is helpful to consider the
role that the supplier's motives play in concerted action analysis. As noted,
to get a vertical price-fixing case to the jury, a terminated distributor will
have to show evidence that its termination was the result of an agreement
between the supplier and someone else and that the agreement included
some price element. The supplier's motive for terminating the distributor is
relevant to the analysis in two ways. It can show that the termination may
have occurred for reasons independent of any agreement. It can also show
that, although the termination was part of an agreement, the terms of the
agreement did not include prices.
Once the supplier presents evidence of either an independent or a nonprice motive for termination, the plaintiff must bring forward some evidence
of price-fixing to survive summary judgment. Yet some evidence that is consistent with forbidden conspiracy will also be consistent with the particular
legitimate independent decision-making process claimed by the defendant.
Monsanto expressly holds that dealer price complaints fall into this category.
Evidence consistent with either explanation is precisely the evidence Matsushita says is insufficient. 189 Thus, to counter the defendant's claim, plaintiff
must present evidence that is inconsistent with the defendant's theory and
that therefore "tends to exclude" it. Matsushita's use of the word "consistent" makes clear that Monsanto's "tend to exclude" test is really about finding evidence190 inconsistent with the defendants' account of legitimate
termination.
phenomenon that appeared to cause injury-price-cutting-rather than absence of skilled personnel cited by supplier).
188. See O.S.C. Corp., 601 F. Supp. at 1295 (inferring conspiracy from price complaints
"would virtually immunize a dealer from legitimate, vertically imposed requirements by a manu-

facturer once a competitor has complained"); Hay, supra note 187, at 432 (noting manufacturer's
reluctance to terminate a free rider for violation of non-price restraints where jury could infer
price-fixing from termination and complaints).
189. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).

190. As with any issue that deals with a defendant's motivation, cases involving the reasons
for a dealer's termination raise the question of what to do when the defendant had mixed mo-

tives. If there is evidence of more than one motive, evidence that otherwise meets the Monsanto
standard that the supplier was at least partially motivated by a price-fixing agreement should be
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Read together, Matsushita, Monsanto, and Colgate protect a supplier's
ability to terminate dealers for legitimate reasons by setting minimum evidentiary requirements that a terminated dealer must meet to allege pricefixing. 191 The dealer must show more than suggested prices, price complaints, and termination, because all of these are consistent with legitimate
reasons for termination. However, as Monsanto's facts make clear, the plaintiff's evidence can be far short of the explicit contractual provision that provided the Dr. Miles paradigm for per se illegal price-fixing. As the Eleventh
Circuit has noted, Monsanto is not an insurmountable burden: "This evidence need not be such that only an inference of conspiracy may be derived
from it. It must, however, go beyond equivocal complaints and tend to exclude the inference of independent action."' 192
IV. THE

METAPHYSICS OF CONSPIRACY:

THE

LOWER COURTS AND

CONCERTED ACTION AFTER MONSANTO

The lower federal courts have struggled with the concept of "concerted
action" in vertical restraint cases since the Supreme Court decided Monsanto.193 Many cases determined that the plaintiff did not show sufficient
evidence' 94 of concerted action in circumstances that certainly are at odds
with the purpose of the concerted action requirement detailed in Part III. To
be fair, in some of these cases, the court probably would not have imposed
liability anyway. A number of the cases involved non-price restraints, which
probably had procompetitive effects and would likely have survived the apsufficient to take the case to the jury. See infra note 521 for a suggested resolution of a situation
where the jury believes the supplier's motives were mixed.
191. The Ninth Circuit has tried to turn this concern into an explicit balancing test:
[T]he trial court must consider whether, on the evidence presented, the protection of
innocent independent conduct outweighs the costs associated with the potential de-

crease in strict antitrust enforcement. If it does, then the plaintiff must come forward
with additional, "sufficiently unambiguous" evidence that does not have these undesirable deterrent effects.
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, 906 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
This test seems likely to be very difficult to apply in practice. Monsanto's approach-setting up

evidentiary minimums-seems more administrable.
192. Helicopter Support Sys. Inc. v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 818 F.2d 1530, 1534 n.4 (11th
Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original); see also Moore v. Boating Indus. Ass'ns, 754 F.2d 698,711 n.22

(7th Cir.) (rejecting claim that for plaintiff to establish antitrust conspiracy from circumstantial
evidence the evidence "must be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion"), vacated on
other grounds, 474 U.S. 895 (1985).

193. See Flynn, supra note 10, at 1104-12 (describing varied approaches to application of
Monsanto and question of what constitutes conspiracy). Apparently, this problem preceded
Monsanto. In 1981, one commentator argued that the federal courts cited Colgate in "com-

pletely inappropriate contexts." Baker, supra note 53, at 1484-85; see also Andersen, supra note
112, at 773-76, 777 (noting pre-Monsanto doctrinal confusion about proper interpretation of
Colgate doctrine).
194. Throughout this Part, I use "sufficient evidence" to mean sufficient evidence of concerted action to survive a motion for summary judgment or directed verdict and to allow a jury
to decide the issue.
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plication of the rule of reason. 195 In other cases, the plaintiffs failed to show
sufficient evidence of harm to competition, so the courts' concerted action
determinations were not crucial to the outcomes. 196 Yet the broad language
of the cases will serve as precedent for later cases where the restraints involved could have significant anticompetitive effects. If Monsanto is read to
mean that a particular type of evidence is insufficient to show concerted action, then the underlying arrangement will be totally immune from antitrust
scrutiny. Thus, the concern underlying Part IV is the courts' potential immunization of harmful conduct without leaving any opportunity to analyze its
competitive impact. 19 7
Part IV examines the post-Monsanto concerted action cases and concludes that many lower federal courts are reaching results unsupported by
policy or precedent. Part IV first looks at the broad application of two key
passages in Monsanto, then examines cases involving explicit agreements and
suppliers' policies restraining their dealers, and then examines cases like
those described in the Introduction, involving dealers' attempts to coerce
their suppliers. Part IV concludes with thoughts about how to restate Monsanto to clarify the concerted action requirement in vertical restraint cases.
A. Interpreting the Language of Monsanto
In the cases discussed in this section, courts arguably took one of two
passages from Monsanto out of context and used the language to support
grants of summary judgment. This section argues that these decisions were
questionable interpretations of the Supreme Court's precedents.
1. "Tends To Exclude"
As noted, the "tends to exclude" standard of Monsanto and Matsushita
means that the plaintiff must come forward with at least one piece of admissible evidence that is inconsistent with the defendant's claim that it acted independently.' 98 Some courts, however, seem to interpret the "tend to exclude"
language to mean that, in order to get its case to the jury, the plaintiff must
produce evidence that, taken as a whole, is more likely than not to support its
claim. 199 The Sixth Circuit, for example, has stated that "a plaintiff.., fails
195. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 236-51 (discussing exclusive dealing cases).
196. See Morgan, Strand, Wheeler & Biggs v. Radiology, Ltd., 924 F.2d 1484, 1489 (9th Cir.
1991) (plaintiffs unable to provide adequate evidence of what constituted relevant market); Ferguson v. Greater Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, 848 F.2d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 1988) (plaintiffs
failed to present evidence that supplier activity constituted unreasonable restraint on, or injury
to, competition in relevant market); see also Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Burlington Indus.,
Inc., 763 F.2d 604, 616-18 (4th Cir. 1985) (Winter, J.,
concurring) (concurring judge would have
found sufficient evidence of concerted action, but not of harm to competition).
197. I assume for the purposes of this part that some vertical restraints have harmful effects.
Part V will discuss the competitive effects of vertical price-fixing.
198. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 217, 229 n.12
(D.D.C. 1984), aff'd, 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
199. At least one commentator agrees. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Fact, Value, and Theory
in Antitrust Adjudication, 1987 DuKE LJ.897, 903-04 (arguing that under Matsushita, to get to
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to demonstrate a conspiracy if, using ambiguous evidence, the inference of a
conspiracy is less than or equal to an inference of independent action. '200 In
another case, a district judge found insufficient evidence of concerted action,
stating: "I conclude that the evidence of a conspiracy, taken as a whole in the
light of all the circumstances, is ambiguous. The entire course of conduct by
the defendants is consistent with the pursuit of permissible independent business purposes." 20 1 A number of other judges have used language suggesting
that they are weighing the
plaintiff's evidence of concerted action in the sum20 2
mary judgment process.
This approach is inconsistent with the role of the judge in a summary
judgment context 203 and with the reasoning of Monsanto and Matsushita. As
the Third Circuit recently noted in rejecting this approach
to the Monsanto
2 °4
test, the judge's role here is not to weigh the evidence:
To raise a genuine issue of material fact.., the opponent need not
match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant. In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the "mere
scintilla" threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact,
then the court cannot credit the movant's version of events against
the jury, "the plaintiff must produce evidence that makes it 'more likely than not' that its version
of things is true"). The basis for this may well be Matsushita's language that plaintiffs "must
show that [an] inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that could not have harmed [them]." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986); see also Markovits, supra note 158, at
593 (suggesting this language usurps jury's role); cf.Shores, supra note 140, at 294 (arguing that
duty to weigh evidence arises from "trends to exclude" language rather than quoted passage).
Yet the Court later refers to the value of pieces of evidence that, standing alone, are consistent
with legitimate explanations. Matsushita,475 U.S. at 588. It does not refer to of all the evidence,
consistent and inconsistent, taken as a whole, as the cases discussed in this section seem to
suggest.
200. Riverview Invs., Inc. v. Ottawa Community Improvement Corp., 899 F.2d 474, 483 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990). While this language simply may be a poorly worded
restatement of the Eleventh Circuit's version of the standard, it certainly is susceptible to the
interpretation that the judge must engage in some weighing of the evidence.
201. Anesthesia Advantage, Inc. v. Metz Group, 759 F. Supp. 638, 650 (D. Colo. 1991).
202. See Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1374 (3d Cir. 1992)
(district court had found defendant's independent reasons compelling "on balance" contrasted
with plaintiff's rebuttal evidence), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1262 (1993); Arnold Pontiac-GMC v.
General Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 577-78 (3d Cir. 1986) (Becker, J., dissenting) (suggesting
strong evidence of independent motive by manufacturer to fail to grant franchise to plaintiff
negated probative value of evidence of competitors' involvement in decision); In re Beef Indus.
Antitrust Litig., 713 F. Supp. 971, 975-76 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (when plaintiffs rely solely on circumstantial evidence, inference of unlawful conspiracy must be the "compelling, if not exclusive,
rational inference"), aff'd on other grounds, 907 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1990).
203. See FED. R. Crv. P. 56 (summary judgment).
204. See Big Apple BMW, Inc., 974 F.2d at 1363 (inappropriate for court to resolve factual
disputes and make credibility determinations); accord In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings,
906 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1990) (allowing court to make such decisions would lead to dramatic
judicial encroachment on province of jury); 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHr ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 574-75 (1983) (issues of fact not triable on summary judgment motion).
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the opponent, even if the quantity
of the movant's evidence far out20 5
weighs that of its opponent.
Monsanto also suggests that its test is not designed to promote judicial
balancing of the evidence on summary judgment motions. In Monsanto, the
Court explicitly rejected the defendant's argument that its strong evidence
contradicting that of the plaintiff supported a directed verdict: "The choice
between two reasonable interpretations of the testimony properly was left for
the jury."'2°6 In addition, as the Ninth Circuit has noted, if Monsanto and
Matsushita mean that courts should grant summary judgment any time that
both inferences of conspiracy and inferences of innocent conduct are plausible, they would effectively require that the plaintiff provide direct evidence of
conspiracy in order to get its case to the jury. 20 7 However, both cases clearly
208
leave open a plaintiff's right to rely on circumstantial evidence.
Finally, the balancing approach is inconsistent with the purpose of the
concerted action rule. If Monsanto is designed to assure that a terminated
dealer has a minimum quantum of evidence before taking its case to a jury,
the court's role should be limited to examining whether the threshold has
been reached. Its focus must be on the amount of the plaintiff's evidence,
rather than on how that evidence stacks up against that of the defendant.
Several circuit courts apply a kind of burden shift in cases raising Monsanto issues. Basically, they require that a plaintiff show more, or better,
evidence of conspiracy once the defendant articulates a plausible legitimate
explanation for its behavior. 209 These cases are not inconsistent with the
205. Big Apple BMW, Inc., 974 F.2d at 1363.
206. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 767 n.12 (1984); see also id. at
768 n.14 (noting that "sharp conflict in the evidence" not enough to prevent case from going to
jury); Markovits, supra note 158, at 593 (noting that these passages in Monsanto suggest that
Court did not intend to change summary judgment standards).
207. CoordinatedPretrialProceedings, 906 F.2d at 439.
208. Monsanto makes this point explicitly. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764. Matsushita implies
the same thing by referring repeatedly to inferences that are to be drawn from evidence. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588, 593-94, 596-97 (1986). A
number of lower courts have concluded that circumstantial evidence is still sufficient to take a
concerted action claim to the jury. E.g., Big Apple BMW, Inc., 974 F.2d at 1360; Monument
Builders of Greater Kansas City, Inc. v. American Cemetery Ass'n, 891 F.2d 1473, 1481 (10th
Cir. 1989) cert. denied, Mount Washington Cemetery v. Monument Builders of Greater Kansas
City, Inc., 495 U.S. 930 (1990); DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d
1499, 1515 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1990). However, since Monsanto, very
few reported cases relying exclusively on circumstantial evidence have gone to the jury. See
Piraino, supra note 89, at 323 (most courts have entered summary judgment in favor of manufacturers when terminated dealer has put forth only circumstantial evidence of conspiracy).
209. See Seagood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555, 1574 (11th Cir. 1991) (undisputed proof of legitimate business reason for defendant's action sufficient to place burden on
plaintiff to produce additional evidence of conspiracy); Market Force, Inc. v. Wauwatosa Realty
Co., 906 F.2d 1167, 1171-72 (7th Cir. 1990) (plaintiffs must present evidence that excludes possibility of independent action when defendants establish that their behavior was consistent with
that possibility); Landmark Dev. Corp. v. Chambers Corp., 752 F.2d 369, 371-72 (9th Cir. 1985)
(per curiam) (undisputed proof of legitimate business reason for defendant action sufficient to
place burden on plaintiff to produce additional evidence of conspiracy).
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reading of Monsanto presented here. When the defendant fails to present a
legitimate reason for its conduct, any evidence consistent with concerted action should be sufficient to survive summary judgment. However, once the
defendant presents a legitimate explanation for its conduct, more evidenceevidence inconsistent with the legitimate explanation-may be needed to
meet the Monsanto standard. However, this approach does not involve balancing. The court still must focus on whether the plaintiff has brought forth a
specific kind of evidence, not on the relative weight or credibility of the
plaintiff's evidence as compared to the defendant's.
2. "Conscious Commitment to a Common Scheme"
The Monsanto requirement that the plaintiff show evidence of a "conscious commitment to a common scheme" also has been read broadly by
other courts. They have required evidence not simply that the co-conspira210
tors agreed to a plan of action, but also that they share a common purpose.
For example, one recent case suggested that there could not be a meeting of
the minds in a vertical price-fixing case where the manufacturer's motive for
terminating the plaintiff was to maintain prices 11
while the non-terminated
2
dealer's motive was to eliminate its competition.
The problem with this analysis is that suppliers and dealers generally
have different business interests. In a vertical non-price restraint case, for
example, the manufacturer should want its dealers to make sufficient profits
in order to have an incentive to work hard selling the manufacturer's products, but otherwise will want prices as low as possible. 212 The dealers should
want prices guaranteed so that they can obtain healthy profit margins without
fear that price competition will lure away their customers. 213 In fact, it is
difficult to imagine a situation where vertical conspirators would have fully
2 14
identical motives.
More importantly, motive is relevant to the question of concerted action
only to determine if the parties have reached an agreement. The supplier's
210. E.g., Castelli v. Meadville Medical Ctr., 702 F. Supp. 1201, 1204-05 (W.D. Pa. 1988),
aff'd without op., 872 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1989); Beutler Sheetmetal Works v. McMorgan & Co.,
616 F. Supp. 453, 456 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Davis v. Sebring Forest Indus., 588 F. Supp. 688, 691

(S.D. Ohio 1984). The Third Circuit has strongly rejected this approach. See Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., 980 F.2d 171, 212 (3d Cir. 1992) (concluding district court's adoption of this
approach was misplaced), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1285 (1993).
211. Adams Parker Furniture v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 1989-1 Trade Cas. 68,606, at 61,197-98
(D. Kan. 1987). This reading of Monsanto was not crucial to the case. Plaintiff had alleged a

price-fixing conspiracy, and there was no admissible evidence of concern about prices by the
non-terminated dealer that would justify treating any agreement as a price restraint.
212. See 7 AREEDA, supra note 4, 1453 (manufacturer wants dealer to make only as much

profit as necessary to keep prices as low as possible); HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 249 (same).
213. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Prerequisitesand Effects of Resale Price Maintenance,

22 U. CHi. L. REV. 825, 830-31 (1955) (some dealers want RPM to protect their profit margins).
214. See Fineman, 980 F.2d at 213 (motives of vertical conspirators vary); Burns, supra note
95, at 14-15 (same); see also Brent H. Feigner, Retailers Grab Power, Control Marketplace, MARKETrINO NEWS, Jan. 16, 1989, at 1 ("relationship between supplier and retailer always has been a
struggle for power").
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motive in terminating the distributor may be relevant where it suggests the
supplier did not reach any agreement with a non-terminated distributor. For
example, evidence of poor relations between the terminated dealer and supplier may show that any complaints or threats of the non-terminated dealer
were simply not part of the termination decision and, thus, that there was no
agreement.
However, if a supplier and a dealer in fact agree to terminate a pricecutting dealer, surely that agreement itself constitutes a "conscious commitment to a common scheme," regardless of what gains the parties separately
hope to achieve from their agreement.2 15 For example, if two criminals cooperate on a mugging, they have conspired, even if one is doing it because she
enjoys violence and the other because she needs money, or even if one is
doing it only to help the other. The screening function of the concerted action requirement is not served by insulating from review cases where the reasons the defendants agreed to terminate the plaintiff differ, even if the
termination is clearly to benefit one party to the agreement with no direct
benefit to the other.
B. Explicit Agreements as ConcertedAction
A second set of questionable lower federal court decisions find insufficient evidence of concerted action despite explicit agreements between the
parties. This section will first examine cases in the context of vertical contracts in general and then focus on cases involving exclusive distribution
provisions.
1. Contractual Provisions as Concerted Action
The language of Section 1 from which the concerted action requirement
is derived bans "contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of
trade." 216 The explicit use of the word "contract" suggests that any explicit
agreement between two parties should meet the concerted action requirement and subject the agreement to scrutiny to determine if it restrains trade
within the meaning of the statute. 2 17 However, several recent cases have
called into question this fairly obvious reading of the statute.
In H.L. Hayden Co. of New York v. Siemens Medical Systems, Inc.,218
the Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a manufacturer of dental
x-ray machines. The court found no evidence that the termination of the
plaintiff distributor was part of a conspiracy between the manufacturer and
other dealers. 2 19 The plaintiff presented evidence that, after complaints from
full-service dealers, the manufacturer developed a policy against mail-order
215. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 1042.

216. See supra note 4.
217. See Baker, supra note 53, at 1496 (where restrictions included in written contract, concerted action requirement no longer issue).
218. 879 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1989).
219. Id. at 1015-17.
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sales and got other dealers to sign agreements that included the policy then
terminated the plaintiff for failing to comply. 220 Both the court of appeals
and the district court referred to the manufacturer's legitimate independent
interest in eliminating free-rider problems. 221 The two courts, however,
never asked, "Independent of what?" Certainly, the manufacturer's interest
is not independent of the individual agreements it signed with all its other
distributors.
In DrabbantEnterprises v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. ,222 the district court analyzed a claim by a landlord that a restrictive covenant the landlord had agreed to put into a shopping center lease was unenforceable as an
unlawful restraint of trade.22 3 The court found no evidence of concerted action between the tenant grocery outlet that had insisted upon the provision
and another grocery chain, and so denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction. 22 4 However, the court nowhere considered that the covenant itself might have constituted concerted action between the tenant and
225
the landlord.
These cases involve variations on classic boycotts where a business entity
tries to prevent a competitor from getting customers or materials necessary
to compete. 226 In each of the cases, the courts never analyzed the alleged
restraint under the rule of reason because they found no concerted action,
despite express contractual language embodying an agreement between the
parties. While boycotts may be legal under certain circumstances, 227 the evidence that they can be anticompetitive 228 suggests they should not be completely immune from antitrust scrutiny.
These cases appear to follow a suggestion made by several courts that
"contract" in Section 1 has no independent meaning and that "contract, combination and conspiracy" is a compound noun simply meaning "concerted
action. '229 Yet, even if we accept that the explicit language of the statute
220. Id. at 1009-11.
221. Id. at 1014; H.L. Hayden Co. of New York, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 672 F.
Supp. 724, 734-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
222. 688 F. Supp. 1567 (D. Del. 1988).
223. Id. at 1570.
224. Id. at 1577-78.
225. The landlord should have had standing to challenge the provision in the same way that
the buyer in Dr. Miles was allowed to challenge the enforceability of the price restraint in that
case.

226. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 209 (1959) (plaintiff asserted that manufacturers and distributors conspired with competitor to sell to plaintiff at highly
unfavorable terms or refuse to sell at all); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United
States, 234 U.S. 600, 605-06 (1914) (retailers conspired to prevent wholesalers from selling directly to public).
227. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 290 (1985) (not all group boycotts are per se violations of § 1 of Sherman Act).
228. See Bopr, supra note 16, at 334-37 (discussing anticompetitive effects of boycotts);
HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, 11 7.7, 7.8c (same); Gerla, supra note 69, at 11 (same).
229. See, e.g., Rio Vista Oil Ltd. v. Southland Corp., 667 F. Supp. 757, 760 n.2 (D. Utah
1987) (citing authorities).
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does not give a special role to "contracts," no precedent or policy supports
applying the language and results of these cases to vertical restraints.
Initially, in Dr.Miles, when the Supreme Court first found vertical pricefixing agreements to be illegal, its ruling was based solely on the terms of the
230
contracts between the manufacturer and its distributors and retailers,
which certainly suggests contracts alone are enough to meet the concerted
action requirement.2 31 Evidence of contractual provisions also should meet
Monsanto's "tend to exclude" test. Although explicit language in written
contracts agreeing, for example, to price terms does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that both parties actually gave the matter thought and considered themselves bound by the language, 232 those terms would certainly tend
to exclude the possibility that the parties were acting independently. In fact,
courts have considered contractual language to be direct, not circumstantial,
evidence of agreement. 233 And as several courts have noted, Matsushita's
standards, by their own terms, do not apply when there is direct evidence of
234
conspiracy.
In addition, if the policy behind the concerted action requirement is to
screen ambiguous cases, there is no reason to screen cases where the plaintiff
presents direct evidence of contractual agreements. These agreements provide the clear indication of a specific purpose that Colgate-type announcements and terminations do not. Thus, when the contract's terms actually
encompass the alleged restraint of trade, surely that is direct evidence of con23 5
certed action, and Monsanto should not come into play.
230. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408-09 (1911).
231. In dealer termination cases, the plaintiff will have to show, in addition to an agreement, that its termination was causally related to the agreement. However, as Monsanto pointed
out, normally this will not be difficult once evidence of the agreement is established. See supra
text accompanying notes 155-57.
232. Conceivably, price lists could be added as exhibits to a contract, for example, or pricefixing language could be buried in boilerplate language in a franchise agreement.
233. See Helicopter Support Sys., Inc. v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 818 F.2d 1530, 1535-36
(11th Cir. 1987) (post-Monsanto case characterizing written agreements as direct or express evidence of conspiracy); Disenos Artisticos E Industriales, S.A. v. Work, 676 F. Supp. 1254, 1281-82
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (same).
234. E.g., McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1207 (9th Cir. 1988); Arnold Pontiac-GMC v.
Budd Baer, Inc., 826 F.2d 1335, 1338 (3d Cir. 1987); Power Conversion, Inc. v. Saft Am., Inc., 672
F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Md. 1987); cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S.
Ct. 2072, 2088 (1992) (noting that direct evidence creates clearly reasonable inferences of matter
at issue).
235. This is not to say that every time two defendants enter a contractual arrangement the
concerted action requirement is met. Obviously, the terms of the contract must constitute the
restraint of trade at issue. See Mosby v. American Medical Int'l, Inc. 656 F. Supp. 601, 605-06
(S.D. Tex. 1987) (contract between defendants not evidence of concerted action where it did not
contain terms of alleged conspiracy). As one court noted, "the unlawful and unilateral conduct
of one alleged conspirator cannot be imputed to the other alleged conspirator merely because
the parties have entered into an otherwise lawful contractual agreement." Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 937, 947 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd, 903 F.2d 988 (4th Cir.
1990).
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2. Exclusive Dealing as Concerted Action
Exclusive dealing or distribution contracts provide either that a dealer
will be the sole outlet for a supplier in a given area or that the dealer will only
carry the supplier's products and not those of the supplier's competitors. Obviously these contracts restrain trade to some extent by limiting the ability of
the participants to choose their trading partners. 236 However, because these
contracts also have significant potential to enhance efficiency by lowering the
transaction costs and uncertainty in relations between suppliers and deal238
ers,2 37 they normally are not analyzed under the per se rule.
As the Seventh Circuit has noted, it is plausible to have a Colgate scenario with reference to exclusive dealing: The supplier simply announces and
enforces a policy that it will not do business with dealers who handle competing products. 2 39 However, judging by the cases, it is more common for suppliers and dealers to sign explicit contracts containing these provisions,
contracts which some courts have found to constitute concerted action. 240
Several recent cases relying on Monsanto have found the existence of
exclusive contracts to be insufficient evidence of concerted action between
the contracting parties.24 1 One court relied on the language in Monsanto
that a supplier may refuse to deal with whoever it wants, as long as it does so
236. See Arquit, supra note 10, at 928-31 (describing how exclusive dealing arrangements
restrain trade).
237. See 8 AREEDA, supra note 10, 1 1655c (explaining how use of sole outlets ends competitor free-riding); BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 16, at 26, 172-74 (discussing how exclusive

dealing and requirements contracts promote efficiency); Arquit, supra note 10, at 928-31
(describing use of exclusive dealing agreement restraints).
238. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 333 (1961) (contract to take
requirements exclusively from one supplier illegal only if substantially lessens competition);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949) (exclusive contract illegal if forecloses "substantial share" of line of commerce); 8 AREEDA, supra note 10, 1 1653 (sole outlet
agreements covered by rule of reason); HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, § 8.12 (most courts of appeals follow Tampa Electric's rule of reason approach).
239. Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 393 (7th Cir. 1984).
240. E.g., Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 955 F.2d 1388, 1392 (10th Cir. 1992); Community
Hosp. of Andalusia, Inc. v. Tomberlin, 712 F. Supp. 170, 172 (M.D. Ala. 1989).
241. E.g., Morgan, Strand, Wheeler & Biggs v. Radiology, Ltd., 924 F.2d 1484, 1488 (9th
Cir. 1991); Ferguson v. Greater Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, 848 F.2d 976, 983 (9th Cir.
1988); Castelli v. Meadville Medical Ctr., 702 F. Supp. 1201, 1205-06 (W.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd
without op., 872 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1989); Davis v. Sebring Forest Indus., 588 F. Supp. 688, 690
(S.D. Ohio 1984); see also National Indep. Theatre Exhibitors, Inc. v. Charter Fin. Group, 747
F.2d 1396, 1402 (11th Cir. 1984) (no antitrust violation where manufacturer "unilaterally" replaced one exclusive dealer with another), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1056 (1985).
The Third Circuit reached a similar result in Englert v. City of McKeesport, 872 F.2d 1144,
1150-52 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 851 (1989). The case is subject to different analysis
because one party to the contract was a municipality that passed an ordinance creating an exclusive relationship with a particular contractor. Id. Arguably, this requires no acquiescence in the
usual sense on the part of the other party. In addition, this contract might well be exempted
from antitrust scrutiny because it involved state action. See, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985) (municipality's anticompetitive acts exempt from antitrust laws
where "taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy"). However, the court did not rely on
the municipal character of the contract, and its language certainly can be read to support the

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

independently. 242 Another court relied on the fact that the supplier had independent reasons to give its dealer exclusive rights. 243 TWo other cases
seemed to require that plaintiff establish that the parties to the exclusive distribution contract shared an anticompetitive purpose. 244 These arguments do
not support the courts' results.
First, an exclusive dealing contract hardly constitutes independent action. For the reasons detailed in the previous section, contractual provisions
should be viewed as direct evidence of concerted action. Moreover, we
would expect exclusive arrangements to be the product of bargaining, rather
than of unilaterally imposed policies. When given an exclusive territory, a
dealer is relieved from intrabrand competition and should be willing to pay in
some way for this economic benefit. We would expect the supplier to try to
exact some contractual advantage for conferring an exclusive territory. A
Colgate-like independent announcement of policy seems less likely in this
context than in situations where the supplier is imposing requirements on its
dealers that the dealers may find burdensome. Thus, we would expect to find
evidence of concerted action in conjunction with such exclusivity
arrangements.
The argument that suppliers have independent reasons for creating exclusive dealers proves too much. Suppliers always have plausible legitimate
reasons for limiting their distribution chains, which is why courts examine
these restraints under the rule of reason.2 45 Yet plausible legitimate reasons
should not shield an arrangement from any antitrust scrutiny. Moreover, this
argument, like the common purpose argument, misconceives "independent"
action. As previously noted, no common purpose is needed for vertical parties to act in concert; a mere agreement to act or refrain from acting should
be sufficient.
The requirement that the common purpose be illegal suffers from an
additional weakness. It seems to be based on Monsanto's requirement of
evidence of a "conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to
achieve an unlawful objective."'246 As one court argued, since not all exclusive contracts are illegal, they cannot constitute an agreement to achieve the
unlawful objective. 247 Yet, in any rule of reason case, the question of
idea that exclusive contracts can constitute independent action by any suppler. Englert, 872 F.2d
at 1151-52.
242. Davis, 588 F. Supp. at 690 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S.
752, 761 (1984)).
243. Ferguson, 848 F.2d at 981.
244. See Morgan, Strand, Wheeler & Biggs, 924 F.2d at 1488 (contract insufficient to show

concerted action because not all contracts illegal); Castelli, 702 F. Supp. at 1204-05 (plaintiff
must show agreement to achieve anticompetitive purpose to support conspiracy claim).
245. See generally Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-59 (1977)
(adopting rule of reason for vertical non-price restraints because they allow manufacturers to
achieve efficiencies).
246. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (quoting Edward J.
Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980)).
247. Morgan, Strand, Wheeler & Biggs, 924 F.2d at 1488.
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whether the agreement is illegal is left to the fact-finder. Given the complexity of rule of reason analysis, the parties often will have trouble determining
in advance whether their actions are unlawful. To hold that this uncertainty
results in finding that the concerted action requirement is not met would
either eliminate all rule of reason cases for lack of concerted action or would
graft a new scienter requirement onto Sherman Act civil cases. Nothing in
Monsanto suggests that the Supreme Court intended either of these
248
outcomes.
Finally, the idea that exclusive dealing contracts do not constitute concerted action serves no useful policy.249 This result does not screen out ambiguous cases. Instead, it insulates from antitrust scrutiny cases where either
a supplier or a distributor refuses to deal with a potential business partner
because of an agreement with the potential partner's competitor. Commentators have noted the potential for anticompetitive results from these arrangements. 250 The existing screens surely are sufficient protection for their
legitimate use.25 1
C. Concerted Action in Suppliers' DistributionPolicies

This section addresses cases in which a court failed to find concerted
action where suppliers terminated dealers to enforce a price or non-price distribution policy. 252 Some of these courts granted summary judgment even
though the plaintiff appeared to offer some evidence of concerted action.
248. Civil cases under the Sherman Act do not require that the defendant actually know
that its conduct is illegal. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,436 n.13
(1978) (civil violation can be proven by either unlawful purpose or anticompetitive effect).
Given the traditional lack of a scienter requirement, the most logical reading of "conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective" is concerted action to
achieve an end, which later is determined to be unlawful. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 364. It seems
implausible that the Supreme Court would change the scienter requirement without any discussion or dissent. Nothing in the discussions of Monsanto, Matsushita, or Sharp suggests that the
Court believes it did so.
249. See 7 AREEDA, supra note 4, 1 1441h2 (arguing that assessing competitive impact of
these contracts best done through substantive rules rather than through determining whether
agreement exists).
250. E.g., Comanor, supra note 23, at 1160-62; Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C.
Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs To Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE
L.J. 209, 234-37 (1986).
251. Exclusive distribution contracts are analyzed under the rule of reason. 8 AREEDA,
supra note 10, 1 1653. Exclusive dealing contracts are only illegal if they foreclose a substantial
share of the relevant market. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949).
252. A group of cases that might fall into this category are tying cases, in which the supplier
allegedly tries to force a customer to accept a second product or service as a condition for obtaining a more desirable service or product. E.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16
(1984). Some federal courts have questioned the existence of concerted action in some tying
cases arising under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. E.g., Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen.
Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 686-87 (4th Cir. 1992); City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955
F.2d 641,650 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992); City of Chanute, 955 F.2d at 65859 (Seymour, J., concurring). Because the economic issues underlying these cases really are
more akin to monopolization than to other distribution issues, see Will v. Comprehensive Ac-
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1. Price Restraints
In Winn v. Edna Hibel Corp.,253 the plaintiff was a price- cutting dealer
terminated by a manufacturer of collectible artwork. The plaintiff offered
evidence that someone acting on behalf of a full-price competitor tape recorded a transaction in which the plaintiff sold one of the manufacturer's
collectibles for less than MSRP.254 The competitor reported the transaction
to the manufacturer, which reimbursed the competitor for the cost of the
artwork. The manufacturer eventually terminated the plaintiff.255 The Eleventh Circuit stated that the manufacturer had legitimate interests both in
maintaining the integrity of its products by keeping its prices high and in
retaining the complaining dealer. 256 It held that the plaintiff's evidence did
not exclude the possibility that the manufacturer independently terminated
2 57
the plaintiff in pursuit of those interests.
The court did not discuss the significance of the manufacturer's reimbursement of the dealer for its espionage, although providing financial rewards for information would seem to be a much greater degree of supplier
involvement than merely receiving price complaints. Surely, a jury reasonably could infer from the reimbursement that the manufacturer was employing its dealers to monitor adherence to its pricing scheme in ways forbidden
by Parke, Davis and Beech-Nut.258 The reimbursement simply is inconsistent
with a scenario in which the manufacturer independently decided to terminate the plaintiff because of dissatisfaction with the plaintiffs pricing.
counting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Tying is not cooperation among competitiors,
the focus of § 1, it is aggressive conduct akin to monopolization under § 2 .... "), cert denied,
475 U.S. 1129 (1986), I will not address these cases in detail. I mention them only to note that
Monsanto's effects and the courts' reluctance to find evidence of concerted action extend even
further than the cases covered in the text.
253. 858 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1988).
254. id. at 1518.
255. Id. at 1519.
256. Id. at 1520.
257. Id. The validity of the argument that maintaining the integrity of luxury or collector's
items justifies resale price maintenance is beyond the scope of this article. However, at first
blush, maintaining high prices by creating scarcity seems just the sort of behavior the antitrust
laws were supposed to prevent. See Goldberg, supra note 133, at 114 (allowing supplier to use
high price to signal high quality and thus encourage sales "is not an obviously desirable achievement"). This seems particularly true since some consumers believe that high price is a good
indicator of high quality. ROBERT 0. HERRMANN, CONSUMER CHOICE IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 8,71 (1988); BRIAN STERN-IHAL & C. SAMUEL CRAIG, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR: AN INFOR-

MATION PROCESSING PERSPECInVE 40 (1982); Donald R. Lichtenstein et al., Price Perceptions
and Consumer Shopping Behavior: A Field Study, 30 J. MARKETING RES. 234,235 (1993). However, some commentators have suggested that decisions by a low-price, low-reputation dealer to
carry less-well-known brands because they are carried by a high-reputation dealer is a form of
free-riding. See Allison, supra note 1, at 132 & n.7 (citing sources).
258. In finding no evidence of concerted action, the court relied on the lack of evidence that
the manufacturer either told the dealer to report violations or indicated that it would take action
on the basis of such reports. Winn, 858 F.2d at 1520-21. Yet surely the reimbursement followed
by the termination implies just such an arrangement and could be considered evidence that an
agreement already was in place.
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In Cheatham's Furniturev. La-Z-Boy Chair Co.,259 the court found no
price-fixing conspiracy despite a manufacturer's attempts to embroil the
plaintiff in a resale price maintenance scheme. The plaintiff, a terminated
dealer, presented evidence that the manufacturer requested that the plaintiff
raise its prices so the manufacturer could establish a resale price level that
other dealers would follow.26 ° The manufacturer told the plaintiff that if it
raised its prices, the manufacturer would make sure that other dealers would
not undercut it. 261 When the plaintiff refused to raise its prices, the manufacturer terminated it.262 The court found that, absent evidence of a price
agreement between the manufacturer and non-terminated dealers, the manufacturer acted independently. 263 Surely, however, the manufacturer's assurances constitute strong evidence, inconsistent with independent action, that
the manufacturer had price agreements with its other dealers.
In Isaksen v. Vermont Castings, Inc.,264 the district court found insufficient evidence of price conspiracy between a manufacturer and a dealer that
claimed it was coerced into adhering to the manufacturer's prices. 265 Because the dealer did not explicitly indicate it was acquiescing to the manufacturer's price demands, but merely raised its prices, the court found that it had
not met the requirements of Monsanto's footnote nine, which demands that
the acquiescence be both sought and received. 266 The Seventh Circuit, per
Judge Posner, reversed, properly finding that the district court had misread
footnote nine:
If footnote 9 is interpreted this way,... a more explicit agreement
would be required to establish concerted action under the Sherman
Act than to establish a contract enforceable under the Uniform
Commercial Code. We imagine that all the court meant was that
the mere fact of adherence to suggested retail prices does not establish an agreement to adhere to them [negative citation omitted]. If
adherence alone could prove an agreement to adhere, the Colgate
privilege ... would be nugatory. Footnote 9 is part of the discussion
reaffirming Colgate.... But we do not think the Court intended to
go so far as to rule that if a supplier telephones a dealer and tells
him, "Raise your price by next Thursday, or I'll ship you defective
goods," and the dealer merely grunts, but complies, this is not actionable as an agreement to fix the dealer's resale price. If it were
259. 728 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Mo. 1989), aff'd mem, 923 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1990).
260. Id. at 571.
261. Id. at 572.
262. Id. at 571.
263. Id. at 572.
264. 644 F. Supp. 1098 (W.D. Wis. 1986), rev'd, 825 F.2d 1158, 1161 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988).

265. Isaksen v. Vermont Castings, Inc., 825 F.2d 1158, 1161 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. deneid, 486
U.S. 1005 (1988).
266. Isaken, 644 F. Supp. at 1100-01; see also Hay, supra note 187, at 435 (arguing that this
is reasonable reading of Monsanto).
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not, there would be very little left of the rule against vertical price267
fixing, which the Court in Monsanto decided not to reexamine.
These three cases do not contain any evidence of the kind of genuine
non-price concerns that motivate the Supreme Court's continued adherence
to Colgate. In all three cases, the evidence suggested that the supplier was
concerned exclusively with raising the plaintiff's prices. All three suppliers
passed the Colgate threshold, respectively by paying for information, by
promising protection from price competition, and by coercion. These three
cases suggest that a number of courts do not believe the Colgate-plus doctrine survives Monsanto. Yet, as previously noted, Monsanto does not overrule Colgate-plus.
2. Non-Price Cases
In Purity Products, Inc. v. Tropicana Products, Inc.,268 a distributor
claimed that a juice supplier terminated it for failure to adhere to territorial
restraints. 269 The distributor presented evidence that the manufacturer had a
policy of doing business only with those distributors who agreed to limit sales
to retailers in specific territories. 2 70 To enforce this policy, the manufacturer
employed color-coded pallets, investigated high sales volumes by distribu271
tors, and used transporters and brokers to detect and report violations.
On its face, the case resembles a combination of two cases in which the
Supreme Court found sufficient evidence of price-fixing agreements: Bausch
& Lomb 27 2 and Parke, Davis.273 However, the district court, in an opinion
Circuit, found the plaintiff's evidence of concerted
affirmed by the Fourth
274
action insufficient.
In reaching its decision, the district court relied on the absence of evidence that anyone except the manufacturer played an active role in the decision to terminate the plaintiff. 275 This is a remarkable requirement to graft
267. Isaksen v. Vermont Castings, Inc., 825 F.2d 1158, 1164 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486

U.S. 1005 (1988).
268. 702 F. Supp. 564 (D. Md. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Purity Prods., Inc. v. Kohlberg, Kravis,
Roberts & Co., 887 F.2d 1081 (4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
269. Id. at 567.
270. Id. at 566-67.
271. Id. at 572-73.
272. See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 714-15 (1944) (manufacturer employed tracking system to trace sales).
273. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 34 (1960) (manufacturer used
firms in its distribution chain as agents to inform it of deviations from its suggested prices).
274. Purity Products,702 F. Supp. at 572-73. The court distinguished Parke, Davis because
the distributors were "merely" relaying information, not participating in the enforcement
scheme. Id. at 574. The basis for this distinction is that, in Parke, Davis, the distributors were
also asked not to do business with noncomplying retailers. Id.
275. Id. at 573. The court elaborated:
The purported participation of the routemen and the brokers in detecting and reporting
violations of defendants' sales policy does not satisfy the concept of "a meeting of the
minds" or "common scheme" to achieve an unlawful end, as required by Monsanto.
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onto the element of "concerted action. '276 In Monsanto itself, there was no
such evidence; the concerted action that the court upheld was the agreement
to fix prices, not the agreement to terminate Spray-Rite. As the Court
pointed out, the termination followed naturally from the price-fixing conspiracy: The manufacturer needed to terminate distributors who failed to comply to protect those who did and to set an example for those considering
noncompliance.2 77 Similarly, in Purity Products, the agreement between the
manufacturer and its distributors was to divide territories;the termination of
the plaintiff protected those who complied and set an example for those who
might not.
In W.A. Stratton Construction v. Butler Manufacturing Co. ,278 a manufacturer urged two of its dealers to enter into an agreement dividing territories between them.2 79 The dealers disagreed about the proper interpretation
of the agreement, and the plaintiff's competitor complained to the manufacturer, which again met with the dealers and hammered out a new agreement.280 After the competitor complained further about the plaintiff's
failure to8 1 adhere to the agreement, the manufacturer terminated the
2

plaintiff.

The court stated, in dicta,2 82 that the plaintiff probably had presented
insufficient evidence of concerted action between the manufacturer and the
other dealer. 283 It noted the absence of evidence of any consideration from
Neither an overt nor a tacit understanding or agreement to carry out an illegal scheme
existed between the parties.
Id. (citation omitted). The Fourth Circuit's endorsement of Purity Products' insistence on dealer
involvement in termination is particularly ironic given its view of the dealer coercion cases discussed in the Introduction and in part IV.D infra. On the one hand, Purity Products suggests
that dealer terminations in support of manufacturer-imposed restraints will not be considered
concerted action because the dealers are unlikely to participate in the termination decision except by complaining, which is protected activity under Monsanto. On the other hand, cases like
Garment District hold that if a termination decision is dictated by threats from a powerful
dealer-surely the type of "involvement" Purity Products suggests is crucial-the manufacturer's decision to "choose" one dealer over another also is an independent decision. See infra
text accompanying notes 294-305. In fact, it is very difficult to imagine any scenario in which the
Fourth Circuit would find a dealer termination decision to have been the product of "concerted
action."
276. See C.R. Swaney Co. v. Atlas Copco N. Am., Inc., No. 85-587N, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12470, at *21.23 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 1987) (rejecting the argument).
277. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 767 (1984). This is not to say
that there need be no causal link at all between the termination and the conspiracy, just that it
normally will be easy to find. 7 AREEDA, supra note 4, 1 1465b. If, for example, the termination
precedes the formation of a price-fixing conspiracy, obviously the causal link is lacking and a
price-fixing claim should fail.
278. No. 87-0041C, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9461 (W.D. Va. June 23, 1992).
279. Id. at *7-8.
280. Id. at *8-12.
281. Id. at *12-13.
282. The plaintiff had claimed only that the agreement was a per se illegal horizontal territorial restriction. Id. at *14. The court held that the restraint was vertical, not horizontal. Id. at
*19-24.
283. Id. at *16 n.5, *26, *28.
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the competing dealer to the manufacturer for termination of the plaintiff.284
The court viewed the agreements between the two dealers as primarily vertical because of the manufacturer's involvement in the negotiations and the
existence prior to the agreements of some limited imposition of territories by
the manufacturer. 2 85 Remarkably, however, it failed to consider whether the
manufacturer's involvement in the contracting process was evidence that it
was a participant in the agreements between the two dealers that all the parties acknowledged.
The requirement of consideration seems strange. If a manufacturer terminates a dealer for failure to comply with a territorial restraint agreement,
why should some further involvement of the complying dealer be necessary?
Again, Monsanto only requires evidence of a causal link between the termination and the agreement, not evidence that all parties to the conspiracy participated actively in every step.
What these cases have in common is their use of Monsanto to add to the
plaintiff's burden in concerted action cases. Neither requirement created by
these cases-consideration and an active role by the dealer in its competitor's termination-is actually found in Monsanto. Furthermore, although
such evidence would be helpful to plaintiffs in vertical restraint cases, requiring it does not further the policy behind requiring concerted action, especially because neither consideration nor dealer participation in termination
286
would necessarily be present in a typical resale-price-maintenance case.
One final case involving enforcement of a supplier's policy demonstrates
the lower courts' general reluctance to find concerted action. In Parkway
Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/PennsylvaniaHouse Group, Inc.,2 87 discount dealers alleged that a furniture manufacturer terminated them pursuant to a vertical non-price conspiracy to eliminate mail-order sales.2 88 Their
evidence demonstrated that the manufacturer had a policy against telephone
and mail-order sales outside a dealer's territory, which it developed in response to dealer complaints and formulated with dealer involvement.2 89 After the manufacturer announced the plan, some dealers communicated their
284. Id. at *16 n.5.
285. Id. at *19-24.
286. In both International Logistics Group, Ltd. v. Chrysler Corp., 884 F.2d 904 (6th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990), and Advisory Info. & Management Sys. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 76 (M.D. Tenn. 1984), two similarly troubling cases within the Sixth

Circuit, courts found that a supplier's non-price restraint was independent because the supplier
did not need its dealers' acquiescence to implement its policy. While the plaintiffs in both cases

failed to present particularly compelling evidence of concerted action, the language about acquiescence is troubling. Both policies at issue consisted of limits on the ability of dealers to resell
the suppliers' products. InternationalLogistics Group, 884 F.2d at 906-07; Advisory Info. &
Management Sys., 598 F. Supp. at 82 n.3. Yet logically, resale restraints do require acquiescence
to work; the dealers must refrain, for example, from selling outside allotted territories. It is
troubling to imagine that the Sixth Circuit might apply the same logic to a price-fixing case,
which would involve about the same level of dealer acquiescence.
287. 878 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1989).

288. Id. at 802.
289. Id. at 801-03, 805-06.
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agreement with the new policy.290 In addition, some dealers reported the
new policy to the plaintiffs' customers, and at least one dealer reported a
violation to the manufacturer. 29 1 The Fourth Circuit found insufficient evidence of concerted action, characterizing the events as an independent deci29 2
sion by the manufacturer to retain many dealers by sacrificing a few.
While the facts suggest that the manufacturer was attempting to address
a genuine free-rider problem and would have survived a rule of reason challenge, 2 93 the concerted action holding seems questionable on two fronts.
First, the manufacturer's successful attempts to get dealer assurances seem to
comply exactly with the requirements of Monsanto's footnote nine. Second,
the dealers' involvement in the enforcement of the policy seems to bring the
case within Parke, Davis. Like the other cases discussed in this section, Parkway Gallery shows that courts have used Monsanto-a case designed to protect suppliers from per se liability on questionable price-fixing claims-to
prevent non-price rule of reason claims from reaching the jury. Yet these
cases nowhere discuss what policies they are attempting to further with their
decisions.
D. Concerted Action in Dealers' Coercion of Suppliers
Reported cases reflect that the scenario described in the Introduction to
this article is fairly common: A distributor or dealer often tells a supplier
that it will reduce or eliminate its business with the supplier unless the supplier stops doing business with a particular rival distributor or dealer. 294 This
section will examine the way that courts have treated this upward coercion
scenario and will discuss the reasons the scenario should properly be viewed
as concerted action.
290. Id. at 802-03.
291. Id. at 803.
292. Id. at 805-06.
293. The manufacturer was responding to complaints by dealers who provided display and
sales assistance to customers. Many customers subsequently purchased the manufacturer's furniture by mail-order from the plaintiff at a discounted price. Id. at 801-03.
294. See, e.g., Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 573-74 (3d
Cir. 1986) (automobile dealers pressuring manufacturer to forego expanding another dealer's
product line); National Marine Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 778 F.2d 190, 192 (4th Cir.

1985) (electronic parts dealers complaining to manufacturer about mail-order dealer); Terry's
Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 763 F.2d 604, 613 (4th Cir. 1985) (evidence that
one dealer threatened to stop doing business with supplier if it continued to deal with competi-

tior); Ben Elfman & Son, Inc. v. Criterion Mills, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 683, 684-85 (D. Mass. 1991)
(carpet dealer complaining to manufacturer about price-cutting competitor); see also Bailey's,
Inc. v. Windsor Am., Inc., 948 F.2d 1018, 1024 (6th Cir. 1991) (evidence showed that supplier was
aware of indirect threats when it terminated price-cutting dealer). A similar situation occurs
when medical personnel threaten to resign from a hospital staff if the hospital hires or refuses to
terminate competitors. See, e.g., Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th

Cir. 1988) (anesthesiologists threatened to leave hospital due to presence of competing nurse
anesthetist); Cooper v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., 789 F.2d 278, 282 (4th Cir.) (Motz, J., concurring) (noting evidence that members of medical-dental staff of hospital threatened "mass
resignations" if podiatrist given staff privileges), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972 (1986).
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1. Upward Coercion as Independent Action
Several cases that have addressed the upward coercion scenario have
failed to find concerted action. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have provided
the most detailed elaborations of this position.
In Garment District,Inc. v. Belk Stores Services, Inc. ,295 a clothing manufacturer sold its products both to the plaintiff, a discount clothing store, and
to a multi-store retail chain that sold the manufacturer's clothing at two hundred outlets.296 The chain used the one hundred percent mark-up over
wholesale price that the court called the "industry's practice;" the plaintiff
only marked up thirty to thirty-five percent. 297 The chain threatened to stop
doing business with the manufacturer unless the manufacturer stopped doing
business with the plaintiff. The chain backed up its threats by excluding the
manufacturer from a trade show and relegating its clothing to the basement. 298 After meetings between representatives of the manufacturer and
the chain, the manufacturer terminated the plaintiff, lying about the reason
for the termination. 299 It then sent a letter notifying the chain that it had
terminated the plaintiff. Later, the chain tried to destroy all copies of the
letter. 3°° The plaintiff also introduced evidence that the chain previously had
convinced the same manufacturer to stop selling to other retailers and that
the chain had convinced other manufacturers to stop selling to the
30 1
plaintiff.
The Fourth Circuit found the plaintiffs evidence-threats, pretextual
reasons for termination, and industry practice regarding pricing-insufficient
30 2
to show that the manufacturer and the chain acted in concert to set prices.
The court focused on the lack of evidence that the manufacturer had ever
tried to enforce a particular price on one of its dealers, 30 3 and referred to the
manufacturer's decision to terminate a discounter "to avoid losing the business of disgruntled dealers" as a "legitimate, independent reason[ ]" for the
304
termination.
Garment District starkly presents the issue of the purpose of the concerted action requirement. The case contains no reference to the existence of
free-rider problems or potentially procompetitive, non-price restraints. Indeed, the court specifically refused to consider evidence that the termination
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

799 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988).
Id. at 906-07.
Id. at 907.
Id. at 907, 911.
Id. at 906-07.
Id. at 907, 911.

301. Id. at 907. Interestingly, a different discounter provided evidence of threats from the
same retailer to a different manufacturer in Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse v. Belk Bros.
Co., 621 F. Supp. 224, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
302. Garment District, 799 F.2d at 908-11.

303. Id. at 908 (citing National Marine Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 778 F.2d 190,
192 (4th Cir. 1985)).

304. Id. at 909.
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had actually harmed competition because it believed the plaintiff had offered
insufficient evidence of concerted action. 30 5 Its statement that saving one
dealer at the expense of another is legitimate and independent conduct basi-6
30
cally means that no upward coercion case ever can be concerted action.
Why read the concerted action narrowly where there is evidence of harm to
competition? Why do upward threats plus acquiescence not equal concerted
action?
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in The Jeanery, Inc. v. James
Jeans, Inc. 3 0 7 A manufacturer of a popular brand of jeans suggested retail
prices that were twice the wholesale price, but the plaintiff sold the jeans for
less, leading the manufacturer to express disapproval. 308 The manufacturer
threatened to stop filling the plaintiff's orders unless it altered its pricing
practices. 30 9 A competing dealer complained about the price-cutting and
threatened to stop purchasing the product unless the manufacturer stopped
selling to the plaintiff.310 The manufacturer responded that it would "take
care of things. '' 311 Subsequently, the manufacturer refused to fill the plaintiff's orders until it discussed the plaintiff's pricing practices with the plaintiff's representative.3 12 When the manufacturer then refused to fill an order,
3 13
the plaintiff sued.

The court characterized the competing dealer's threat as a "strongly
worded complaint," insufficient under Monsanto to survive summary judgment. 314 It characterized the manufacturer's response not as acquiescence to
the threat, but merely as an effort to "calm an angry customer. '315 The court
found the manufacturer's tactics not illegal coercion, but rather legitimate
305. Id. at 910-11.

306. Of course, one could read the case narrowly to hold merely that the evidence did not
show the dealer threats were sufficiently price related. However, the court's broad language
about threats belies that reading. Inany event, the combination of industry pricing practices and

the absence of non-price restraints that might have demonstrated genuine procompetitive concerns should have constituted sufficient evidence of price concerns to take the case to the jury.
Despite the weakness of its logic, at least one other court has followed Garment District on this
point to find no concerted action in an upward coercion case. Blanton Enters. v. Burger King

Corp., 680 F. Supp. 753, 760-61 (D.S.C. 1988); see also Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656, 663 (7th Cir.) (citing Garment District with approval on this point), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987).
307. 849 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1988).

308. Id. at 1150-51.
309. Id. at 1159.
310. Id. at 1150-51.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 1151.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 1157-59. The court also found no evidence of an agreement on price or price
levels as required by Sharp for per se treatment. Id. at 1160 n.10. This seems strange in light of
the industry practice of pricing at twice the wholesale price and the specificity of the complaint
by the other dealer: "[W]e've got a guy right across from me that's selling your product for $5.00
off all the time." Id. at 1158. The specificity of "$5.00 off" certainly suggested some understanding that the price was supposed to be $5.00 more than plaintiff charged.
315. ld. at 1158.
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pressure to get the plaintiff to sell at MSRP.3 16 Like the Fourth Circuit, the
court concluded that the manufacturer had an independent reason for refus3 17
ing to do business with the plaintiff: avoiding problems with other dealers.
The court focused its analysis on the lack of evidence of a general pricefixing conspiracy between the manufacturer and its many dealers. 318 It found
significant the absence of evidence that other dealers communicated acquiescence in the manufacturer's prices and that some of these dealers charged
less than MSRP. 319 However, the court's focus here is backward. The alleged conspiracy was not price-fixing arranged by a supplier, but.rather a
dealer-coerced termination. Here, the dealer's threat constituted a "request"
for acquiescence, and arguably, the manufacturer acquiesced when it assured
the dealer that it would "take care of" the problem. 320 The other dealers'
low prices did not demonstrate the absence of a price agreement, but instead
strengthened the plaintiff's claim by suggesting that the manufacturer did not
take its MSRP terribly seriously in the absence of threats from an important
dealer. The court made no effort to explain why it was looking for a conspiracy involving all the dealers, rather than just an agreement between the manufacturer and the threat-maker. Like the Fourth Circuit in Garment District,
the court failed to address the purpose of the concerted action requirement
at all.
If these cases are followed everywhere, they will insulate a threatening
full-price retailer from any antitrust liability because, even if its supplier responds to its threats, courts will find no concerted action. The rest of this
section will demonstrate that this result encourages anticompetitive behavior
and extends far beyond anything contemplated by the Supreme Court.
2. Upward Coercion as Concerted Action
Several federal courts have found, or suggested that, the upward coercion scenario constitutes concerted action. Some, including the Third Circuit,
have explicitly relied on threats by dealers to overcome the Monsanto hurdle. 32 1 Both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have analyzed upward coercion
316. Id. at 1159.
317. Id. The court relied on Sharp, which it read as holding "that a manufacturer can agree
to terminate a price-cutting distributor in response to a complaint from another dealer." Id. at
1160. This is a profound misreading of Sharp, which only addressed the question of which agreements should be judged under the per se rule, and not whether an agreement was formed. See
Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 720 (1988) ("We granted certiorari to
resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals regarding the proper dividing line between the rule

that vertical price restraints are illegal per se and the rule that vertical nonprice restraints are to
be judged under the rule of reason.") (citations omitted).
318. The Jeanery, 849 F.2d at 1157-60.
319. Id. at 1160.

320. Id. at 1163 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Whether this exchange was intended to "calm"
the dealer, as suggested by the majority, or represented an acquiescence to the threat, as suggested by the dissent, is arguably a jury question. Id. at 1163 n.5 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
321. See Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1375-78 (3d Cir.

1992) (evidence of dealer threats sufficient for antitrust liability), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1262
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situations for unreasonableness, apparently assuming that concerted action
was present. 3 22 Other courts have indicated that they would reach similar
results, either explicitly in dicta 323 or by distinguishing evidence before them
from situations in which threats were made. 324 This subsection argues that
these courts have analyzed the upward coercion scenario correctly.
a) Precedent
The Supreme Court vertical restraint cases do not support the holdings
of Garment District and The Jeanery.325 Significantly, the Sharp case involved an example of the upward coercion scenario. 326 In Sharp, the Fifth
Circuit, after extended discussion, decided that the terminated dealer had
produced sufficient evidence of concerted action. 327 The Supreme Court did
not question whether concerted action existed in the case and, indeed,
seemed to categorize the situation as a vertical agreement. 328 Of course, the
manufacturer did not raise the concerted action issue directly with the
Court. 329 However, given the Fifth Circuit's opinion, surely some of the jus(1993); Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 573-74 (3d Cir. 1986)
(same); Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse v. Belk Bros. Co., 621 F. Supp. 224, 234-35, 235 n.23
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same); Marco Holding Co. v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 204, 210 (N.D. I11.
1985) (same); Marco Holding Co. v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 204, 210 (N.D. I11.1985)
(same); James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 593 F. Supp. 915, 922-23 (D. Del. 1984) (same).
In Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hospital, 861 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit
held that doctors' threats to leave a hospital unless the hospital terminated the plaintiff, combined with the hospital's knowledge of and concern about the threats, constituted direct evidence of concerted action between the doctors and the hospital. Id. at 1451. Interestingly, the
case does not refer to The Jeanery at all.
322. Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 594 (8th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988); Westmann Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l Co., 796
F.2d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988).
323. Beach v. Viking Sewing Mach. Co., 784 F.2d 746, 750 (6th Cir. 1986).
324. E.g., Dunnivant v. Bi-State Auto Parts, 851 F.2d 1575, 1581 (11th Cir. 1988); Barnes v.
Arden Mayfair, Inc., 759 F.2d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 1985); Sorisio v. Lenox, Inc. 701 F. Supp. 950,
958-59 (D. Conn.) aff'd, 863 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1988); Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 617 F.
Supp. 800, 808 (N.D. Ind. 1985), aff'd on other grounds,797 F.2d 1430 (7th Cir. 1986); Moffat v.
Lane Co., 595 F. Supp. 43, 48 (D. Mass. 1984); Reborn Enters., Inc. v. Fine Child, Inc., 590 F.
Supp. 1423, 1433 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 754 F.2d 1072 (2d Cir. 1985).
In Regency Oldsmobile Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 723 F. Supp. 250 (D.N.J. 1989), the
court seemed to come out both ways on dealer threats. On the one hand, the court stated that
suggestions from dealers did not create concerted action because they were not threats. Id. at
260. On the other hand, in addressing a separate conspiracy, the court stated that termination in
response to threats did not constitute concerted action. Id. at 261-63 (citing Garment Dist., Inc.
v. Belk Store Servs., Inc., 799 F.2d 905, 909-10 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988)).
325. See Shores, supra note 140, at 309 (Garment Districtgoes beyond requirements of both
Monsanto and Matsushita).
326. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 721 (1988).
327. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 780 F.2d 1212, 1219 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd
on other grounds, 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
328. See Sharp, 485 U.S. at 726, 729 n.3 (repeatedly using term "agreement" in responding
to dissent concern about appropriate legal standard, including phrase "[in the precise case of a
vertical agreement to terminate other dealers").
329. Id. at 753 n.18 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tices would have raised the issue if it even had occurred to them that the
apparent agreement between Sharp and its dealer did not constitute concerted action.

330

In addition, as previously noted, in several pre-Monsanto cases the
Supreme Court found that a supplier's active coercion of a dealer to adhere
to a vertical restraint constitutes an agreement within the meaning of Section
1.331 Furthermore, as some courts have noted, Monsanto itself found that
the manufacturer's coercion of certain dealers to adhere to the suggested retail prices constituted direct evidence of a price conspiracy. 332 As Judge Pos330. Concededly, the plaintiff in Sharp adduced more evidence of concerted action than the
simple version of the upward coercion scenario presented in the Introduction. The Fifth Circuit
opinion reveals evidence that the manufacturer expressed concern about the plaintiff's prices
prior to the other dealer's threats and that the non-price reasons for the termination were
pretextual. See Sharp, 780 F.2d at 1219 (explaining summary judgment denial). However, it
seems unlikely that the Sharp plaintiff would have been able to take its case to the jury under the
analysis applied either in The Jeanery or Garment District.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 130-32. Some courts have suggested that the coercion cases do not survive Monsanto. See Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1478 (9th
Cir. 1986) (precedential value of coercion cases called in question by Monsanto), modified, 810
F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1987); Ben Sheftall Distrib. Co. v. Mirta de Perales, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1575,
1582 (S.D. Ga. 1992) (Monsanto may have limited effect of Parke, Davis on Colgate); Newport
Components, Inc. v. NEC Home Elecs. (U.S.A.), Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1546 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
(continuing validity of coercion cases cast in some doubt by Monsanto); see also Empire Volkswagen, Inc. v. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 627 F. Supp. 1202, 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding
supplier's threats and coercive actions insufficient evidence of concerted action), aff'd, 814 F.2d
90 (2d Cir. 1987).
Yet many courts, including the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, have stated or found that this
form of coercion still constitutes concerted action. E.g., Tidmore Oil v. BP Oil CoJGulf Prod.
Div., 932 F.2d 1384, 1389 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 339 (1991); Z Channel Ltd. Partnership v. Home Box Office, Inc., 931 F.2d 1338, 1344 n.9 (9th Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 875
(1992); Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, 878 F.2d 801,
806 n.5 (4th Cir. 1989); Isaksen v. Vermont Castings, Inc., 825 F.2d 1158, 1164 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1213 (6th Cir.
1984); Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., Inc., 732 F.2d 779, 780 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 469
U.S. 854 (1984); Sorisio v. Lenox, Inc. 701 F. Supp. 950, 954-55 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 863 F.2d 195
(2d Cir. 1988).
The Dimidowich case relied on a statement by Phillip Areeda that unwilling compliance no
longer states a cause of action after Monsanto. See Dimidowich, 803 F.2d at 1478 (citing 7 PHILip E. AREEDA, ANTrrRuST LAW 1451 (1986)). However, as his subsequent discussion makes
clear, Areeda refers in the cited passage to claims where the only evidence of agreement is a
supplier's Colgate-style policy plus the plaintiff's claim that it followed the policy unwillingly.
See 7 AREEDA, supra note 4, 1 1451 (discussing unwilling compliance after Monsanto); Isaksen,
825 F.2d at 1164 (Posner, J.) (same). Areeda recognizes that concerted action still arises in
situations in which the supplier puts individualized pressure on the dealer and the dealer gives
(coerced) acquiescence. 7 AREEDA, supra note 4, 1 1449-1451; 8 AREEDA, supra note 10, 11
1630-1631. In any event, as Professor Areeda himself notes, the policy behind Colgate does not
apply to upward attempts at coercion. See infra text accompanying notes 336-48; 7 AREEDA,
supra note 4,
1457.
332. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servs. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-65 (1984); see also Beach
v. Viking Sewing Mach. Co., 784 F.2d 746, 749 (6th Cir. 1986) (discussing Monsanto holding);
Black Gold, 732 F.2d at 780 (same); Reborn Enters., Inc. v. Fine Child, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1423,
1439 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same), aff'd, 754 F.2d 1072 (2d Cir. 1985).
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ner has stated, "A conspiracy is not less sinister because some of its members
are intimidated, rather than bribed, into joining it. '' 333 As a definitional matter, if downward threats plus acquiescence equal conspiracy, the same should
be true for upward threats, unless some policy reason demands treating them
differently. 334 The Jeanery suggested that Monsanto foreclosed this position
by requiring that the supplierseek and the dealergive acquiescence. 335 However, Monsanto nowhere explicitly foreclosed finding concerted action in upward coercion cases. More importantly, as the next section will show, the
policies behind Monsanto suggest that upward coercion is more dangerous to
competition and should be easier to attack than downward coercion.
b) Purpose
One of the concerns expressed by the Court in Monsanto was the need
to allow the free flow of information within a distribution chain. 336 The
Court worried that deterring suppliers from acting on information they receive in the form of complaints would create irrational dislocations in the
market. 337 The Jeanery and a number of other cases have characterized upward threats as a form of complaint.338 This view makes sense if one sees the
threat as a statement such as: "In present market conditions, I cannot afford
to continue distributing your product. If you do not change the market conditions, I will cease doing business with you."' 3 3 9 In response, the manufacturer can terminate a competitor, institute price restraints, negotiate with the
threat-maker, or simply ignore the statement altogether. In all cases, the
manufacturer has new information that it can use to decide how or whether
to reorganize its distribution chain.
However, unlike other complaints, dealer threats are not necessarily
purely informational in nature. 340 They may be exertions of market power
333. Isaksen, 825 F.2d at 1163 (7th Cir. 1987).
334. See Gerla, supra note 69, at 14, 15 (arguing that Colgate does not foreclose finding of

conspiracy in upward coercion cases); cf. 7 AREEDA, supra note 4, 1 1457 (logically, upward and
downward coercion cases should be treated alike).
335. The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148, 1160 (9th Cir. 1988); accord Link
v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 679, 689-90 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd in part and
vacated in part on other grounds, 788 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1986).

336. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64.
337. Id.
338. E.g., The Jeanery, 849 F.2d at 1157-59; National Marine Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 778 F.2d 190, 192 (4th Cir. 1985); Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Burlington Indus.,
Inc., 763 F.2d 604, 614-15 (4th Cir. 1985); Magid Mfg. Co. v. U.S.D. Corp., 654 F. Supp. 325, 329
n.6, 331 (N.D. I11.1987).

339. See 7 AREEDA, supra note 4, 1453c (dealer complaint about competing dealer may
"merely be stating that the truism that the complainer cannot profitably comply with the manufacturer's desire for certain services, or for prices facilitating costly services, if rival dealers without such services sell the same product for less"); Ned E. Barlas, Dealers Coercing
Manufacturers: A Proposalfor a UnilateralAntitrust Offense, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2335, 2355-56
(1989) (arguing that full-price dealers' ultimatums simply communicate that supplier's marketing
strategy of including discounters is not working).
340. The Jeanery, 849 F.2d at 1164 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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by powerful dealers. 34 1 Indeed, Phillip Areeda has cited Garment District as
an example of a harmful restraint on intrabrand competition caused by an
exercise of dealer power. 342 Because of the risk of anticompetitive harm, we
should hesitate to follow Garment District and The Jeanery and completely
immunize the conduct. After all, threatening a supplier is quite risky for retailers. If a retailer tries to force the supplier to accept supra-competitive
pricing, its threats may backfire. The supplier may decide that it can sell
more products at the lower competitive retail price and thus may allow the
higher priced retailer to stop distributing its products. Given this risk, rational retailers would not attempt to threaten a supplier unless they have
some suspicion that they may succeed, either because of their market power
or because of the supplier's indifference to pricing. Thus, once a retailer has
made a threat, it seems fair to treat the threat as a sincere attempt to compel
the termination of a rival, rather than a mere complaint about the condition
of the market and to treat the supplier's acquiescence as creating concerted
action. 343 This approach allows the supplier the opportunity to defend the
threat and its consequences by convincing the jury that it acted for reasons
other than the threat or, in a rule of reason case, that the agreement aided
competition. 3" It also allows the supplier to adjust its distribution system in
the event that the "complaints" take the form of threats but does not encourage threats from full-price retailers by completely immunizing their
conduct.
More importantly, Monsanto and Sylvania are designed, in part, to give
suppliers the ability to organize their distribution systems in a way that maxi341. Of course it is possible to argue that retailers and distributors generally have little
market power because of the large numbers of players in the fields and the ease of entry. See
supra note 10. If we believe that few dealers have real power, we might worry less about immunizing their conduct. However, small manufacturers might become very reliant on access to a
single large dealer, and evidence in the cases suggests that these large dealers are not afraid to
take advantage of their position. For example, one case described evidence of a speech by a
department store chain executive to a meeting of retailers and garment manufacturers arguing
that department stores, to end free-riding, should stop dealing with manufacturers who sold
current season fashions to discounters. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit De
Corp., 769 F.2d 919, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1985). Another case described evidence that a retailer had
announced that it would meet any competitor's prices. However, when one discounter's prices
became so low they were difficult to meet, the retailer threatened suppliers that it would drop
their product lines if they continued to sell to the discounter. Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. R.H. Macy &
Co., 728 F. Supp. 230, 231-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
342. Areeda, supra note 38, at 575 n.8.
343. See Jones, supra note 12, at 742-44 (arguing that acquiescence to "harmful threats"
should constitute concerted action). Jones proposes a multi-factor test examining market conditions to distinguish threats from simple complaints. Id. at 743. This seems like an unnecessarily
complex analysis for the court to undertake at the summary judgment stage. Common sense
may be sufficient to make the distinction. If the proposal described in Part VI is adopted, the
consequences of finding conspiracy will be somewhat reduced along with the need to be quite so
precise in distinguishing threats from complaints.
344. Under the burden-shifting approach proposed in Part VI, even in a price-fixing case,
the manufacturer could also try to show that it was attempting to deal with a free-rider problem.
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mizes their ability to compete. 345 To fulfill this purpose, it makes sense to
give the suppliers significant leeway to structure these systems. It makes less
sense to give leeway to the dealers themselves. Many judges and commentators have noted that actions taken at the direction of dealers are different in
kind than those taken by suppliers regulating their distribution chains. 346 In
these upwardly motivated cases, we need to worry that the purpose of coercion by a retailer or dealer is to eliminate competition from rivals on its own
level. These cases are much closer in structure to horizontal boycotts, which
are often subject to per se treatment.347 To immunize upward coercion cases,
while still subjecting supplier-imposed restraints to the rule of reason, stands
Sylvania and Monsanto on their heads.
The Jeanery and Garment District allow harm to intrabrand competition
yet do not contain evidence that the supplier acted after making an assessment of its own needs, evidence that creates the presumption that the restraint will increase interbrand competition. The approach used in these
cases also screens from the jury cases in which the manufacturer's independent reasons for terminating a dealer simply are much less likely to be at issue
because strong evidence that the manufacturer is acting in furtherance of its
threat-making dealer's interests exists.348 Upward coercion cases raise the
specter of dealer cartels and oligopoly without clear procompetitive
advantages.
E. Taming the Wayward Children
Separately, the cases in this part may simply be examples of work by
lawyers and judges that is careless or not well reasoned. Together, however,
they suggest more than sloppy reading of the Supreme Court's precedents,
but rather a general attack on the ability of plaintiffs to survive summary
judgment in vertical restraint cases. Judged solely by the facts and holdings
of the Supreme Court's vertical concerted action cases, this anti-plaintiff
trend is a bit bizarre. Since 1921, every Supreme Court case involving verti345. See supra part II.
346. E.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 741 n.4 (1988) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Crane & Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802,809 (6th Cir. 1988)
(same); Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 593-94
(8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988); O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 792
F.2d 1464, 1467 (9th Cir. 1986); Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133,
140-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 469
U.S. 1072 (1984); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 728 F. Supp. 230,236 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
North Cent. Watt Count, Inc. v. Watt Count Eng'g Sys., Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1305, 1314-15 (M.D.
Tenn. 1988); Allison, supra note 1, at 135; 7 AREEDA, supra note 4, i 1457; BORK, supra note 16,
at 33 (same); Doherty, supra note 11, at 996 (same); Flynn, supra note 10, at 1144; Gerla, supra
note 69, at 14; Piraino, supra note 86, at 17-18. But see Bailey's, Inc. v. Windsor Am., Inc., 948
F.2d 1018, 1029 n.5 (6th Cir. 1991).
347. E.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers' Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 421 (1990).
348. Presumably, if the termination of the price-cutter was clearly in the manufacturer's
interests, a mere suggestion or explanation by the other dealer would trigger termination. If the
other dealer were forced to resort to threats, it suggests that the manufacturer did not see the
termination as clearly furthering any truly independent needs.
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cal restraints has found sufficient evidence of concerted action. 34 9 Yet the
lower courts have found in the language of Monsanto and Matsushita potent
weapons to use against antitrust plaintiffs.
This turn of events has not been inevitable. As noted previously, it is
possible to read Monsanto quite narrowly given its facts. Moreover, in Kodak, the Supreme Court recently indicated that it did not intend Matsushita
to establish a new summary judgment standard or to be read broadly: "Matsushita demands only that the nonmoving party's inferences be reasonable in
order to reach the jury, a requirement that was not invented, but merely articulated, in that decision. ' 350 Yet between Monsanto, Matsushita, and the
Supreme Court's other recent summary judgment jurisprudence, 35 1 the lower
courts clearly have gotten the message that summary judgment in antitrust
352
cases is a good thing.
To be consistent with the policies of Sylvania and Monsanto, either the
Supreme Court or Congress needs to clean up this area of the law. One
possibility is simply to abandon as unworkable Monsanto's standards for
showing concerted action. 353 If, as Part VI suggests, the per se rule for vertical price-fixing is eliminated, the need to use the concerted action requirement as a screen will be lessened significantly. However, Monsanto is not
necessarily unworkable. The Supreme Court could clarify it in ways that will
make it work in the fashion suggested in Part III without completely freeing
questionable vertical arrangements from any judicial scrutiny.
First, the Court could make clear that the concerted action requirement
has little or no role to play in non-price rule of reason cases. Monsanto appears to have been designed to prevent questionable cases from falling into
349. The last case to find no concerted action was Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256

U.S. 208 (1921).
350. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (1992). Of
course, Matsushita's broad language might well have encouraged the belief that the case was a
significant change in summary judgment law. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 599-601 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) ("If the Court does not intend such a
pronouncement, it should refrain from using unnecessarily broad and confusing language.").
351. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (establishing summary judgment
standards); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986) (same).
352. For example, one court explicitly noted that Monsanto and Matsushita represented a
withdrawal from an earlier reluctance to grant summary judgment and demonstrated that the
Court now freely approves summary treatment in antitrust cases. Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. v.
Medina, 834 F.2d 242, 247 (lst Cir. 1987). This seems to be part of a larger trend toward disfavoring civil plaintiffs in the federal system. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 87-94 (1990) (discussing lower court
application of Supreme Court summary judgment holdings); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted
Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the
Adjudication Process, 49 Oio ST. L.J. 95, 107-08 (1988) (suggesting that recent Supreme Court

decisions have eased ability to obtain summary judgment). The trend may predate the 1986
summary judgment cases. See Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and
Other Examples of Equilibriating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1104,
1130-31, 1137-39 (1986) (discussing results of research project indicating increased use of sum-

mary judgment in antitrust area).
353. See Bums, supra note 95, at 38-39 (suggesting abandonment of Colgate distinction).
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the unforgiving domain of the per se rule. 354 Matsushita was also a per se
case. 355 Although courts regularly apply these precedents in non-price cases,
rule of reason defendants have less to fear from a jury because the plaintiff
must prove not only that the defendants conspired, but also that the conspiracy actually harmed competition. Given this additional burden on the plaintiff, treating a dealer's acquiescence in its supplier's non-price policies as
concerted action should not unduly deter procompetitive conduct. Thus,
worrying about the concerted action requirement in non-price cases makes
356
little sense.

Second, the Court could make clear what the Monsanto standard means.
Part III argued that Monsanto stands for the idea that the plaintiff must
demonstrate some evidence inconsistent with the defendant's account of a
legitimate reason for termination. If this reading of the case is correct, clear
Supreme Court guidance would eliminate much confusion, particularly in the
important class of upward coercion cases. If the Court intended some other
meaning, it would be helpful to have a more precise elaboration of the relevant standards.
The courts in many of the cases discussed in this Part appear very quick
to expand the concerted action requirement to eliminate any antitrust scrutiny of vertical restraints. These courts may well believe that vertical restraints are generally harmless and therefore may want to limit the harms
they believe are caused by the continued existence of the per se rule for price
fixing. 357 Part V develops reasons for the continued heightened scrutiny of
vertical price restraints, and Part VI lays out a test that limits the harshest
effects of the per se rule. The proposals in Part VI should limit the perceived
need to soften the impact of the per se rule with questionable concerted action decisions.
V.

TOWARD A NEW TEST FOR VERTICAL PRICE-FIXING

For more than three-quarters of a century, vertical price restraints have
been per se illegal. Since the Supreme Court decided Sylvania in 1977, vertical non-price restraints have been judged under the rule of reason and rarely
have been found to be illegal. Discomfort with the stark dichotomy between
354. See supra Part III.D; see also Calkins, supra note 352, at 1094 (discussing Monsanto

Court's effort to limit application of per se rule); Flynn, supra note 10, at 1143 (same); Piraino,
supra note 86, at 318-19 (same); Shores, supra note 140, at 311 (same).
355. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1986).

356. See 7 AREEDA, supra note 4, 1 1437 (concerted action rules for price agreements may
not be appropriate for non-price restraints); Barbara Ann White, Black and White Thinking in
the Gray Areas of Antitrust: The Dismantling of Vertical Restraints Regulation, 60 GEO. WASH.

L. REV. 1, 29 (1991) (arguing that most scholars believe that Court did not intend Monsanto
standard to apply to non-price restraints); cf. Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d
380,402 (7th Cir. 1984) (Swygert, J., dissenting) (questioning application of Colgate in non-price
case).

357. For arguments that this type of thinking has governed particular cases, see Baker,
supra note 53, at 1498; Blair & Harrison, supra note 98, at 1561; and Calkins, supra note 352, at
1067, 1082, 1094.
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the per se rule and the rule of reason undoubtedly animated the Supreme
Court's decisions in Monsanto and Sharp, as well as some of the awkward
concerted action cases discussed in Part IV. After all, why should arrangements that have effects similar to those that motivated Sylvania fall under the
358
ruthless guillotine of per se analysis?
Yet in the years since Sylvania, the Court has blurred the dichotomy in

other areas of antitrust law involving per se rules. This set of precedents,

combined with continued critical commentary of current vertical restraints
doctrine, 359 suggests that a re-examination of the treatment of vertical pricefixing is in order. This Part argues that the existing forms of analysis are
inadequate to deal with the issues raised by vertical price-fixing.
A. The Blurring of the Distinctions Between the Per Se Rule and the Rule
of Reason
At one time, the Supreme Court could assert with confidence that a
number of categories of business behavior-price-fixing, tying, 360 and group
boycotts 36 1-were per se illegal. 362 Business arrangements falling outside of
these categories generally were judged under the rule of reason. However, in
the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has retreated from a strong dichotomy between per se and rule of reason analysis.
In a number of important cases, the Court has created an extra layer of
judicial examination for all the traditional per se categories except vertical
price-fixing. In a process known as the mini-rule of reason, the court examines the alleged illegal arrangement to determine if it looks like the kind of
case for which per se treatment is appropriate. For example, in horizontal
price-fixing cases, if the defendant can show evidence that the price-fixing
arrangement helps make creation of a new product or market possible, or can
show that the price-fixing might be justified by professional ethical norms,
358. See Steiner, supra note 2, at 144 (noting discomfort of commentators with dichotomy).
359. E.g., BORK, supra note 16, at 435-36; Baxter, supra note 10, at 933; Bock, supra note
47, at 122-23.
360. "lying" occurs when a seller of goods or services makes the purchase of one good or
service conditional on acquiring some more desired good or service. HOVENKAMp, supra note
13, § 5.4d.
361. "Group boycott" is a shorthand phrase used to describe a business arrangement in
which a group of firms jointly refuses to do business with another firm or firms, either completely or under certain conditions. Several kinds of patterns are characterized as boycotts. See
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768, 770 (1990) (competitors agree not to
do business unless they receive a particular price); FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S.
447, 449 (1986) (competitors agree not to do business with cutomers except on particular nonprice terms); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 286 (1985) (participants in joint venture refuse to let competitor participate); Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 209 (1959) (retailer convinces suppliers not to do
business with retailer's competitor); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S.
457, 461 (1941) (fashion designers refuse to sell to retailers who also sell unathorized copies of
clothing they have designed).
362. The Court also has held horizontal territorial divisions to be per se illegal. E.g., United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
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the Court will analyze the arrangement under the rule of reason rather than
the traditional per se rule. 36 3 The Court has developed similar approaches
for boycott and tying cases. 364 For our purposes, the importance of these
analyses is the Court's willingness to move away from years of rhetoric about
the per se rule by relying on economic theory, despite receiving no new instructions from Congress about the proper interpretation of the Sherman
5
36

Act.

Other recent Supreme Court cases have blurred the line between the
rule of reason and per se analysis further by creating a tougher version of
rule of reason analysis. The Court stated that an antitrust plaintiff need not
prove that the defendants had market power in a rule of reason case where
the agreement in question is a "naked restraint" on trade-that is, a pure
restraint on output not ancillary to any competition-enhancing arrangement. 366 Once a court characterizes an arrangement as a naked restraint, the
defendant bears the burden of producing evidence that the arrangement has
significant procompetitive effects. 367 Naked restraint analysis obviously

363. E.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1,24 (1979);
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
364. In boycott cases, if the defendants can show that their arrangement possesses potential
to improve competition or that they lack market power, they may be entitled to rule of reason
analysis. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 286. The Court has not made clear precisely which combination of elements is required to distinguish per se from rule of reason treatment. Id. at 295, 298; see also FTC, 110 S. Ct. at 774-75 (Court refuses to require showing of
market power for per se treatment where defendants engaged in boycott to force District of
Columbia to pay more for their services).
In a tying case, for a plaintiff to receive the benefits of per se treatment, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant has some market power over the product or service it is using as a lever
to force purchases of other goods. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 4
(1984). The market power may take the form of a unique product, like a patented good or land,
or a market share of more than 30%. Id. at 16-18, 26-28. In addition, even in some supposedly
per se tying cases, the lower federal courts have allowed a narrow defense: that the tying arrangement was the least restrictive alternative necessary to achieve some procompetitive end.
E.g., Mozart v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1349 (9th Cir. 1987) cert. denied,
488 U.S. 870 (1988); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033,
1040 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988).
365. E.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 295; BroadcastMusic, 441 U.S. at 2023.
366. FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1986), 476 U.S. at 457-58;
NCAA, 468 U.S. at.98.
The Eleventh Circuit has rejected the reading of NCAA advanced here:
In NCAA, the fact that the NCAA possessed power in the collegiate sports television
market was obvious. The thrust of the Court's discussion ... is actually to the effect
that where "[als a factual matter, it is evident that petitioner does possess market
power .. ," a lengthy economic analysis of market power is unnecessary.
DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1507 n.10 (11th Cir. 1989)
(quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. at 111).
367. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113; Areeda, supra note 38, at 578. While the case does not say so
explicitly, the structure of Indiana Federation of Dentists suggests that it applies the same burden-shift. Indiana Fed'n, 476 U.S. at 459-65.
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makes it much easier for plaintiffs to win a limited group of rule of reason
cases. Moreover, like the mini-rule of reason cases, these precedents suggest
that creating intermediate positions between per se and the rule of reason is
well within the bounds of existing case law.
After these cases, vertical restraints remain the only significant area of
Section 1 jurisprudence starkly divided into traditional per se and rule of
reason analysis. 368 This suggests that the time is ripe for a re-evaluation of
the appropriateness of the per se rule for vertical price-fixing. 369 In order to
better undertake this evaluation, it is useful to examine the operation of retail markets, which are the setting for many, if not most, vertical restraints
cases.
368. The Court has not yet ruled on whether the exceptions to the per se rules it has developed in other areas apply to horizontal territorial divisions. Robert Bork has noted two possible
reasons for the retention of the pure per se rule for vertical price-fixing. First, an influential
political group, discount retailers, opposes the change. BoRx, supra note 16, at xiii. Second,
"[ilt may be the case that the Supreme Court is reluctant to change the rule ... because the
justices know that Congress, as presently constituted, would probably react by freezing that misguided doctrine in statutory law." Id.
369. The stare decisis argument in favor of retaining the per se rule for vertical price-fixing
goes as follows: The Supreme Court has a long history of treating price and non-price restraints
differently. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 500 (1940) ("In general restraints
upon competition have been condemned only when their purpose or effect was to raise or fix the
market price."). Per se treatment of vertical price-fixing dates back to Dr. Miles in 1911. Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373,408 (1911). Additionally, the per se
rule has been reaffirmed repeatedly, even in the new era of antitrust law. See Business Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724, 735-36 (1988) (vertical restraints per se illegal if
they contain agreements on price or price levels); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465
U.S. 752, 761-62 (1984) (reaffirming per se analysis of vertical price restraints); Continental TV,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977) (same).
Moreover, Congress repealed statutory provisions allowing resale price maintenance in
1975. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18. Thus, the argument of implied congressional adoption of per
se treatment of vertical price-fixing as part of the Sherman Act is relatively strong. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 769 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that Congress has never enacted legislation overruling this interpretation of Sherman Act).
However, as the tampering in other areas suggests, antitrust law is often seen as having an
evolving nature that allows the judiciary to continually reassess the suitability of the doctrines it
has developed. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 4, at 670 (explaining that this is exactly what framers
of antitrust laws intended). For example, during the 1960s and 1970s, the Court performed a
major flip-flop on the treatment of non-price vertical restraints although Congress did not
amend the Sherman Act during this period. Compare White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253 (1963) with United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) and Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). It seems sensible to at least examine
whether the jurisprudence of the last 15 years applies to vertical price restraints as well.
Much of the analysis presented in the rest of this section might also suggest a re-evaluation
of the benefits of full-blown rule of reason analysis for some non-price vertical restraints. Commentators have suggested a range of other options, from per se illegality, to creating categories
of non-price restraints that would receive more searching scrutiny, to simply making these restraints per se legal. E.g. BORK, supra note 16, at 288; Altschuler, supra note 10, at 31-34; Bock,
supra note 47, at 136-37; Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 135; Robert H. Heidt, A Redrafted Section I of the Sherman Act, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 603, 604-05 n.12 (1991); Pitofsky, supra note
162, at 28-33; Posner, supra note 11, at 23; Roszkowski, supra note 18, at 135; Steiner, supra note
2, at 146.
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B. The Complexity of Retail Markets
The most important characteristic of modem retail markets is the immense amount of product differentiation. "Product differentiation occurs
when the offerings of sellers include unique features, even minor ones, that
make price-quality comparisons between sellers difficult. When consumers
become convinced that two similar products are different, it becomes more
'370
feasible for sellers to charge different prices for them.
Most consumer goods demonstrate a great deal of product differentiation.37 1 Clothing comes in a bewildering array of styles, colors, fabrics, and
sizes. 372 A category like "men's shirts" includes subcategories like "dress
shirts," "sport shirts," "polo shirts," and "tee shirts," each of which includes
items in several materials and different cuts, in hundreds of colors and patterns, and in an array of sizes (which are not uniform across the industry).
Even if we define the relevant category narrowly, like men's white cotton
medium three-button short-sleeved polo shirts, we still find significant product differentiation. For example, a shopping jaunt through the three department stores in one South Florida shopping mall revealed seventeen different
brands of these shirts, four of which had more than one style, ranging in price
from $9.99 to $62.50.373 Studies show that many industries have increased
their level of differentiation in recent years.3 74 Even the breakfast cereal

market, long seen as an example of unnecessary differentiation, 3 75 has seen
376
an acceleration in the number of new brands introduced.

Dealers also try to differentiate themselves by using a variety of productservice packages. 377 When you buy clothing, for example, you can do so at
establishments that vary tremendously in terms of the amount and type of
information and service they provide, the convenience of their location, the
acceptable methods of payment and the availability of credit, their policies
about returning unwanted items, and the attractiveness of their displays and
other amenities. Within the industry, a number of rough categories of retail370. HERRMANN, supra note 257, at 91; see also J.Douglas Zona, Substitution Among Imperfect Substitutes, Address Before the American Bar Ass'n Section of Antitrust Law, Oct. 15,
1991, at 2-3 (noting that sellers can increase profits by differentiating products).
371. B. JOSEPH PINE II, MASS CUSTOMIZATION: TmE NEw FRONTIER IN BusrNEss COMPETrroN 7 (1993); Zona, supra note 370, at 2.
372. See AMERICAN APPAREL MmRS. Ass'N, APPAREL MANUFACrURING
(1984) (noting increase in variety).
373. Janice Clement, Mall Survey (data on file with author).

STRATEGIES

29-30

374. See PINE, supra note 371, at 35-41 (discussing studies of various industries).
375. See In re Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8, 12 (1982) (F.T.C. alleged cereal manufacturers deliberately increased entry barriers by unnecessarily marketing approximately 150 brands in 20year period); Richard Schmalensee, Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry, 9 BELL J. ECON. 305, 306 (1979) (six leading cereal producers introduced over 80 new
brands between 1950 and 1972).
376. See PINE, supra note 371, at 40 ("In 1980, only 88 brands were available in the United
States; by 1990, 205 brands were being sold.").
377. E.g., BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 16, at 36-37; BORK, supra note 16, at 296; HERRMANN, supra note 257, at 3.
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ers have come into common usage: 378 department stores, 379 specialty
38 3
381
warehouse clubs,3 82 and off-price outlets.
stores, 380 discount stores,

Subcategories exist as well; a retailer may call itself, for example, an "upscale
discount store" 384 or even a "moderate-priced department store company
specializing in nationally branded and top-quality private label and casual
apparel. '385 In addition, consumers may purchase retail products from cata378. For examples of industry publications utilizing these and similar categories, see, AMERICAN APPAREL MiFRs. ASS'N, supra note 372, at 32; Discount Barriers Crashing Down, DIscour
STORE NEWS, Mar. 16, 1992, at 33; 1992 Consumer Buying Study, DIscoUNT STORE NEWS, Mar.
16, 1992, at 36.
379. Department stores traditionally carry large assortments of items, stocking extensive
choices of brands, styles, and colors. MICHAEL LEVY & BARTON A. WErrz, RETAILING MANAGEMENT 43 (1992); Gail Hutchinson Kirby & Rachel Dardis, Research Note: A Pricing Study of
Women's Apparel in Off-Price and Department Stores, 62 J. RETAILING 321, 329 (1986). They
emphasize attractive store facilities and a variety of services: advice, assistance, delivery, and
liberal return policies. LEVY & WErrz, supra, at 44; Kirby & Dardis, supra, at 329. Indeed, the
emphasis on presentation is such that the attorney for the bondholders of one large department
store chain wondered whether its new chairman's "nuts-and-bolts approach is right for a retail
company where glitz and glamour are necessary parts of the business." Stephanie Strom, Changing the Mood at Macy's, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1993, at F8. To cover larger inventories and
services, they charge higher prices. HERRMANN, supra note 257, at 83-84. One study found that,
on average, prices for women's apparel were 40% higher in department stores than off-price
stores. Kirby & Dardis, supra, at 321.
380. Although specialty stores offer a limited range of products and generally have higher
prices, they also offer a large assortment of, and more advice and service related to, the particular products they do sell. See HERRMANN, supra note 257, at 4, 83-84; LEVY & WErrz, supra
note 379, at 49 (concentrating on limited merchandise). They also, in effect, offer exclusivity and
prestige. See Gretchen Morgenson, Here Come the Cross-Shoppers, FORBES, Dec. 7, 1992, at 90,
93 (selling to young people's egos).
381. Traditional discount stores offer relatively few brands, colors, and styles, proven best
sellers, simpler facilities, and no clerk assistance. HERRMANN, supra note 257, at 84; LEVY &
WErrz, supra note 379, at 47.
382. Warehouse clubs sell a limited number of brands of common items in large bulk packages and often limit access to fee-paying members. Anthony Faiola, Food Fight: With Their
Bargains in Bulk, Mammoth Warehouse Clubs Are Helping Redefine How We Buy Groceries,
MIAMI HERALD, May 10, 1993 (Business Monday Section), at 26, 28; see also LEVY & WErIz,
supra note 379, at 53 (referring to these as "wholesale clubs").
383. Off-price stores offer first-quality brand-name goods at substantial discounts from department or specialty stores. Kirby & Dardis, supra note 379, at 322; Ann McGee Johnson,
Competition for Shoppers Heated as New Retailers Target Stores for Jacksonville, FLA. TIMESUNION, Jan. 7, 1991, at F9, Fl1. They also provide fewer services and less product variety than
traditional stores. Jack G. Kaikati, Don't Discount Off-Price Retailers, HARV. Bus. REV., MayJune 1985, at 85-86; Kirby & Dardis, supra note 379, at 328. One study called the "growth of offprice stores.., the single greatest retailing phenomenon in the 1980s." Kirby & Dardis, supra
note 379, at 321.
Many off-price stores are not located at major shopping malls, so customers are denied the
convenience that malls provide. Id. at 328; AMERICAN APPAREL MS. ASS'N, supra note 372,
at 29. Recently, however, smaller malls dedicated entirely to off-price stores have sprung up.
AMERICAN APPAREL MFRs. ASS'N, supra note 372, at 29.
384. E.g., Ann Merrill, Wal-Mart Invasion Forces Competitors To Sell Service, MINNEAPOLIS
ST. PAUL CrrYBusINEss, July 1, 1991, at C9, C1O.
385. Johnson, supra note 383, at F10. The company refers to its niche as "between upscale
discounters and traditional department stores." Id. at Fl.
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logues or from in-home salespeople. 3 86 While some customers have strong
preferences for one type of shopping experience, retailers of similar products
all compete with one another to some extent. 387 As one Kmart
manager
''388
noted, "Anyone who carries what we carry is our competition.
The widespread incidence of product and service differentiation is, of
course, no accident. Current marketing wisdom is that successful companies
capture market niches, small sub-markets that appeal to particular groups of
consumers. 389 Successful firms survey consumers and keep careful track of
how well each item is selling in order to reformat their products to meet
particular consumer needs. 390 Thus, to compete, some firms redesign and
repackage existing products or services to differentiate them and attract particular groups of consumers, rather than merely figure out how to provide the
same products or services at lower prices.39 1 As one retailer put it, "The
386. HERRMANN, supra note 257, at 4; Leonard L. Berry, The Time-Buying Consumer, 55 J.
RETAILING 58, 64-65 (1979).
387. One survey found that 88% of those participating had shopped in a department store

in the previous year, and 86% had shopped in a discount store during the same period. Discount
Barriers CrashingDown, supra note 378, at 35. Although this does not indicate that any of these
people were regular shoppers at either or both types of establishments, it does suggest that the

two types of retailers probably compete to a significant extent.
388. Johnson, supra note 383, at F10.
389. See, e.g., PINE, supra note 371, at 90-93 (discussing replacement of mass producers with
niche marketers); Robert T. Davis, Marketing Management: Becoming a Market-Driven Company, in THE PORTABLE MBA 174, 178 (Eliza G.C. Collins & Mary Anne Devanna eds., 1990)
(population can be divided into subsets which strategist will manipulate); Drew Hyman & John
Shingler, The Hierarchy of Consumer Participationas a Blueprint for Segmenting Consumer
Strategies, in AM. COUNCIL ON CONSUMER INTERESTS, ANNUAL CONFERENCE, PROCEEDINGS

233 (Mary Carsky ed., 1990) (identifying four types of consumers); Anne Moncreiff Arrarte,
Traditional Stores Cutting Prices, Growing Larger, Adding Services, MIAMI HERALD, May 10,
1993 (Business Monday Section), at 27, 29 (supermarket trade representative said finding niche
and catering to it "the key" for independent supermarkets); see also Zona, supra note 370, at 2-3
(producers try to improve their market position through product differentiation). One author
referred to current successful management systems as ones where managers recognize "that customers can no longer be lumped together in a huge homogeneous market, but are individuals
whose individual wants and needs can be ascertained and fulfilled." PINE, supra note 371, at 6.
390. See Davis, supra note 389, at 190 (best managers are "forever in search of additional
insights and market changes"); Anne Moncreiff Arrarte, Scent of a Shopper: Store Sniffs Out
What You Like, MIAMI HERALD, June 21, 1993 (Neighbors Section), at 26 (discussing the merits
of keeping in touch with customer needs); Arrarte, supra note 389, at 27 (emphasizing focusgroup studies); Wal-Mart Casts a Shadow of Concern upon P.R. Retailers, CARIBBEAN BUS., July
18, 1991, at B9, Bll.
391. See, e.g., William S. Comanor, Vertical Territorialand Customer Restrictions: White
Motor and its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1423 (1968) (firms have "considerable incentive" to differentiate products to limit substitutability and insulate themselves from price competition); see also Battle of Brands: Who's Winning?, STORES, May 1990, at 77 ("[Flrom the
marketer's perspective, brands provide a means of differentiating one's position from competitor's in order to avoid direct price competition at retail.").
For recent real-life accounts of this phenomena, see, e.g., Kirby & Dardis, supra note 379, at
322, 329 (department stores develop private-label brands to avoid competition with off-price
outlets for brand name clothing); Edmund L. Andrews, Long-Distance Giants Find Strength
Amid Price Wars, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1993, at D1 (biggest long-distance telephone carriers
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minute you get overly concerned about only price, it's the beginning of the
discount stores have to compete on the basis of service and
end.''392 Even
393
presentation.
The pricing system itself is complex. "In many markets, price dispersion
is substantial for identical or similar products. '394 Obviously full-service retailers and specialty stores generally charge more than off-price retailers and
discount stores. But there is no easy relationship between service and price.
Studies have found that the same store may employ relatively high prices on
one good and relatively low prices on others. 395 Some retailers employ loss
leaders-popular goods advertised widely at prices that bring little or no revenue to the retailer-in order to draw people into the store to purchase
goods with higher margins, while conveying the impression that the store's

using "clever marketing gimmicks" in which specific discounts are offset by higher prices elsewhere); Arrarte, supra note 389, at 27 (grocery stores increase floor space to allow more items
and give consumers "one-stop shopping"); Stuart Elliott, New! Improved! $100 Million Soap!,
N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1993, at Dl, D22 (detergent producers introduce super-concentrated detergents to maximize shelf space in competitive market); see also Elliott, supra, at D1 (householdproducts market analyst notes that to keep consumers interested, manufacturers have to improve their products on periodic basis); Michael Janofsky, Discount Brands Grab the Spotlight,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1993, at 17, 24 (manufacturers enhancing, reformulating, and repackaging
traditional products to meet competition from discount brands).
In addition, because cost-cutting often involves unpleasant personnel cuts, managers may
prefer other methods of competition. Davis, supra note 389, at 183. This may be particularly
true if the labor force is unionized, which may mean that layoffs carry very high transaction
costs.
392. Merrill, supra note 384, at Cll; see also Davis, supra note 389, at 184 ("the business
executive must develop a unique approach, the alternative being reliance upon price
concessions").
393. See Alison Fahey, Off-Price Chains Strike Back at Price Cutters, ADVERTISING AGE,
July 16, 1990, at 28 (off-price chains improve facilities to compete with department stores); Johnson, supra note 383, at F10 (discounters likely to change service and store ambiance to meet new
competition); Stephanie Strom, Kmart Predicts Profit Drop, Causing Retail Stock Selloff, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 1993, at Cl, C4 (discount stores competing on basis of quality of facilities); WalMart Casts a Shadow, supra note 390, at Bll (Wal-Mart obsessed with customer service).
394. Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. &
ECON. 491, 502 (1981); accord Amitai Etzioni, New Thinking About Why We Do the Things We
Do, AcRoss THE BOARD, June, 1990, at 58 (discussing how price variations for same product can
be explained by socioeconomic theories); Scott Maynes & Terje Assum, Informationally Imperfect Consumer Markets: Empirical Findings and Policy Implications, 16 J. CONSUMER AFF.62,
73 (1982) (sellers sell high to less knowledgeable consumers and low to knowledgeable consumers); see also John W. Pratt et al., Price Differences in Almost Competitive Markets, 93 Q.J.
ECON. 189 (1979) (finding "surprisingly large differences" in prices of 39 goods surveyed). A
survey of several South Florida malls revealed some price differentials of over 15% on identical
products at different department stores within the same mall. See Clement, supra note 373.
395. See Greg J. Duncan, The Dynamics of Local Markets: A Case Study of Cameras, 15 J.
CONSUMER AFFAIRS 64, 72 (1981) (stores were not consistently high priced on all models offered); Maynes & Assum, supra note 394, at 72-74 (study of retailers showed that none offered
consistently high or low prices across all varieties). The survey of South Florida stores replicated
these results. See Clement, supra note 373.
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prices are generally low. 396 High-price retailers regularly lower prices on
397
items that are not selling fast enough and often hold sales.
Consumers obviously will have trouble obtaining and processing all the
information necessary to do optimal purchasing in the face of highly differentiated products, multiple product-service packages, and regularly fluctuating
prices. 398 Marketing studies suggest that many consumers do relatively little
396. E.g., Corey, supra note 98, at 53; Wal-Mart Casts a Shadow, supra note 390, at B10.
397. E.g., Kirby & Dardis, supra note 379, at 324-25 (survey of price comparisons); Gerla,
supra note 69, at 4; Stephanie Strom, Retailers' Latest Tactic: If It Says $15, It Means $15, N.Y.
Trams, Sept. 29, 1992, at D1. One study of sales through 1984 found a significant increase in the
amount of markdowns used by retailers in the 20-year period ending in 1984. B. Peter Pashigian,
Demand Uncertainty and Sales: A Study of Fashionand Markdown Pricing, 78 AM. ECON. REV.
936, 940-41 (1985).
This markdown process can be seen either as adapting prices to the market or as a form of
price discrimination. The stores gain higher margins from impatient or fashion-conscious consumers who will buy the product when it initially appears at the upper-end price. They then get
successively lower margins as they lower their prices and groups of increasingly price-sensitive or
fashion-unconscious people become willing to purchase. Cf. Beales et al., supra note 394, at 50708 ("[F]irm[s] with market power may contrive either price or quality dispersion in order to
price-discriminate against consumers with less information or reduced ability to discover the
better value."). This process, which operates over the course of a "season" in clothing, is very
similar to descriptions of product life cycles for longer-lived products. This suggests that novelty
sells products when they are new, and price increasingly sells products as they mature. See Davis, supra note 389, at 187-88.
398. See HERRMANN, supra note 257, at 4; Beales, et al., supra note 394, at 503-09 (describing possible information failures in retail markets); Kirby & Dardis, supra note 379, at 328
("[c]ustomers incur costs when comparison shopping"); Maynes & Assum, supra note 394, at 65
("[T]echnical complexity and multi-component nature of product make it difficult to assess both
quality and price."). Consumers also may underestimate the value to themselves of obtaining
information that is readily available. Beales et al., supra note 394, at 506; see also Maynes &
Assum, supra note 394, at 80-83 (noting consumers' tendency to underestimate extent of retail
price dispersion); William L. Wilkie & Peter R. Dickson, Shopping for Appliances: Consumers'
Strategies and Patterns of Information Search, Marketing Science Institute, Report No. 85-108
(1985), at 20 (consumers generally felt little uncertainty at beginning of search process leading to
purchase of major appliances). Perhaps as a result, consumers often misidentify which retailers
are discounters and which charge full-price. Discount Barriers CrashingDown, supra note 378,
at 33. In addition, suppliers and dealers may provide misleading or irrelevant information. See
Warren S. Grimes, Spiff, Polish, and Consumer Demand Quality: Vertical Price Restraints Revisited, 80 CAL. L. REV. 815, 824 (1992) (advertising that is deceptive may skew consumer choices).
One article concluded that "virtually no consumer product market meets the textbook ideal of
perfect information and perfect competition." Beales et al., supra note 394, at 512.
The analysis in this article does not attempt to take into account the extent to which consumer tastes and beliefs about product differences are created by advertising. See Donald I,
Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to Where?, 44 AwrrrusT
L.J. 537, 540 (1975) (effect of merchandising in television age); Stephen J. Schnably, Property
and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin's Theory of Property and Personhood,45 STAN. L. REV.
347, 388-92 (1993) (discussing effect of advertising on consumers' undertanding of themselves).
It seems likely that questionable advertising claims are best dealt with outside the antitrust laws.
See generally Beales et al., supra note 394, at 513-39 (describing use of information remedies as
alternatives to regulation to deal with misinformation). However, to the extent that consumers
are acting based on questionable information, reliance on the market to provide efficient outcomes is less reasonable.
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searching before purchasing even expensive products. 399 The information
problem has been exacerbated in recent years by demographic and workplace trends which leave many households with less time to do comparison
shopping. 4°° Moreover, sellers may lack sufficient incentives to adequately
40 1
provide this information.
Potential information failures suggest the possibility that some retail
markets might not attain competitive equilibria. 4°2 Similarly, product differ399. One study of purchasers of large appliances found that one-third of the purchasers
visited only one store and one-third considered only one brand. Wilkie & Dickson, supra note
398, at 8. Approximately 2.5 stores and brands were surveyed on average. Id. More than half of
the purchasers consulted no independent sources of information such as Consumer Reports. Id.
The total time spent shopping was also less than might be expected for relatively expensive
durable goods. Seven-eighths of those surveyed spent less than eight hours shopping; almost
half spent less than two hours. Id. at 11. These results were generally consistent with those of
similar studies. Id. at 2.
This does not mean that consumers necessarily have inadequate information when purchasing. They may have prior familiarity with the stores or with the goods in question before starting
the "shopping" process, and thus rely on the pre-existing knowledge more than the pre-purchase
search. STERNTHAL & CRAIG, supra note 257, at 86; Peter H. Bloch et al., ConsumerSearch." An
Extended Framework, 13 J. CONSUMER RES. 119 (1986); Wilkie & Dickson, supra note 398, at
11. In addition, those consumers who do obtain good information may have a disproportionate
impact on the market by spreading by word of mouth the information they gather. Bloch et al.,
supra, at 124-25; Hyman & Shingler, supra note 389, at 234-35. However, these data do support
the hypothesis that a significant number of consumers are not aware of all their options when
they make purchases. The fact that these data were compiled concerning durable goods also
suggests that the information situation for less expensive items might well be worse. See Linda
K. Zimmermann & Loren V. Geistfeld, Economic Factors Which Influence Consumer Search for
Price Information, 18 J. CONSUMER AFF. 119,128-29 (evidence that relative size of expenditure
increases search efforts). Moreover, some evidence exists that consumers often do not check
prices at all before making purchases. STErNTHAL & CRAIG, supra note 257, at 239.
400. See, e.g., HERRMANN, supra note 256, at 4-5; Berry, supra note 386, at 58-62 (discussing how increase of women in labor force and more time spent for physical and mental wellbeing has resulted in less time for comparison shopping); Eugene H. Fram & Joel Axelrod, The
DistressedShopper, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Oct. 1990, at 44 (marketing edge may now be to save

shoppers' time); Molly O'Neill, Drop the Mop, Bless the Mess: The Decline of Housekeeping,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1993, at 1, 13 (discussing loss of available time in modem life); Fred Tasker,
Ragnet, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 29, 1993, at G1 (same). Surveys of consumer behavior confirm
the common sense suspicion that time availability is correlated with the amount of effort consumers put into comparison shopping, particularly for non-durable goods. See Sharon E. Beatty
& Scott M. Smith, External Search Effort: An Investigation Across Several Product Categories,
14 J. CONSUMER RES. 83, 91 (1987) (demonstrating time availability is positively correlated with
total search effort); Fram & Axelrod, supra, at 45 (indicating families are reluctant to infringe
upon quality time by comparison shopping).
401. For example, providing information about a particular type of product creates benefits
for competing brands, reducing incentives for any one seller to provide it. See Beales et al.,
supra note 394, at 503-04 (explaining how individual sellers have little to gain by unilaterally
providing positive information about product class or negative information about competing
product class). In addition, information provided by sellers may contain exaggeration and omission. See Maynes & Assum, supra note 394, at 65 (stating that net effect of seller control of
information was biased and inaccurate information for consumer).
402. Steven Salop & Joseph Stiglitz, BargainingRipoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion, 44 REV. EcoN. STUD. 493, 495-97 (1977). Good information is normally viewed as a necessary predicate to competitive market conditions. LLOYD G. REYNOLDS,
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entiation can yield market power in some circumstances. 40 3 Thus, the complexity of these markets may yield some circumstances in which price-fixing
can help the players attain monopoly profits.4°4 Although the actual frequency of monopoly profits at either the retailer or supplier level is beyond
the scope of this article, the performance of the retail industry in recent years
405
does not suggest that many retailers are making supracompetitive profits.
Even assuming that most retail prices are at or near those that would
occur at competitive equilibria, the difficulty of getting complete information
suggests a potential problem in these markets. Recent psychological studies
of consumer choices among a bounded set of products reveal that the context
in which the choice is made greatly influences decision-making. 4 06 More speECONoMIcs: A GENERAL INTRODUCrION 550-51 (4th ed. 1973); Hyman & Shingler, supra note
389, at 233. For explanations of ways in which inadequate information can lead to market power
even among small sellers, see Beales et al., supra note 394, at 509-13 (describing how market
imperfections arise from imperfect information); Steiner, supra note 2, at 151 (explaining how
customer ignorance and high consumer search costs contribute to individual retailer monopoly
power).
403. See Thomas J. Campbell, Predationand Competition in Antitrust. The Case of NonFungible Goods, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1630-35 (1987) (discussing impact of consumer-recognized differentiated products); Comanor, supra note 391, at 1423-24 (noting that regardless of
underlying cause, product differentiation has effect of restricting price competition and contributes to market power).
404. Where retailers can earn supracompetitive profits, they obviously have incentives to
engage in price-fixing and in upward coercion. Andersen, supra note 112, at 784-85. For example, empirical evidence exists that the elimination of one supplier's intrabrand resale price maintenance has led to a decrease in prices in an entire market, suggesting that the price-fixing was
facilitating oligopoly pricing. Steiner, supra note 2, at 178-83. If this is commonplace, it obviously would strengthen my argument for the legal presumption against price-fixing. See infra
Part VI.B. However, it also should not militate against creating a defense for genuine free-rider
problems, because the defense would not come into play where the supplier is acting simply to
gain monopoly profits.
405. Major players such as Macy's and Federated have been in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, A Key for a Macys Comeback, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1992, at
F4 (discussing Macy's new strategy for emerging from bankruptcy). In addition, commentators
have noted the intense competition in retail markets in recent years. See, e.g., HERRMANN,
supra note 256, at 3; Battle of Brands, supra note 391, at 77; Merrill, supra note 384, at C9
(merchants failing to compete on price alone).
Of course, poor bottom-line performance does not mean that retailers are not earning high
profits on certain products or that the poor performance is due to poor cost management rather
than low prices. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir.
1945) ("fair" profits for company as a whole do not mean that profits on particular product were
not greater nor that same profits "could not have been made at lower prices").
406. See STERNTHAL & CRAIG, supra note 257, at 9-11 (study finds consumers subscribe to
newspaper at different rate following completion of different two-week trial offers); Joseph W.
Alba et ai., Transitions in Preference Over Time: The Effects of Memory on Message Persuasiveness, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 406, 406-07 (1992) (discussing relative importance of memory and
stimulus in consumer choices); Russell W. Belk, Situational Variables and Consumer Behavior, 2
J. CONSUMER RES. 157, 161-62 (1975) (suggesting that explicit recognition of situational variables can substantially enhance ability to explain consumer behavior); Ravi Dhar & Itamar Simonson, The Effects of Focus of Comparisonon Consumer Preferences, 29 J. MARKETING RES.
430, 439 (1992) (suggesting marketers can affect consumer preferences by influencing manner in
which product promoted is compared with competing alternatives); Joel Huber & Christopher
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cifically, an important series of studies by Itamar Simonson and Amos Tversky shows that, if a consumer is choosing between brands X and Y of a
product, the presence or absence of a third brand, Z, or of the same brand
offered from a different source at a different price, will significantly affect
their preferences between X and y.407 Indeed, "under certain conditions, the
market share of a given brand increases rather than decreases when a new
brand is introduced. 4 °8
For example, suppose consumers are presented a choice between two
cameras, one of which, X, is priced higher but has nicer features than the
other, Y. To begin with, consumers are equally divided between the two;
neither is clearly a better option. Now suppose a third camera, Z, is introduced. Z is clearly worse than one but not both of the original two cameras;
perhaps Z has the same features as X, but an even higher price. Consumers
subsequently will choose the option that appears better than the newcomer
more often than they had before, even though the newcomer provides no
new information about the value of either of the pre-existing options. In
other words, even though they have no new information about whether X or
Y is a better buy, the fact that X looks good compared to Z, will make X look
good compared to Y. Significant numbers of consumers who originally chose
4 9
Y over X, will choose X over both Y and Z. 0
Puto, Market Boundaries and Product Choice: IllustratingAttraction and Substitution Effects, 10
J. CONSUMER RES. 31 (1983) (postulating that new item may increase desirability of similar
items); Itamar Simonson, The Influence of Anticipating Regret and Responsibility on Purchase

Decisions, 19 J. CONSUMER RES. 105, 117 (1992) (suggesting that concerns about future, regret,
and responsibility can influence consumers' purchase decisions); Itamar Simonson & Russell S.
Winer, The Influence of Purchase Quantity and Display Format on Consumer Preference for
Variety, 19 J. CONSUMER RES. 133, 137 (1992) (hypothesizing that as number of items purchased
on shopping trip increases, consumer is more likely to purchase items he/she does not usually
purchase); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A ReferenceDependent Model, 106 QJ. ECON. 1039, 1040-45 (1991) (considering implications of loss aversion for economic behavior); Amos Tversky & Eldar Shalir, Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of Defined Decisions. 3 PSYCHOL. Sct. 358, 358 (1992) ("[Pleople are more likely to defer
choice when conflict is high than when it is low"); see also Hugh Phillips & Roy Bradshaw, How
Customers Actually Shop: Customer Interactionwith the Point of Sale, 35 J.MARKET RES. Soc.
51, 52-53 (1993) (arguing that because customers often make unplanned purchases, their interaction with shopping environment contributes greatly to their decision to buy).
407. Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrastand Extremeness Aversion, 29 J.MARKET RES. 281, 281-82 (1992).
408. Id. at 281. In one real-world example, a retailer introduced a second bread-baking
appliance in its catalog at a very high price. This introduction greatly increased the sales of the
pre-existing lower priced bread-baker. Id.at 293-94.
409. See id.at 285-88 (describing concept of asymmetric dominance); see also Joel Huber et
al., Adding Asymmetrically Dominant Alternatives: Violations of Regularity and the Similarity
Hypothesis, 9 J. CONSUMER RES. 90, 91-92 (1982) (adding alternative to choice set can increase
probability of choosing item that dominates it); Srinivasan Ratneshwar et al., Toward Understandingthe Attraction Effect: The Implications of ProductStimulus, Meaningfulness, and Familiarity, 13 J. CONSUMER RES. 520, 520-21 (1987) (explaining attraction effect and its boundary
conditions).
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There are other related context effects. If the new product is clearly
better than one, but not both, of the existing products, consumers will favor
the newcomer over both. 4 10 The introduction of an extreme alternative to
two existing alternatives will cause a significant number of consumers to
switch to the alternative that now appears to be in the middle.4 1' Simonson
and Tversky conclude that "context effects are both common and robust,
rep'4 12
resenting the rule, rather than the exception in choice behavior.
Because of the importance of context, and the imperfect dissemination
of information, firms in retail markets may have more to fear from certain
competitors than others. 41 3 A consumer's awareness of a particular lowprice competitor, for example, may take substantial sales away from a particular full-price retailer by making that retailer appear to be overpriced. One
recent news story further suggests the validity of context effects in retail
sales. Barneys, a clothing retailer that currently has a store in downtown
Manhattan, prepared to open a large store in midtown Manhattan. 4 14 Apparently in response, other Manhattan retailers remodeled their facilities and
announced a new emphasis on customer service. 415 Several clothing designers reportedly refused to sell to Barneys' new store.4 16 "Some designers said
they did not want the store to compete with their own boutiques in the area,
a rather weak excuse, because almost every other large retailer there already
carries their lines. And a few hinted that these retailers pressured them not
to sell to the new Barneys. ''41 7 Although the retailers denied this, they did
plant unflattering speculation about Barneys' prospects in the ears of investors and vendors.4 18 While Barneys' competitors may or may not be engaged
in upward coercion, the fuss attending the new store suggests the possible
importance of particular retailers to the context of shopping. After all, the
retail clothing market is crowded and the existing Barneys is a fifteen-minute
subway ride from midtown Manhattan stores. Why should the other retailers
care if Barneys opens a new store unless they believe its proximity to their
outlets will change consumer perceptions of their outlets?
Given these context effects, even in a market with several discounters, a
full-price retailer may have incentives to eliminate one particular discounting
410. See Simonson & Tversky, supra note 407, at 293 (suggesting that new product posi-

tioned as clearly superior to another brand is likely to benefit from asymmetric dominance
effect).
411. See id. at 292 (noting that this finding is contrary to intuition); Itamar Simonson,
Choice Based on Reasons: The Case Attraction and Compromise Effects, 16 J. CONSUMER RES.

158, 171-72 (1989) (suggesting that brands can sometimes benefit from being positioned between
alternatives).
412. Simonson & Tversky, supra note 407, at 293.
413. Cf. PNFE, supra note 371, at 90-92 (noting how traditional mass production techniques
left market niches of unsatisfied customers that more flexible competitors filled).
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

Stephanie Strom, Barneys Takes On Uptown Set, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1993, at D1.
Id. at D2.
Id.
li
Id.
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rival or at least to assure that the products the discounter sells do not overlap
with its own stock.419 Additionally, a supplier, faced with a choice between a
large customer and a smaller one, might rationally elect to stick with the
larger.42 0 The full-price retailer may not make monopoly profits if it succeeds in limiting the rivalry because higher prices may be necessary to cover
its higher costs. However, consumer welfare may be harmed if some consumers, who would have purchased the product at the discounter's lower
price, either purchase a less-favored brand or do not purchase at all.
This phenomenon, which we might call "targeted upward coercion," provides a sensible explanation for cases like The Jeanery and the Supreme
Court's decision in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 4 2 1 In both of
those cases, a higher priced dealer attempted to get suppliers to cut off a
discounting rival. In both cases, the rival was in close physical proximity to
the complaining dealer, a proximity that may have brought the price differential into the awareness of some significant number of consumers. In both
cases, under classical economic theory, it is hard to see what the complaining
dealer accomplished: the elimination of one rival from a crowded retail market should have little effect on consumer behavior. Yet the defendants in
both cases obviously felt that a low-priced rival in the vicinity was a threat.
Like vertical price-fixing agreements, targeted upward coercion might stem
from both pro- and anticompetitive concerns. The complaining dealer might
be suffering acute free-rider problems because of the proximity of the dis-

419. This is particularly true where the removal of a few high-visibility brand names, that
consumers expect to see, may have a large effect on the discounter's appeal. See Gerla, supra
note 69, at 19 (terming removal of high-visibility brands from discounters "devastating"); see
also Comanor, supra note 23, at 1159 (suggesting similar results when discounter stocks limited
number of recognized brands). Interestingly, some models of differentiated markets similarly
suggest that market players can be susceptible to anticompetitive activity from rivals who are in
proximity with them. See Campbell, supra note 403, at 1646-52 (describing impact of geographic
and product characteristic proximity).
420. Commentators have suggested a large number of reasons that a supplier might accede
to dealer pressure. Most obviously, the retailers may have market power. 8 AREEDA, supra
note 10, 1604; Pitofsky, supra note 163, at 20-21 & n.71. A recent survey of suppliers and
retailers suggested that power has been shifting to retailers in recent years as the retail market
has consolidated. Feigner, supra note 214, at 1.
Even if the dealers do not have market power in the traditional sense, the supplier may have
reason to acquiesce. This may simply occur because it will make more sales with the larger
retailer. See Barlas, supra note 339, at 2337, 2352-53; Comanor, supra note 23, at 1158-59;
Steiner, supra note 2, at 172. In addition, the transaction costs of looking for a replacement for
the threatening dealer may be high. 8 AREEDA, supra note 10, 1604. The supplier may also
give in because the reputational value of the larger retailer is important to the supplier's overall
sales. This seems a likely issue in cases involving small manufacturers and large retailers in an
industry with little brand loyalty. See id. (noting small manufacturers' dependence on dealers'
willingness to stock product). Finally, Harry Gerla has suggested scenarios in which the suppliers' managers may have incentives to accede to coercion even if it is not in the supplier's long
term interest. Gerla, supra note 81, at 913-15.
421. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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count free-rider.4 22 Or the complaining dealer might simply be trying to
eliminate a rival who, because of proximity and information gaps, makes consumers see the high-priced outlet in a different and unfavorable light. The
latter seems a plausible explanation for The Jeanery. In The Jeanery, the
defendants did not raise a free-rider problem. 423 Additionally, purchasers of
jeans do not need extensive pre- and post-sale services, 424 and the complaining retailer was quoted as saying, "[W]e've got a guy right across from
me that's selling your product for $5.00 off all the time."'4 2 5 Thus, in considering the possible harmful effects of price-fixing, we must keep in mind the
targeted upward combination scenario.
C. Problems with the Existing Tests
Vertical price-fixing creates analytic difficulties because it has both positive and negative uses. On the one hand, it is an effective tool to stop freeriding. If all dealers adhere to a single pricing scheme, no individual dealer
has an incentive to cut back its services since there are no other means to
attract the customers of full-service dealers. On the other hand, vertical price
fixing can be used to facilitate either supplier or dealer cartels by making it
easier for cartel members to detect attempts by renegade participants to deviate from the agreed cartel prices.4 26 This section demonstrates that both the
per se rule and the rule of reason are inadequate tools for sorting out the
competitive effects of resale price maintenance in light of the complexity of
retail markets.
1. Problems with the Per Se Rule
The Supreme Court employs the per se rule when the likelihood of anticompetitive effects from a particular type of transaction is so great that the
expense of particularized analysis is unwarranted. 427 Given this approach,
422. This is a common explanation for the actions taken by the defendant in Klor's. See,
e.g., Boiu,, supra note 16, at 332 n.* (advancing free-rider justification for defendant's action);
HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, § 7.8 (terming this more plausible explanation); Liebeler, supra
note 69, at 895 (identifying supplier's goal in Kor's to eliminate free-rider who refused to provide point-of-sale service).
423. The defendants in cases like The Jeanery have an incentive to raise evidence of freerider problems. Eliminating a free-rider would constitute an independent business reason for a
termination, which would make it easier for the defendant to prevail under the Monsanto standard. See supra text accompanying note 209.
424. This does not mean there was no free-rider problem. The discounter could have been
free-riding on, for example, advertising done by the complaining dealer.
425. The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 1988).
426. Cartel participants always have an incentive to cheat by lowering prices to a point just
below the cartel price, thereby attracting extra sales. For a cartel to remain stable, it must find
some way to monitor members' prices. Vertical price-fixing, by locking in prices at a key point in
the distribution chain, makes it easier for both manufacturers and retailers to monitor prices,
and thus facilitates cartels.
427. See Continental TV,Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977) (reflecting
judgment that expenditure of time and expenses of particularized analysis not warranted).
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the existence of plausible procompetitive effects arising from vertical price
428
agreements strongly suggests that per se treatment is inappropriate.
While the actual frequency of free-riding is unclear, it doubtless occurs
sometimes. 42 9 Free-riding probably is most common in complex markets
where differentiated products require pre-sale information and common
dealer service packages (such as warehouse stores) make provision of that
information unlikely. Resale price maintenance provides guaranteed profit
margins for dealers. These margins provide incentives to the dealers to employ a variety of services to make the product more attractive to customers.430 In particular, if a supplier faces a free-rider problem in its distribution
chain, imposing resale price maintenance immediately eliminates the problem. The low-service dealer should not be able to steal customers from fullservice rivals because it lacks any price advantage to help lure away their
43 1
customers.
Of course, contractual non-price restraints are a less restrictive way to
432
force distributors to provide services that the supplier sees as important.
However, commentators have suggested that contractual restraints may be
expensive or difficult to monitor. 433 A manufacturer may find it easier and
428. See BLAm & KASERMAN, supra note 16, at 167 ("Judicial expediency... does not
justify assigning a per se label to the resale price maintenance agreement."); White, supra note
356, at 44 (terming per se rule "too strong" and advocating case-by-case approach); see also 8
AREEDA, supra note 10, 1 1628 (defenders of per se rule must deal with fact that vertical pricefixing benefits consumers in "non-trivial" number of cases).
429. See supra text accompanying notes 173-75. See also 8 AREEDA, supra note 10, 1 1611
(conceding free-riding exists); Allison, supra note 1, at 133 (concluding that free-riding clearly
exists); Calvani & Berg, supra note 158, at 1182 n.69 (noting evidence of free-riding in furniture
and computer sales); Ross A. Fabricant, Special Retail Services and Resale Price Maintenance:
The California Wine Industry, 66 J.RETAILING 101, 110-13 (1990) (evidence from wine industry
consistent with use of price-fixing to deal with free-riding); Goldberg, supra note 133, at 108 n.72
(quoting memo from manufacturer to its dealers detailing free-rider problem); Steiner, supra
note 2, at 187 ("There is no doubt that manufacturers encounter free-riding problems,").
430. Warren Grimes has suggested that higher margins give dealers added incentive to provide customers with misleading or irrelevant sales information regarding products that give them
the best return. Grimes, supra note 398, at 825-32. But as Grimes admits, retailers always have
incentives to push the products with the highest margins, regardless of the existence of pricefixing. Id. at 839. In the absence of price-fixing, suppliers may lower their wholesale prices to
give retailers incentives to promote their products, which leads to the same incentives for the
retailers. In fact, absent a guarantee that all retail margins are the same, this problem will exist.
Thus, it is hard to see that it should affect the antitrust treatment of vertical restraints.
431. See Allison, supra note 1, at 133 (asserting that vertical price restraints reduce freeriding in this fashion); Goldberg, supra note 133, at 108 (discussing how vertical price restraints
squelch free-riders).
432. See 8 AREEDA, supra note 10, 1602 (describing how suppliers can restrain market by
requiring distributors to provide "free" services); Andersen, supra note 112, at 788-89 (arguing
that there are seldom sufficient benefits to competition that cannot be achieved by less restrictive means). There also may be more effective ways to eliminate free-riders under some conditions. See BLAIm & KASERMAN, supra note 16, at 41-42 (suggesting superiority of market
division to price maintenance when physical commodity involves trade-ins).
433. E.g., BORK, supra note 16, at 291; Goldberg, supra note 133, at 107; Benjamin Klein &
Kevin Murphy, Vertical Restraints as ContractEnforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265,
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cheaper to protect its high-service dealers from price competition than to
create a system to check on the service, promotions, and facilities of each of
its distributors. Thus, a per se rule may punish suppliers who are merely
way to encourage their distributors to help them
using the most cost-effective
434
effectively.
compete
Moreover, per se treatment is not required merely because resale price
maintenance and upward coercion may be used to facilitate cartels. 435 Horizontal collusion by suppliers can be attacked directly. Moreover, other devices that facilitate collusion are not treated as per se illegal. 4 36 Horizontal
collusion in retail markets is easy to accomplish. These markets are complex,
4 37
have low entry barriers, and often include a substantial number of players.
Suppliers may resist participating in dealer collusion because dealer cartels
increase dealer profit margins at the expense of suppliers. 438 Although the
possibility of cartel facilitation suggests some scrutiny of vertical price-fixing
for colluis necessary, there is enough doubt about the frequency of its use
43 9
harsh.
unduly
is
treatment
se
per
that
sive purposes to suggest
Dr. Miles rests in part on the Supreme Court's assertion that it saw no
benefits to the manufacturer from a price-fixing arrangement, except the unacceptable benefit of helping its distributors and retailers fix prices.440 Today, the existence of the widespread belief that vertical price-fixing can yield
procompetitive benefits,441 at least in limited circumstances, suggests that Dr.
Miles should be overruled. 442
267-68 (1988); Piraino, supra note 86, at 28; Tesler, supra note 99, at 92-94. One economic
model suggests that vertical price-fixing yields lower prices and profits than a supplier paying
fees directly to dealers for shelf space. Greg Shaffer, Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of FacilitatingPractices,22 RAND J. EcoN. 120, 122 (1991). However,

both practices yield higher profits and prices under the model than when suppliers use no restraints at all. Id.
434. See Turner, supra note 43, at 804 (sometimes RPM is only effective device to eliminate
free-riders).

435. Posner, supra note 18, at 8.
436. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, §§ 4.2 (discussing legal treatment of cartel facilitating
devices).
437. See Arquit, supra note 10, at 927 (describing retailing in many industries); Baxter,

supra note 10, at 944, 946-47 (retail markets generally are unconcentrated and have low entry
barriers); Springer & Frech, supra note 2, at 434 (noting ease of entry into market and number of
retailers).
438. See BORK, supra note 16, at 33, 290 (criticizing assumption that suppliers have same
interest as dealers in maintaining cartel); Arquit, supra note 10, at 927 (manufacturer will not
willingly participate in dealer cartels for this reason); Baxter, supra note 10, at 945 (suppliers
likely to resist collection of monoploy rents by retailers); see also Goldberg, supra note 133, at
112 (arguing that retailers' ability to coerce suppliers has declined "in the last generation").

439. See 8 AREEDA, supra note 10, 1604 (arguing that concern about dealer's power does
not itself support per se rule).
440. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407-08 (1911).
441. See Comanor, supra note 40, at 990 (acknowledging that free-riding analysis of vertical
restraints has become conventional wisdom).
442. A few commentators have suggested that vertical restraints can lead to the production
of unnecessary or inefficient dealer services. See, e.g., 8 AREEDA, supra note 10, 1 1611, 1631
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2. Problems with the Rule of Reason
Many commentators who are critical of the application of the per se rule
to vertical price-fixing advocate analyzing all vertical restraints, price and
non-price alike, under the rule of reason." 3 However, this approach also has
drawbacks. First, doing rule of reason analysis is extremely complex, particularly in the context of retail markets. Second, the application of the rule of
reason in vertical cases virtually guarantees that the defendant will win the
case, but there are potential harms that the legal system needs to take seriously that arise from price restraints that do not flow from non-price restraints. Third, empirical evidence of the procompetitive benefits of vertical
price-fixing is not strong enough to justify effectively abandoning legal scrutiny altogether.
a) Difficulty of analysis
As noted in Part II, in a full-blown rule of reason case, the plaintiff must

prove that the challenged business arrangement is, on balance, anticompetitive in a particular market. The defendant may present a wide range of evidence to demonstrate that the plaintiff's market definition is incorrect and
that the challenged practice has procompetitive effects. The factfinder is then
required to determine the market and weigh the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the arrangement. The Supreme Court has provided
little guidance as to how this process should work in practice. 4 " No one
writing in this area appears to have great confidence in the ability of
(noting potentially superfluous services); Comanor, supra note 40, at 990-1000 (arguing that vertical price restraints lead to inefficient services targeted at marginal customer); Hovenkamp,
supra note 199, at 909-11 (arguing not all consumers place equal value on increased services
brought about by vertical price maintenance); White, supra note 356, at 57-59 (questioning
whether point-of-sale services really benefit consumers). Yet the continuing efforts of even discounters to attract customers through service and presentation suggests that many consumers
value them. See supra text accompanying notes 389-93. For example, some empirical evidence
supports the value of display in attracting purchases. See, e.g., STEmRriTL & CRAiG, supra note
257, at 242-44 (evaluating effects of product presentation); Jean Paul Gagnon & Jane Osterhaus,
Research Note: Effectiveness of Floor Displays on the Sale of Retail Products, 61 J. RETAILING
104, 105-06, 111-15 (1985) (analyzing point-of-sale floor displays and concluding that they increase net sales); Simonson & Winer, supra note 406, at 136-37 (evaluating effects of display
format); J.B. Wilkinson et al., Assessing the Impact of Short-Term Supermarket Strategy Variables, 19 J. MARKETING RES. 72, 73, 79 (1982) (examining importance of display alternatives).
Given the costs of trying to determine whether services in a complex market are inefficient,
surely it makes sense to allow suppliers latitude to experiment with different levels of services
that might yield greater sales.
443. E.g., Baker, supra note 53, at 1465; Kaufmann, supranote 107, at 115; Almarin Phillips
& Joseph Mahoney, Unreasonable Rules and Rules of Reason: Economic Aspects of Vertical
Price-Fixing,30 ANTITRUsT BULL 99, 100 (1985).
444. See, e.g., Altschuler, supra note 10, at 23, 30 (lamenting Sylvania's limited analysis of
what factors are relevant to appraisal of particular restraints under rule of reason); Gerhart,
supra note 52, at 420 (characterizing Sylvania's rule of reason standard as unworkable); Pitofsky,
supra note 163, at 11 (predicting that Sylvania's failure to provide guidance will breed further
confusion and litigation).
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factfinders to perform this task in general, 445 let alone in the context of complex retail markets. As one commentator noted, "a 'rule of reason' trial
tends to be long, arduous and expensive for the litigants-and not always
very predictable in outcome." 446
First of all, defining markets is a difficult task.447 In a case like The Jeanery, for example, the factfinder would have to determine the market that
includes a particular brand of designer blue jeans. It would have to consider
a variety of difficult issues: Are the jeans part of some subclass of jeans
(prewashed, straight-legged, button-fly) that has a separate following? Are
some other types of casual slacks part of the same market? Do you include
brands of jeans that are sold in nearby markets, but not available in the immediate vicinity?
The amount of information that might be relevant to this inquiry is obviously quite large, and much of it will be speculative at best. For example, one
method of defining markets, examining cross-elasticity of demand," 8 involves obtaining and analyzing detailed pricing and sales data from a large
number of products.44 9 Even if the information is available, digesting it is
likely to be expensive and time-consuming, perhaps requiring a battle of experts. Furthermore, in a market containing highly differentiated products,
the task is made more burdensome because some products are only partial
substitutes for others, and determining how much weight to give competition
450
from these sources is problematic.
445. See, e.g., Areeda, supra note 38, at 582 (claiming that juries are asked to quantify
harms and benefits without information and analytical tools economist would require); Altschuler, supra note 10, at 30 (citing juries' lack of economic sophistication); Easterbrook, supra
note 10, at 11 (noting difficulty of getting 12 jurors to do what 12 economists cannot); Roszkowski, supra note 18, at 156-59 (asserting that rule of reason is incapable of judicial determination);
see also BORK, supra note 16, at 37, 125 (referring to attempt to determine net effects of business
practices on competition as "futile" and "impossible").
446. Baker, supra note 393, at 541.
447. See, e.g., Heidt, supra note 369, at 607-08 (defining relevant market is "answerable"
inquiry); Markovits, supra note 158, at 595 (arguing that case law provides no particular aid in
settling market definition disputes); Pitofsky, supra note 10, at 1489 (arguing that defining relevant geographic and product markets is extremely complicated).
448. Cross-elasticity of demand is a measure of the effect of price changes for one good on
the quantity demanded of another. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
377, 400 (1956); HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, § 2.2. For arguments that cross-elasticity can be
used to define markets, see E.L duPont de Nemours, 351 U.S. at 380-81; HOVENKAMP, supra
note 13, § 2.2.
449. Using cross-elasticities is further complicated because in practice they are asymmetrical: The price of one good can significantly affect the quantity purchased of another, while the
reverse might not be true. See STEPHEN E. LEA ET AL., THE INDIVIDUAL INTHE ECONOMY: A
TEXTBooK OF ECONOMIC PsYCHOLOoY 199 (1984) (discussing effects of price on demand).
450. Zona, supra note 370, at 4. In one real-life example, a major rental car company reportedly maintained that it was gaining market share at a time it was losing customers to rental
car companies that did not have airport rental sites. It simply excluded off-airport rentals from
its market definition. See PINE, supra note 371, at 60-61 (describing Hertz Corporation's manipulation of market statistics).
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Once it defines a market, the factfinder must determine the effects of the
challenged arrangement in that market. Again, complicated pricing and sales
data might be employed, and experts may be needed to distinguish the effects
of the particular restraint from those stemming from other factors. Overall,
it is no wonder the process inspires little confidence.
One possible proxy for full-blown rule of reason analysis is simply to
focus on the effect of the restraint on output. We know that resale price
maintenance yields higher prices and, therefore, movement along the demand curve in the direction of lower output. This result is inefficient unless
the provision of services by the newly-recompensed dealers results in an increase in the demand for the product sufficient to overcome the effect of the
higher price. Thus, if the supplier's output increases as a result of the restraint, the restraint is efficient. 45 ' While this process is helpful because it
narrows the inquiry and eliminates the need to define markets, assessing452a
restraint's effect on output remains "a daunting task in the real world.
Expert help is again likely to be needed to differentiate output changes
caused by economic conditions, seasonal fluctuations, or fashion changes,
from output changes caused by the restraint.4 53 Moreover, if the restraint is
imposed at the beginning of a supplier-dealer relationship, determining its
output effect requires the hypothetical determination of what the output
would have been were the restraint not in place. Thus, the output proxy does
not yield an analysis that gives more confidence in accurate outcomes. Another possible simplifying device, the market power screen, will be discussed
in detail in Part VI.A.
Of course, the cynical answer to the concerns about the difficulties of
proceeding under the rule of reason is that the real effect of its application is
to make it nearly impossible for plaintiffs to win antitrust cases. 454 The uncertainty and costs of putting together a rule of reason case undoubtedly deter some plaintiffs from bringing suit, and, as previously noted, the plaintiff's
likelihood of victory appears to be slight. 455 If we believe that there is almost
nothing to fear from vertical price-fixing, or that the free-rider effects it may
prevent are pervasive, then discouraging plaintiffs may be an acceptable result. Thus, we must next examine the benefits and harms caused by vertical
price-fixing.
451. See BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 16, at 161, 167 (arguing that output could be
method of distinguishing between procompetitive and anticompetitive motivations); Baxter,
supra note 10, at 946 (same); Posner, supra note 18, at 19 (suggesting that vertical restraints that
increase output should be legal).
452. Arquit, supra note 10.
453. See BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 16, at 167-68 (describing experts' treatment of
various economic effects); Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 11 (describing factors economic experts may use to evaluate market).
454. See Jones, supra note 12, at 739 (move to rule of reason would be "tantamount to
judicial sanction of" vertical price-fixing).
455. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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b) Potential harms
As the Supreme Court has noted, and as even strong opponents of per se
treatment acknowledge, vertical price restrictions can facilitate cartel pricing
at both dealer and supplier levels. 456 Some evidence suggests that much of
the price-fixing that occurred during the era of fair trade laws was inspired by
pressure from groups of retailers. 45 7 Moreover, as discussed earlier, targeted
upward coercion can remove particular competitors from the market. This
can leave consumers with less choice about the product-service mix they wish
to purchase and may reduce output.4 58 These results alone suggest that a
456. E.g. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725-26 (1988); Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977); BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra
note 16, at 161; Allison, supra note 1, at 134-35; Areeda, supra note 38, at 575; Baxter, supra
note 4, at 697; Goldberg, supra note 133, at 112; Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 1061; see also
Phillips & Mahoney, supra note 443, at 100 ("Few would argue ... that the effects of vertical
restraints are universally benign."). Lester Tesler described a real-life example of the use of
vertical price-fixing to support a manufacturer's light bulb cartel. Tesler, supra note 99, at 99.
Wesley Liebeler has argued that intrabrand dealer cartels should be treated under the rule
of reason. He argues that they only affect the prices of one producer and thus cannot increase
the market power of an individual product and thereby reduce output. Liebeler, supra note 52,
at 5-6. However, if retailers handle multiple brands, they would have little reason to attempt to
drive up prices of one product if they did not believe it would be profitable to do so, either
because the supplier of the product has market power or because they are also trying to raise
prices of the competing products. There seems little point in forcing the plaintiff to go through
the complex exercise of demonstrating that suppliers or retailers have market power, particularly
if a free-riding defense is available to the coerced supplier to cover procompetitive uses of pricefixing.
457. Andersen, supra note 112, at 787; see also Bowman, supra note 213, at 830-31, 838
(citing druggist industry as example); Carl H. Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. Cm. L.
REV. 175, 180 (1954) (citing legislative history of McGuire Act); Goldberg, supra note 133, at
113 (retail druggists primary supporters of RPM since early 1900s); Steiner, supra note 2, at 152
(explaining passage of fair trade laws due to pressure from dealers). Evidence also suggests that
pressure from dealers has led to resale price maintenance in other countries. See 8 AREEDA,
supra note 10, 1604 (citing events in United Kingdom and Sweden); Bowman, supra note 213,
at 829 (citing events in Great Britain and France).
458. See supra text accompanying notes 421-25. Gerla, supra note 69, at 5 (explaining that
"discounters enhance consumer sovereignty by providing a choice of product mix and ancillary
services"). This is not to say that any exclusion of a potential competitor from a market is harmful. Competition means that some potential players will be excluded from markets because they
are not as good at providing products and services as their rivals. BORK, supra note 16, at 137.
The argument is that a firm's successful exclusion of a rival from a market should be suspect
when it succeeds by threats or agreements that are unrelated to any benefit it confers on consumers. Thus, an exclusion to prevent a free-rider problem would be allowed; an exclusion in
the absence of free-riding to prevent a group of customers from obtaining a product-service
package they prefer would not be allowed. See id. at 332 (making this argument in support of
holding in Klor's); see also infra part VI.C.
Robert Bork and Thomas Piraino apparently would deal with upward coercion cases by
classifying them as horizontal, rather than vertical. BORK, supra note 16, at 288; Piraino, supra
note 89, at 316-17. The difficulty with this position is that it may be hard to determine after the
fact whether coercion was applied. See Baker, supra note 53, at 1505-06 (using General Motors
and Sylvania as examples); Gerhart, supra note 52, at 440 (claiming difficulty inherent in approach makes it unworkable). Bork suggests focusing on industries in which almost all suppliers
use similar restraints in order to determine dealer coercion. BORK, supra note 16, at 292. How-
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system that essentially eliminates vertical price-fixing as a viable cause of action should be viewed with suspicion. 4 59 As one commentator noted,
"[t]here is a broad consensus that vertical restraints should be condemned if
they directly facilitate horizontal collusion, at either the manufacturer or the
dealer level." 460 Since price restraints are much more likely to do so than
non-price restraints,461 price restraints should be scrutinized more carefully.
More importantly, vertical price-fixing tends to increase prices and
therefore tends to reduce output. Of course, as the Supreme Court has
noted, although all vertical restraints have the potential to increase prices, 46 2
price restraints almost always do so. 46 3 This observation is important in examining suppliers' use of price restraints to provide sufficient profit margins
ever, in the kind of context-specific exclusion described here, the full-price dealer may effectively
change the context in which it sells by preventing a rival from obtaining a few specific products
that consumers use as modes of comparison. Indeed, for products of which retailers typically
carry only a couple of brands, the elimination of one of them from a particular rival might
dramatically alter the context. Moreover, even if a dealer attempted to coerce its supplier, the
supplier may have procompetitive reasons for agreeing to terminate a free-riding supplier. Thus,
keeping the focus on the supplier's motives seems a better way to handle the issue. In cases
where the supplier has no reason but dealer coercion, the restraint will still be disallowed.
459. See Thomas W. Gilligan, The Competitive Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 17
RAND J. ECON. 544, 555 (1986) (study of firms litigating RPM suggests that economic efficiency
arguments do not support per se legality of RPM); cf. Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Economics of the Insurance Antitrust Suits: Toward an Exclusionary Theory, 63 TUL. L. REV. 971,
995 (1989) ("[Clourts might pause before construing boycotts of unclear purpose in defendants'
favor-especially when defendants attempt to dictate the products that their rivals can sell.").
In addition, Barbara Ann White has argued that when suppliers use multi-brand retailers,
vertical price-fixing will facilitate monopoly pricing because retailers selling all brands have no
incentive to try to further interbrand competition. White, supra note 356, at 44-46. If empirically verified, this argument further suggests that per se legality for resale price maintenance is
inappropriate. Id. at 47.
460. Arquit, supra note 10, at 926; see also Goldberg, supra note 133, at 117 (widespread
agreement regarding illegality of vertical restraints that maintain horizontal cartel).
461. Airtight territorial restraints (those that effectively prevent dealers from selling outside
their territories) may have similar effects to vertical price-fixing, and in fact may be worse because they eliminate intrabrand non-price competition. Piraino, supra note 86, at 6-7; Posner,
supra note 11, at 9. The analysis here generally deals with other types of non-price restraints like
contractual provisions requiring dealers to provide promotion or services. However, it is worth
noting that even airtight territorial restrictions do not facilitate retail cartels in the way that
price-fixing can.
462. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 728 (1988); see also supra
note 19.
463. A variety of sources suggest that fair trade leads to higher prices. See 8 AREEDA,
supra note 10, 1 1604 ("resale price maintenance ... produces higher consumer prices"); Corey,
supra note 98, at 53-54 (asserting that fair trade pricing increased price of appliances and discount housing in post-World War II era); Doherty, supra note 11, at 964-65 n.13 (prices of goods
rose under fair trade laws); Fulda, supra note 457, at 195-96 (pharmaceutical prices rose in fair
trade areas); see also Bowman, supra note 213, at 849-58 (some but not all studies support this);
but see Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, The Political Economy of Resale PriceMaintenance, 94 J. POL. ECON. 1074, 1075-76 (1986) (higher prices in fair trade due to use of same
wholesale prices in jurisdictions with different legal regimes).
William Baxter has argued that the higher margins guaranteed by resale price maintenance
may, in some cases, result in lower costs to the manufacturer as the dealer undertakes promotion
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to encourage distributors to provide costly services that may improve interbrand competition by increasing output. Although in theory different forms
of vertical restraints may be economically equivalent, 464 in practice, price and
non-price restraints may affect behavior differently. Faced with contractual
obligations to provide these services, but no price protection, distributors
465
have strong incentives to try to find the least costly way to provide them.
If freed from price competition, these incentives realistically are not as
strong.46 6 While distributors always have some interest in trying to increase
their profit margins by decreasing the costs of their inputs, events of the recent recession make clear that businesses do not always expend significant
energy trying to cut costs unless they face either stiff competition or the pos467
sibility of losses.
Although in some cases, price-fixing may be a cheaper way to handle
free-riding than non-price restraints,'4 8 the two should not necessarily be
treated interchangeably. 6 9 Encouraging manufacturers to use contractual
costs, or may result in lower optimal wholesale prices. Baxter, supra note 10, at 945. However,
in most cases, higher margins almost certainly will increase consumer prices.
464. E.g., BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 16, at 6; Piraino, supra note 86, at 8.
465. William Comanor has argued that vertical non-price restraints lead to higher prices
than price restraints. Comanor, supra note 23, at 1160. His analysis, however, ignores the incentives retailers have in a competitive market to find cheaper ways to provide services. See 8
AREEDA, supra note 10, 1 1611 (resale price maintenance may deny some dealers benefits that
come from changing lower prices due to lower costs).
466. See Barrett, supra note 37, at 474-75 (absent price competition, some retailers under
RPM may pocket profit rather than providing pre-sale services). A related argument on behalf
of non-price restraints is that price restraints may force consumers to pay more for services than
they actually value them. See Blair & Harrison, supra note 98, at 1559 (arguing that consumer
surplus may not increase, causing consumers not to value additional services by as much as cost
increases). Allowing dealers to compete in the setting of price levels for required services may
provide the distribution chain with better information about how much consumers value those
services.
467. Business entities, particularly in flush times, have some tendency to overspend on salaries, facilities, and benefits. See, e.g., Gerla, supra note 81, at 896-97 (noting large incidence of
wasteful corporate behavior); Office Costs Are Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1993, at D5 (Treasury Secretary Bentsen criticizes financial institutions for wasteful spending). However, retailers
do institute new cost-cutting measures in response to new or intense competition. See Arrarte,
supra note 389, at 27 (supermarkets "getting more price-competitve" in response to competition
from discounters); Strom, supra note 393, at Cl (lowering of prices by Kmart to compete with
Wal-Mart); Stephanie Strom, Macy's Plan Would Cut Costs Deeply, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1993,
at D5 (unveiling of Macy's plan to cut back on personnel and management to emerge from
Chapter 11 status); Stephanie Strom, Signs of Life at Sears Roebuck, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1992,
§ 3, at 1 (discussing Sears' plan to do away with real estate and financial services to cut costs).
468. See supra text accompanying notes 433-34.
469. There also may be some tendency to overstate a supplier's policing costs. Robert Bork
argues that dealers quickly will provide information to suppliers if rivals breach price or territorial restraints. BORK, supra note 16, at 291. The cases on vertical restraints suggest that dealers
are quick to report any perceived inequity, and so can be counted on to police other restraints as
well. Moreover, the costs of policing price-fixing may not be trivial. See Corey, supra note 96, at
58-59 (discussing high costs involved in General Electric investigation of fair trade violations);
Grimes, supra note 398, at 846-48 (discussing producers' monitoring and enforcement costs in
administering vertical price restraints). In addition, suppliers may find it difficult to find the
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non-price restraints to achieve their procompetitive ends may encourage distributors to find ways to provide key services at lower cost, and thus to lower
the prices of the products associated with them. Discounters already have
had some success creating productive efficiencies in retailing through economies of scale and innovative service methods. 470 Therefore, they should be
allowed the opportunity to find efficient ways to meet suppliers' genuine distribution needs. After all, a fundamental premise of the antitrust laws is that
the market should set prices and be employed to insure that better services
are provided at less CoSt. 4 7 1 Encouraging the use of non-price restraints may
472
lessen the price impact on consumers and result in even greater output.
As Robert Pitofsky has pointed out, discounters may "offer lower prices not
because they fail to provide services, but because they provide them more
473
efficiently.,
c) The uncertain frequency of free-rider problems
Although vertical price-fixing can cause harm to consumer welfare
under some circumstances, we might not want to expend resources sorting
out the harmful cases if we believe that the practice yields procompetitive
effects in most instances. However, the frequency of free-rider problems
presents a difficult empirical question. Although there is evidence of some
genuine free-rider problems, that they sometimes exist hardly justifies acceptance of a rule that effectively yields no scrutiny for vertical price-fixing.47 4 Significantly, a number of commentators have expressed skepticism
475
that free-riding is the explanation for most resale price maintenance.
Free-rider problems are more likely to exist in markets involving technologiprice that yields the optimal level of services. Hovenkamp, supra note 199, at 903. Finally, at
least one economist has pointed out that vertical price-fixing can be an inefficient method of
obtaining optimal service levels where dealers have different costs of providing service, which
may often be true as between different types of retailers. Fabricant, supra note 429.
470. E.g., Subrata N. Chakravati, Planningfor the Upturn, FoRBES, Dec. 23, 1991, at 49, 4950; Gerla, supra note 69, at 4-5; Grimes, supra note 398, at 850; Steiner, supra note 2, at 153-55.
In Britain, the growth of efficient self-service supermarkets creating significant economies of
scale has been attributed to the end of legal resale price maintenance for grocers. Chris Ryan,
Trends Past and Present in the Package Holiday Industry, 9 SERV. INDUSTRIEs J.61, 61 (1989).
471. See Pitofsky, supra note 10, at 1493 (arguing against allowing manufacturers to set
prices and to decide what mix of products and services will be made available to market).
472. Suppliers may have incentives to utilize price restraints even where non-price restraints are equally or even more efficient. Dealers will obviously prefer having guaranteed
margins, and so may seek negotiating concessions in return for non-price restraints. Moreover, if
the markets involved are not perfectly competitive, the harms from employing inefficient price
restraints may not fall on suppliers, but on consumers.
473. Pitofsky, supra note 10, at 1493.
474. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
475. E.g., Barrett, supra note 37, at 472-73; Comanor, supra note 23, at 1157-60; Doherty,
supra note 11, at 992; Gerhart, supra note 52, at 431-36; Pitofsky, supra note 10, at 1493;
Roszkowski, supra note 18, at 145-47; F.M. Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52
ArmrrrusT L.J. 687, 694 (1983); Steiner, supra note 2, at 189.
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cally complicated products, such as computers and stereo systems. 476 Yet
many of the cases discussed in Part IV involve simpler products and include
no evidence of free-riding. 477 Many historical examples of resale price maintenance also involved simpler products. 47 8 Additionally, some studies of specific instances of resale price maintenance have concluded that the parties did
479
not enter the price-fixing arrangement to deal with free-rider problems.

476. Pitofsky, supra note 163, at 23; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 69, at 1020 (free-riding
unlikely explanation for price restraints in markets for fungible products or products involving
no point-of-sale service). Added skepticism comes from the press's treatment of resale price
maintenance during the fair-trade era. Such noted left-wing organizations as Business Week, The
Wall Street Journal, and Fortune attacked resale price maintenance during the 1950s. Fulda,
supra note 457, at 186-87. Presumably, they had not yet discovered that price-fixing was helpful
to suppliers. See also Hovenkamp, supra note 69, at 1014 (noting that resale price maintenance
occurred for 50 years before free-riding explanation was developed).
477. E.g., The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148, 1160 (9th Cir. 1988); Garment Dist., Inc. v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc., 799 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1005 (1988); Purity Prods., Inc. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 564, 567 (D. Md. 1988),
aff'd, 878 F.2d 1081 (4th Cir. 1989). See also Springer & Frech, supra note 2, at 435 (arguing that
number of vertical price-fixing cases do not seem to fit free-rider scenario).
In addition, a study of consumer purchases of major appliances found that about two-thirds
of consumers did not rely primarily on information obtained during the search process to determine which items to buy. Wilkie & Dickson, supra note 398, at 23. The study also found that
discount stores were much less successful at converting store visits into sales than appliance
specialty stores or Sears, which presumably offer considerably more in-store information. Id. at
25. The products that were the subject of the study, refrigerators, washers, etc., are expensive
and may have a number of complex distinguishing features. They seem likely subjects of freerider problems. Yet the data suggests that more people look at the discount stores and then buy
at Sears than the other way around.
478. See 8 AREEDA, supra note 10, 1604 (noting occurrence of resale price maintenance
with products such as gasoline, paper, and beer); Bowman, supra note 213, at 835 (same); Fulda,
supra note 457, at 179 (same); Steiner, supra note 2, at 188 (noting example of resale price
maintenance involving low-price, staple items). Of course, even sellers of simple products may
provide some information for first-time buyers that can lead to free-riding. See Fabricant, supra
note 429, at 106 (describing possible free-riding in retail sales of cosmetics and other inexpensive
products).
479. See, e.g., Comanor, supra note 23, at 1156 (noting two studies rejecting free-rider explanation); Fulda, supra note 457, at 192-93 (discussing evidence that RPM in drug industry was
result of pressure form retail cartels); Stanley I. Ornstein & Dominique M. Hanssens, Resale
PriceMaintenance: Output Increasing or Restricting: The Case of Distilled Spirits in the United
States, 36 J. INT'L ECON. 1, 16 (1987) (study of RPM of retail distilled spirits finds evidence of
reduced output inconsistent with free-rider explanation). For example, one result of price-fixing
under the fair trade regime was to increase greatly the sales by grocery stores of over-thecounter drugs. Fulda, supra note 457, at 191-92. Grocery stores are not likely to provide presale services for these products.
In addition, Steven Salop surveyed post-Sylvania antitrust cases, and found a relatively
small number of cases discussing free-rider issues. Salop, supra note 52, at 168-69. Salop attributed this in part to the discomfort of attorneys and judges with these issues. Id. at 169. Yet given
the focus on free-riding in the cases and literature, it is perhaps more plausible to suppose that
there simply was little evidence to support such claims.
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Proving the frequency of free-riding is, of course, a difficult proposi-

tion. 480 As a result, courts and commentators advocating relaxed treatment
of resale price maintenance tend to rely entirely on hypothetical discussions
of free-riding and often fail to point to any empirical support. 48 1 A recent
Third Circuit case illustrates this point.
In Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc.,482 unsuccessful
applicants for car dealerships claimed that the distributor had refused to do
business with them because of pressure from other dealers, who feared price
competition from the applicants. Their evidence consisted largely of statements suggesting that the dealers were opposed to the applicants, that the
distributor, after initially encouraging the applicants, seemed to cool suddenly, and that the many reasons put forward by the distributor for refusing
the applicants were all pretextual. 483 The majority opinion found sufficient
4 84
evidence of a price-fixing conspiracy to send the case to the jury.
The dissent, focusing on the plausibility of the defendant's free-rider arguments, noted that "the relevant literature" suggested that the distributor
"had an interest in protecting its reputation and ... image," that it "could
have feared" free-rider problems, that it "may have acted in a desire to protect the investments of its dealers," and that it "had ample reason" to want to
insure that its products were offered with adequate services. 48 5 The use of
hypothetical verbs is significant. 486 Basically, the dissent argued that because
the distributor had a legitimate reason, in theory, to refuse to do business
with the plaintiffs, the court should ignore the evidence that the theoretical
reasons were not the real ones. 487 By reversing the lower court's grant of
480. Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1697, 1699 n.9

(1986); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 199, at 909 (empirical evidence of free-rider problems
"has proven elusive").
481. Peritz, supra note 49, at 550-51; Popofsky, supra note 52, at 35; Steiner, supra note 2, at
152-53. For examples of these hypothetical discussions, see Wesley J. Liebeler, Resale Price
Maintenanceand Consumer Welfare: Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 36
UCLA L. REV. 889, 893 (1989) (asserting without authority that non-price vertical restraints
"usually adopted" to address free-rider problem); Passell, supra note 22, at D2 (quoting Charles
Rule, Assistant Attorney General for antitrust during second Reagan administration as saying
suppliers who use RPM are "probably" responding to free-riders). Frank Easterbrook has argued that if you locked 12 economists in a room to analyze a given business practice, one of them
undoubtedly could develop a model that demonstrated the practice harmed competition under
certain conditions. Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 11. Equally undoubtedly, of the same 12
economists, at least one would develop a model showing that, under certain assumptions, the
practice could do no harm.
482. 974 F.2d 1358 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1262 (1993).
483. Id. at 1365-80.
484. Id. at 1363-64.
485. Id. at 1388 (Roth, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

486. See California Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n v. Johnson, 807 F.2d 1456, 1466
(9th Cir. 1986) ("[v]erbs are telling").

487. This position was not without support. As the dissent in Sharp pointed out, one can
read the majority opinion in that case to hold that rule of reason treatment was appropriate in
that case because of plausible free-rider concerns. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.,
485 U.S. 717, 757 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Similarly, in a pre-Sharp case, Judge Posner

1995]

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

summary judgment, the majority implicitly rejected this elevation of theory
over evidence. 488
In sum, there simply is no clear empirical evidence that strongly suggests
that suppliers employ resale price maintenance primarily to address free-riding.489 If we move vertical price-fixing entirely into the rule of reason as
presently applied, we would effectively shield many price-fixing arrangements from liability based on a theory that may or may not apply in the
particular case. Because vertical price-fixing can also facilitate cartels and
because it may be an unduly expensive way to address free-rider problems,
we need more refined analysis than either the per se rule or the rule of reason can provide.
VI. A

NEW MIDDLE GROUND

The complexity of retail markets makes both the per se rule and the
wide-ranging rule of reason analysis clumsy tools for assessing vertical pricefixing. What is required is an intermediate methodology that allows the decision-maker to focus on the probable economic effects of price restraints without undertaking analysis that is unduly time-consuming or dauntingly
complex.
This part first examines one commonly proposed middle ground, the
market power screen, and concludes that in practice this screen will not prove
less complex than the rule of reason. It then advocates replacing the traditional forms of Section One analysis with a presumption of illegality that the
supplier can overcome by showing that it employed price restraints in the
reasonable belief that it was addressing a free-rider or similar problem. The
solution proposed relies on the motive of the supplier-that is, whether the
supplier genuinely and reasonably believed it was acting to address a freerider problem. Because this focus on the defendant's motive is not a common part of antitrust analysis, the analysis includes an explanation of why
this is a useful technique for analyzing vertical restraints. This part concludes
by arguing that the proposed burden-shifting analysis renders unnecessary
the questionable distinction the Supreme Court created in Sharp to distinguish price from non-price restraints.
reached the same conclusion as Sharp by relying on the fact that many distributors have legitimate exclusive rights, and their attempts to enforce them may be hard to distinguish from price
complaints. Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1440 (7th Cir. 1986). However,
Judge Posner never tried to set out any mechanism for determining whether, in a particular case,
this concern was warranted.
488. Note that this is not a case about what to do when the defendant has mixed motives.
Rather, it was a case in which the plaintiff presented some pretty good evidence that the only
motive had been to protect prices, and so it was entitled to a jury trial on the question of whether
that had really been the motive for its termination.
489. See Page, supra note 67, at 1252 (state of empirical research "inadequate to resolve the
dispute" as to most common reasons for using RPM).
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A. The Market Power Screen

A number of commentators have suggested that courts require the plaintiffs to make a threshold showing that the defendant has market power
before proceeding with a full rule of reason analysis in vertical restraints
cases. 4 90 The idea here is that a vertical restraint should be unable to harm
competition by reducing output unless either the supplier or retailers have
market power. 491 As noted, many courts do apply this sort of screen in rule
492
of reason cases.

The market power screen, however, is not particularly well tailored to
distinguish between benign and harmful uses of price-fixing. 493 The screen
yields false negatives in cases where the vertical arrangement is disguising or
facilitating horizontal collusion among small competitors. 4 94 It also yields
false negatives in some targeted upward coercion cases.4 95 It will yield false

positives where a defendant with market power genuinely is using the restraint to deal with a free-rider problem. 496 Of course, the court could deal
with false negatives by allowing the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant is part of a collusive group that has market power, 4 97 although this will
greatly expand the scope of discovery. A court could deal with false positives
during the subsequent rule of reason analysis.
A more significant problem is that a market power screen will require
almost as much discovery and economic analysis as the full-blown rule of
reason analysis. As noted, most courts require the plaintiff to define the mar490. E.g., Peritz, supra note 49, at 576; Posner, supra note 18, at 17-19; Steiner, supra note
2, at 146. Frank Easterbrook has advocated using a series of screens, including market power.
Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 14-19; Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 159-68. One of the congressional proposals to address Monsanto and Sharp also included a market power screen. RPM and
Telemarketing Fraud Bills Reach Top of Antitrust/Consumer Agenda on Hill, 62 ArNrrrrusr &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 27, 29 (1992).
491. E.g., Klein & Murphy, supra note 433, at 295; Posner, supra note 18, at 17; White,
supra note 10, at 760.
492. See supra note 10.
493. This will be particularly true if the only defendant is the supplier. A focus on the
supplier's market power would not recognize harm done by coercion by one or more dealers
with market power or cases where the supplier was functioning as a coordinator for a dealer
cartel. Robinson, supra note 100, at 613. However, even if the court allows the plaintiff to use
the market power of the non-defendant dealers to meet the screen, the other problems discussed
in the text remain.
494. Arquit, supra note 10, at 923-24; cf Turner, supra note 43, at 803 (market power has
nothing to do with whether non-price vertical restraints are efficient). Moreover, in order to
successfully employ resale price maintenance to raise prices for whatever reason, either the supplier or the dealer has to have a little bit of market power. Tesler, supra note 99, at 87.
495. In addition, it would yield false negatives in those cases where the use of resale price
maintenance in conjunction with multibrand retailers might yield supracompetitive pricing even
without market power.
496. See Arquit, supra note 10, at 923 (defendant's market power "does not necessarily or
even commonly suggest" that restraint is anticompetitve).
497. See White, supra note 10, at 761-62 (noting possibility of taking into account market
shares of non-parties conspiring with defendants).
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ket to establish the defendant's market power. 498 This will require the wideranging discovery and uncertain analysis normally connected with defining a
499
market.
Frank Easterbrook has argued that a market power screen does not require defining markets. 5°° However, even if courts can roughly determine
the defendant's market power without precisely defining the relevant market,
plaintiffs surely will be entitled to discovery on the wide variety of issues that
may be relevant. 50 1 For example, they should be permitted to show that consumer loyalty to a particular brand creates market power. They likely will be
permitted to examine cost and pricing information to determine if the defendant is earning supracompetitive profits. Because the existence of entry
barriers can help create market power, plaintiffs should be permitted to inquire into structural industry factors that might demonstrate entry barriers.
In addition, since the Supreme Court has recognized in Kodak that information failures can lead to market power, 50 2 plaintiffs should be entitled to discovery regarding the availability of information in the particular market.
After this wide-ranging discovery, the court often will have to determine the
market power of a defendant that produces a somewhat differentiated product in a complex market where consumers often lack important information. 50 3 Thus, the market power screen not only yields time-consuming and
expensive discovery, but also leaves the court with difficult analysis to perform at the end. In sum, the market power screen will create little benefit
when compared to the full rule of reason analysis.
B. Motive as a Proxy for Market Effect
Determining the precise effect a vertical restraint will have in a complex
retail market is quite difficult. To simplify the analytic process, we need to
employ some proxy for market effect. Here, we will use the supplier's motive
for terminating the price-cutting dealer.
Motive arguably presents a problematic basis for antitrust liability. After all, some have argued that if a business arrangement improves consumer
welfare, why should it matter if the defendant was thinking "bad"
thoughts? 504 On the other hand, the legal system presumably should forbid
an arrangement that harms competition, even if the defendant did not intend
498. See supra note 10.
499. See supra text accompanying notes 444-47.
500. Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 22.
501. Cf Popofsky, supra note 52, at 37 (noting that courts have refused to use market
power screen to end litigation where product in question was unique, in market that had significant differentiation or barriers to entry, or simply unusual).
502. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072,2085-87 (1992)
(describing effects of information failures on consumer marketplace decisions).
503. See supra part V.B.; see also White, supra note 10, at 760-61 (market power is difficult

to ascertain).
504. See 7 AREEDA, supra note 4, 1 1506 ("Discerning intention is no substitute for appraising conduct in the light of antitrust objectives.").

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

to harm the market or its rivals.50 5 Moreover, the mental state of wishing illfortune on your rivals and total market control for yourself is, supposedly,
the mental state that makes the competitive process operate. 50 6 Thus, in certain cases, notably those involving allegations of predatory conduct against
competitors, focusing on the evil gleam in the defendant's eye may well cause
the factfinder mistakenly to see vibrant competitive behavior as undesirable
507
conduct.
Yet vertical cases present different issues. Suppliers may make decisions
about their distribution systems with nasty side glances at their direct competitors, but the looks they reserve for their dealers certainly will not be hostile, even if they are not always entirely loving. Thus, a court examining the
suppliers' reasons for imposing or agreeing to a particular restraint is unlikely
to confuse competitive fervor with bad intent. Of course, the focus must remain on the motivation of the supplier and not on that of the conspiring rival
50 8
dealers, who obviously will not wish their competitors well.
More importantly, as many courts and commentators point out, a supplier is much more likely than a subsequent factfinder to understand the operation of the complex markets in which it trades and to understand the
likely effects of the restraints it employs. 50 9 Thus, rather than engaging in the
difficult, if not impossible, task of determining the cumulative price and output effects of vertical price restraints, courts should defer to the opinions that
the supplier itself held at the time it decided to impose the restraints.510 Given
the extensive information that the supplier possesses about the operation of
its own business, its own opinion about why it acts provides the best guide to
arriving at a useful guess about the true effects of the restraint.51 ' So with
505. See Areeda, supra note 38, at 578-79 ("An innocent purpose will not absolve a practice
that objectively appears to have adverse and unredeemed effects."). Obviously, specific intent is

important in criminal cases. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978)
(holding that defendant's state of mind is element of criminal antitrust offense).
506. 7 AREEDA, supra note 4, ' 1506; BORK, supra note 16, at 38-39.
507. 7 AREEDA, supra note 4, 1506.
508. 8 AREEDA, supra note 10, 1 1604.
509. Goldberg, supra note 133, at 111; Piraino, supra note 89, at 342; see also Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 412 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The
Dr. Miles Medical Company knows better than we do what will enable it to do the best busi-

ness."); North Cent. Watt Count v. Watt Count Eng'g Sys., 678 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (M.D. Tenn.
1988); BoRK, supra note 16, at 290 (explaining superior information and insight make suppliers'
judgment more accurate than court's assessment); Easterbrook, supra note 480, at 1700-01
(courts not capable of identifying "best" structure for particular markets).
510. Cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, § 7.10 (arguing that motive serves as proxy for difficult market assessments in context of assessing reasonableness of trade association's quality
standards).
511. See 8 AREEDA, supra note 10, 1 1607 (arguing that business is less likely to err than

legal system about efficiency of restraint); BORK, supra note 16, at 345 (suggesting that examining firm's intent is useful evidence of market conditions); John J. Tharp, Raising Rivals' Costs:
Of Bottlenecks, Bottled Wine and Bottled Soda, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 321, 373 (1990) ("It seems

reasonable to ask businessmen to explain themselves when presented with plausible claims of
anticompetitive injury and to defer to them when they provide credible efficiency justifications
for their actions."); cf Areeda, supra note 38, at 579 (defendant's motive is useful as indicator
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motive as our guide, we turn now to the specifics of a proposed test for the
legality of vertical price-fixing.
C. A Burden-Shifting Approach to Analyzing Vertical Price-Fixing

To review, the per se rule provides a conclusive presumption that a restraint is unreasonable, a presumption that allows no defense. The rule of
reason is a thorough inquiry into "reasonableness," which allows a defendant
to introduce a broad range of information to justify its conduct. When the
workings of the two rules are juxtaposed in this fashion, another possible way
to determine "unreasonableness" leaps to mind: one could adopt rebuttable
presumptions and allow a limited range of defenses. That is, once the plaintiff comes forward with sufficient evidence of the disfavored restraint, the
burden would shift to the defendant to demonstrate that it employed the
restraint for a legitimate purpose. 512 This section proposes a specific burdenshift and then discusses its advantages.
that "a redeeming virtue might be present" in a particular restraint or "as an aid to characterizing ambiguous conduct as pro- or anticompetitive"); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of
Silence: Default Rules and ContractualConsent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821, 837-44 (1992) (discussing
benefit of relying on party with best access to information).
This approach also should satisfy those who believe that antitrust law needs to take into
account the extent to which individual managers' goals might vary from those of the firm or from
those postulated by economic theory. E.g., Gerla, supra note 81, at 893-94; Herbert
Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law and Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 293, 294 & n.5 (1992).
An examination of the actual decision-making process leading to a dealer termination will expose those instances where managers might be acting in a manner inconsistent with economic
theory. See Gerla, supra note 81, at 913-16 (explaining managers may capitulate to distribution
restraints to further personal interests even where supplier lacks market power).
512. Intermediate positions between the per se rule and the rule of reason, including variations on burden-shifting, have been suggested by other authors. See Baker, supra note 398, at
544-45 (proposing presumptive illegality of restraint where dealer shows any degree of market
power); Baxter, supra note 10, at 948-49 (proposing plaintiff attacking vertical restraint have
initial burden of proof to show restraint "facilitates the exercise or formation of market power",
but burden shifts to defendant to show restraint was a response to market failure such as freeriding, followed by shift back to plaintiff to show bad faith or part of horizontal conspiracy);
Cann, supra note 23, at 534-38 (advocating placing burden on supplier to show positive benefits
of restraint once restrictions cross market share or similar thresholds); Flynn, supra note 10, at
1143-47 (proposing examination of all evidence with varying levels of presumption of legality
depending on type of vertical restraint); Hay, supra note 187, at 441-44 (suggesting intermediate
position based on analysis of market structure and supplier's reasons for using restraint); Robinson, supra note 100, at 614-18 (proposing showing of market power and gain by anticompetitive
behavior as screen to filter meritless claims; based on filter analysis, court may choose per se or
burdenshifting approach); Scherer, supra note 475, at 706-07 (advocating rule of reason analysis
with presumption of legality except where restraints are widespread).
Wesley Liebeler has proposed using the mini-rule of reason to deal with all vertical cases.
Liebeler, supra note 481, at 909-11. In practice, since all vertical restraints have plausible
procompetitive effects, all these restraints would probably fall into the rule of reason. See
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294
(1985) (per se rules appropriate were no plausible efficiency arguments); Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-24 (1979) (applying rule of reason to blanket licensing arrangement
in part due to existence of efficiencies). Thus, this proposal, absent the use of other screens,
suffers from the same weaknesses as simply applying the rule of reason from the start.
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1. The Structure of the Proposal

A rebuttable presumption, or burden shift, to address vertical price restraints might work along the following lines: if a terminated distributor
proves that a supplier and competing distributors entered into a vertical price
fixing arrangement that resulted in its termination, 513 the defendants could
avoid liability only if they established that the supplier genuinely and reasonably believed, at the time it imposed or agreed to the price restraint, that it
did so in order to eliminate a free-rider problem. 514 Presumably, the defense
also would apply if the defendant could show another procompetitive concern that it was attempting to address with a price restraint. 5 15 Because the
513. The same standards obviously would apply if the government could prove the existence of a price-fixing conspiracy.
514. An additional component that a court or Congress might add to the test is that the
supplier must believe that the price restraint was reasonably necessary to defeat the free-rider
problem. See Altschuler, supra note 10, at 59-61; (arguing that scope and existence of reasonably necessary test as part of rule of reason still unclear); Areeda, supra note 38, at 580-81;
Baker, supra note 398, at 546 (proposing necessity defense in some vertical cases); cf. Commodore Business Machs. v. Montgomery Grant, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 7498, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1993) (suggesting test of manufacturer's ability to take steps to stem
sales from unauthorized dealers was whether actions taken were "reasonably necessary" to prevent unauthorized sales).
This requirement would force a supplier to impose non-price restraints unless it had good
reason to believe that they would be too expensive to enforce. Given the advantages of nonprice restraints, this requirement makes some economic sense. Moreover, because the common
justification for allowing resale price maintenance involves precisely the situation where nonprice restraints are inefficient, this requirement has the advantage of tailoring the defense narrowly to suit its purpose. On the other hand, the additional costs of complicating the litigation
with this more subtle issue may mean that the requirement is not worth imposing. The mere
difference in legal treatment of price and non-price restraints may be enough incentive for suppliers to prefer non-price restraints where they are efficient.
515. See Springer & Frech, supra note 2, at 435-36 (suggesting procompetitive alternative
reasons for vertical price-fixing). Some commentators have suggested that one procompetitive
use of resale price maintenance is to provide sufficient margins to encourage retailers to locate
and promote the supplier's product in the stores in a way that maximizes its impact on consumers. Calvani & Berg, supra note 158, at 1183-84; Victor P. Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem,
Imperfect Pricing, and the Economics of Retailing Services, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 736, 738-44
(1984). This use of price-fixing seems suspicious. Fixing the price does not guarantee to the
supplier that the margins are sufficient to entice the retailer to push its products. Other suppliers
may outbid it. Weak sales in the context of a price fix might mean either that the price was set
too high to attract consumers or too low to command retailer attention. A supplier concerned
with favorable shelf space, location, and promotions would seem well-advised to contract for
them directly. Cf Pitofsky, supra note 163, at 21 (observing that supplier and dealer sometimes
contract for post-sale service and repair). Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola, for example, use such
agreements. Tharp, supra note 511, at 332-33, If a supplier demonstrated that it genuinely set
the price in an attempt to achieve strategic placement in the stores, perhaps the defense should
be allowed.
A similar argument can be made in response to image free-riding: the claim that discounters free-ride on the implicit quality claim made when a fancy store sells a particular product. See 8 AREEDA, supra note 10, 1 1613 (analyzing quality certification by elite dealers and
free-riding off certification by discounters); Fabricant, supra note 429, at 105 (describing freeriding on "quality signalling"); Grimes, supra note 398, at 844-45 (analyzing use of RPM to
certify image of product). Again it is unclear why non-price restraints would not meet suppliers'
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discussions of the procompetitive effects of vertical restraints have focused
primarily on free-riding, 516 I will confine the rest of this analysis accordingly.
If the defendant successfully asserts the defense, the plaintiff could still prehave to present the
vail under a full rule of reason analysis, but it would then 517
much wider range of evidence required by that analysis.
518
Other commentators have made somewhat similar proposals,
although the specific details of this variation are unique. Here, the supplier's
genuine distribution needs in this regard. See id. at 845 (stating producer could limit distribution
to elite outlets through non-price restraints). After all, suppliers are free to sell only to "quality"
retailers. 8 AREEDA, supra note 10, 1 1601. Indeed, in the seminal article on free-riding, Lester
Tesler argued that "no wise manufacturer would adopt a policy of retail price maintenance
merely to get competing stores of different kinds to sell [its] product." Tesler, supra note 99, at
90.
A more sophisticated version of these arguments suggests that retail price maintenance, in
conjunction with supplier monitoring of non-price restraints, could limit profits for non-complying retailers by limiting price competition, while providing complying dealers with quasi-rents as
incentives. Klein & Murphy, supra note 433, at 268-69. Again, if the supplier could demonstrate
that this was its intent, the defense could be allowed.
Another possible use of vertical price-fixing is to facilitate price discrimination. Tesler,
supra note 99, at 103-04. The net consumer welfare effects of price discrimination are the subject of some debate. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 16, at 394-98 (arguing price discrimination
generally benefits consumers); HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, § 13.5 (noting potential harm from
price discrimination). A court applying the burden-shift proposal would have to decide whether
to allow the defense for price discrimination.
516. E.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,731 (1988); Continental
TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977); Hovenkamp, supra note 173, at 524;
Shores, supra note 51, at 400; see also Steiner, supra note 2, at 187-88 (attributing to modem
Chicago School theorists view that most vertical restraints are imposed to address free-riding).
517. As the post-Sylvania non-price cases show, the plaintiff is very unlikely to prevail in
such a case. See supra text accompanying notes 268-93. Thomas Piraino has suggested that if a
supplier successfully asserts the motive defense, its actions become per se legal. Piraino, supra
note 86, at 18. This has the advantage of preventing costly and uncertain rule of reason suits, but
does forestall the opportunity for dealers to try to show that, for example, the restraint results in
unwanted services. Because plaintiffs have so much trouble winning these cases, the difference
may not be all that significant.
518. Donald Ibrner suggested this sort of burden-shift in a fairly general way. Tiuer,
supra note 43, at 804; see also Pitofsky, supra note 10, at 1495 (resale price maintenance might
be allowed if defendant could show "extreme examples of free-rider problems"). Phillip Areeda
would place the burden on the defendants to disprove a series of structural factors that suggest
anticompetitive effects. 8 AREEDA, supra note 10, 1 1633. Like the market power screen, this
proposal incorporates market analysis and would be quite complex to administer.
The proposal that is closest to mine is that of Thomas Piraino, who developed in a series of
articles a screen based on the supplier's motive for terminating the dealer. Piraino, supra note
175, at 319; Piraino, supra note 11, at 728-32; Piraino, supra note 86, at 4; Piraino, supra note 89,
at 339-41. However, his analysis focuses on whether the supplier acted independently or as a
result of retailer coercion, that is, on determining whether the supplier is acting from its "own
purposes," or at the "behest" of retailers. Piraino, supra note 175, at 320; Piraino, supra note 11,
at 729; Piraino, supra note 86, at 16; Piraino, supra note 89, at 317, 339, 353. This focus seems
inappropriate for at least two reasons. First, the supplier's "independent" motive could be to
facilitate a cartel at its own level. Second, the supplier, although terminating a price-cutter at the
behest of retailers, could be trying to address a free-rider problem that the retailer's complaints
brought to its attention. Piraino would deal with this last problem by allowing the defense if the
supplier would have terminated the dealer even in absence of the dealer complaints. Piraino,
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affirmative defense has both a subjective and an objective component. The
subjective component is that the supplier actually must have believed that it
terminated the price-cutting dealer to address a free-rider problem. Defendants should be able to meet the subjective component with contemporaneous
internal documentation. The subjective component insures that the mere
recitation of "free-riders" as a mantra in litigation will not insulate a supplier
from liability for price-fixing. Otherwise, competent counsel might be
tempted to assert imaginary free-rider problems, 519 particularly considering
520
the attention the Supreme Court has given to free-riding.
Given the empirical uncertainty regarding the frequency of free-riding,
to get the benefits of the defense, the defendants will have to show that the
free-rider problem was a significant part of the supplier's motivation at the
time it terminated the plaintiff.52 1 If they cannot show this, it seems reasonsupra note 89, at 360-61. Yet this seems an unduly hypothetical inquiry. The burden-shift proposed here merely asks if the supplier believed it saw a real free-rider problem, a somewhat
simpler and more provable question than the one raised by Piraino.
Piraino also employs a number of questionable evidentiary and screening devices. First,
Piraino's most recent elaborations of his analysis put the burden on the terminated dealer to
prove the supplier's motive. Piraino, supra note 89, at 341-43; Piraino, supra note 11, at 729.
This seems to me an unnecessary burden when the supplier has better knowledge of its own
motives and easier access to the relevant evidence. See supra text accompanying notes 504-06.
Indeed, in an earlier formulation, Piraino placed the burden on the supplier to show independent motivation once the plaintiff had shown a conspiracy to terminate it. Piraino, supra note 175,
at 328-29.
In addition, Piraino argues that the relative market power of the parties can be used to sort
out the cause of the termination. Piraino, supra note 89, at 362. He also argues that the supplier
should only be able to claim the benefits of a positive motive if it can show real interbrand
competition, and the existence of a "formal quality program." Piraino, supra note 86, at 23-25.
However, bringing analyses of market power and interbrand competition into the equation significantly increases the scope of the inquiry and thus limits administrability, the primary benefit
of the motive test. Requiring a "formal quality program" seems a very high burden. Shouldn't it
be enough if dealer complaints reveal to a supplier a free-rider problem of which it was previously unaware?
519. See Calvani & Berg, supra note 158, at 1200 (noting that post-Monsanto use of freerider argument is unsurprising). In one Third Circuit case, for example, beer suppliers claimed
they employed exclusive territories to encourage effective promotion of their products, yet the
evidence demonstrated that promotions were done at the national, not the local, level, so no
free-rider problem could have existed. Fragale & Sons Beverage Co. v. Dill, 760 F.2d 469, 47172 (3d Cir. 1985). One of my colleagues with experience representing the industry has suggested
that in fact some beer promotions are local, so the free-rider problem was not hypothetical. Yet
the fact remains that the defendants failed to get evidence of free-riding on local advertising
before the court. See Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068, 1079-80 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting
free-rider claim inconsistent with evidence presented).
520. E.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 728 (1988).
521. See 8 AREEDA, supra note 10, 1602 (cannot assume that challenged restraint actually
serves claimed objective). Focusing on motive leaves open the question of what to do in mixed
motive cases. In the employment area, the Supreme Court has resolved the mixed motive question by a type of burden shift. Once employees demonstrate that the impermissible motive
played some role in their termination, the employer bears the burden of proving that it would
have terminated the employee even in the absence of the impermissible motive. Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989); National Labor Relations Board v. Trans-
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able to assume that the supplier was engaged in price-fixing for one of the
more sinister reasons. As the Second Circuit has stated, "[t]he failure of a
business's management to note at the time what is later claimed by its lawyers to have
been a mortal commercial wound weighs heavily against such a
2
claim."

52

The objective component of this approach is that the supplier's belief
must have been reasonable. This component is not intended to be a strict
burden, but rather a small hurdle to prevent legally sophisticated defendants
from planting a paper record that bears no relationship to reality.5 2 3 My
assumption is that this part of the test would be met if the defendants identified a plausible free-rider problem in the relevant distribution chain. 524 This,
however, will not always be the case. For example, I suspect that a court
would be quite skeptical of a supplier that claimed that it adopted resale
price maintenance to insure adequate pre- or post-sale services with regard to
525
the sale of milk.
portation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 399 & n.4 (1983); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
This standard seems inappropriate in vertical price-fixing. Because complaints about freerider problems will be entangled in other dealer complaints, particularly those about low prices,
leaving the jury to sort out whether the supplier would have terminated in absence of the freerider problem, or whether it would not have terminated absent the other incentives it had to do
so, seems very complicated. In addition, it may invite the type of jury confusion between permissible and impermissible behavior that the Court condemned in Sharp and Monsanto. Instead, I
suggest that so long as part of a supplier's motivation is a genuine reasonable concern about
free-riding, the law should allow price-fixing. If in fact it acts in part to further a monopoly or
cartel, other legal avenues remain to attack those problems.
522. Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 801 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1088 (1987). The court went on to find as a "telling blow" to a litigant's claim that "contemporary accounts of the reasons for its economic ailments consistently contradict its present position." Id.; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 69, at 1015 ("after the fact explanations about why
condemned conduct was really competitive must be taken with a bag or two of salt").
523. See Gerhart, supra note 52, at 439 (evidence of subjective motive can be manipulated);
Piraino, supra note 86, at 17 (recognizing that evidence may merely reflect counsel's recommendation about what motive should have been).
524. This is similar to Thomas Piraino's suggestion that the product must be one for which
quality of service concerns are relevant. Piraino, supra note 86, at 23.
525. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, § 6.6 (vertical restraints in markets for fungible products should be viewed with more suspicion). Judging by the Antitrust & Trade Regulation Report, dairy products seem to be the subject of a remarkable number of price-fixing conspiracies.
See, e.g., Agriculture Dep't Will DebarDairy that Pleaded Guilty to Bid Rigging, 65 ANTrrRuST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 263 (1993) (school lunch program milk provider); Dairy Resolves
Civil, CriminalChargesof Bid Rigging, Must Pay $4 Million Fine, 63 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) 238 (1992) (conspiracy among competitors supplying milk to schools); Fourth Circuit Upholds Conviction of Co-op for Fixing Prices of Milk, 63 ANTITRusT & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) 383 (1992) (1400-member cooperative rigged bids for school milk supply); Dairy Resolves
ssl Charges in Four Different Venues, 63 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 389 (1992)
(large dairy supplier involved in four separate conspiracies); Dairy Resolves ssl Charges in Seven
Different Venues, 63 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 445 (1992) (suppliers allocated
school customers).
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The focus of the defense must be on the supplier's motivation. Competing dealers will always want to be rid of a price-cutting competitor, so their
motivations are poor indicators of whether the restraint provides efficiency
gains. As Monsanto suggests, the appropriate focus of the inquiry is not the
cacophony of wheedling, suggestion, and complaint that is likely to arise out
of the dealers in the normal course of business, but rather the supplier's actions and motivations. The existence of anticompetitive animus among rival
dealers reveals nothing about whether the supplier's handling of its distribution chain is efficient.
This approach places the burden on the defendants because the supplier
will clearly have better information regarding the nature of its own motives
and the location of the evidence that demonstrates those motives. 5 26 This is
an area where history demonstrates that the possibility of anticompetitive
activity is not unreasonable. If the supplier cannot demonstrate an acceptable justification for its behavior, it seems more reasonable to assume that it
was acting for impermissible reasons than to force the plaintiffs to hypothesize motives and then disprove them.5 27
2. Advantages of the Burden-Shifting Approach
The approach suggested here has a number of advantages over the current modes of analysis and over some of the alternatives that commentators
529
have suggested. 528 First, it focuses narrowly on the relevant questions.
Commentators arguing against the per se rule want suppliers to be able to
526. Piraino, supra note 175, at 328-29.

527. White, supra note 10, at 758; see also 7 AREEDA, supra note 4, 1504 ("There is no
reason for the court creatively to imagine possible justifications that the defendants have not
adduced.").
Frank Easterbrook has argued that sometimes suppliers don't know the reasons that they
apply restraints and thus that forcing them to explain themselves is unfair. Easterbrook, supra
note 10, at 5-6. Yet his argument was made in the context of new kinds of restraints. Id Verti-

cal price-fixing has been around long enough for a number of plausible reasons for its implementation-both good and bad-to develop. A supplier that may be using a price restraint to
exercise its market power, or yielding to a retailer cartel, should not be given the same benefit of

the doubt as one who is trying an untested form of distribution restraint.
528. Another approach that would narrowly tailor the analysis would be to characterize

agreements to terminate price-cutters without free-rider justifications as naked restraints. After
all, these agreements are not necessary to the operation of the distribution contract. A litigant
would argue that this was similar to the television limitation restrictions at issue in NCAA, which
did not contribute to the procompetitive aspects of the other agreements between university
athletic programs. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 117-20 (1984).
However, the Supreme Court, by rejecting the dissent's position in Sharp, has refused to

characterize an agreement to eliminate a price-cutting competitor as a naked restraint. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 740-45 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(characterizing agreement at issue as naked restraint). The majority's position is also not unreasonable. One can see the agreement as "ancillary" to the larger distribution agreement because
it might have the effect of eliminating free-rider problems that hinder the distribution of the
product. Although, as Justice Stevens observed in his Sharp dissent, the elimination of price

competition is not necessarily intertwined with the provision of better or more efficient services.
Id. at 740 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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deal with free-riders. 530 The burden-shift points the fact-finder precisely at
that issue. 531 Furthermore, it artfully deals with the empirical question about
the extent of free-riding in the real world. If you believe that most vertical
price-fixing attempts to prevent free-riding, then you should be comfortable
with the burden-shift because, if you are correct, most resale price arrangements will be allowed. If you believe that vertical price-fixing rarely stems
from free-rider problems, you also should be comfortable with the approach,
because vertical price-fixing remains presumptively illegal.
Second, the streamlined cause of action will be much simpler to litigate,
reducing the burden on courts and litigants. The parties need not adduce
evidence related to market power or definition. In addition, fact-finders,
who are generally unfamiliar with sophisticated economic tools, are probably
determine the net efbetter equipped to analyze a supplier's motive than to
532
fects on competition required by the rule of reason.
Third, the burden shift should not unduly burden procompetitive behavior. Should a supplier believe in good faith that it needs to set prices to solve
a free-rider problem, it merely has to document its decision-making process.
Although the Court's acceptance of the characterization of vertical price-fixing as a naked
restraint would ameliorate some of the same problems as the burden-shift, the contours of the
burdens of the parties in a naked restraint case are not yet clear. The approach suggested here
has the advantage of clearly laying out the burdens on both sides.
529. The narrow focus is supported in Dr. Miles itself. In that case, the Supreme Court
identified the common law restraint of trade doctrine as one of the sources of § 1, and noted that
it had allowed contractual restraints only where "the restraint on one party is not greater than
protection to the other party requires." Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220
U.S. 373, 406 (1911) (quoting Gibbs v. Baltimore Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889)). As previously noted, the Dr. Miles Court was unable to identify any reason that the manufacturer "required" anything in a price-fixing contract. The burden shift allows protection not greater than
that required where a manufacturer can affirmatively demonstrate that price-fixing is used to
address free-riding, and is therefore consistent with the common law antecedents to which Dr.
Miles refers.
530. See, e.g., Allison, supra note 1, at 132 (critics of per se rule for vertical price-fixing
often focus on free-rider issue).
531. Because of the narrow focus, the burden-shift also addresses the concerns that underlie
Robert Bork's argument that, because a supplier generally can choose to perform retailing functions itself, nothing is lost to consumers if resale price maintenance is allowed. BORK, supra note
16, at 29. So long as the supplier can show that it reasonably believed that it was acting to run its
distribution system most efficiently, we allow price-fixing. When RPM is used to support cartels,
or as part of an exercise of dealer power, it is forbidden. The resulting analysis is similar to that
Bork suggested for horizontal price cases: where the defendants can show that the restraints are
needed to make a procompetitive venture function, they should be allowed. Id. at 279.
532. See Piraino, supra note 89, at 352, 363 (noting that courts commonly rely on factfinder
to determine motive in antitrust cases); see also BORK, supra note 16, at 157 (noting that firm's
specific intent is not unduly difficult to prove); Gerla, supra note 69, at 15 (arguing that
factfinders are familiar with sorting out motives). The focus on motive also eliminates a concern
that a defense based on efficiencies will unduly focus on measurable economic information and
ignore what is hard to measure. See BORK, supra note 16, at 127 (people tend to "measure what
is susceptible of measurement and will tend to forget what is not"). Because the factfinder is not
attempting to determine whether the practice is itself efficient, but merely whether the supplier
really thought it was, this concern should not arise.
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Even under the current system, some suppliers seem to generate paper
records that verify free-rider concerns.53 3 While this simplified cause of action may generate more lawsuits, in addition to receiving the benefits of the
Monsanto screen, suppliers can bring summary judgment motions on their
affirmative defense where undisputed documentary evidence shows that their
motivation for terminating the plaintiff was permissible. 534 Because the focus is on the supplier's motive, stray documents referring to anticompetitive
motivations on the part of non-terminated dealers should not be sufficient
evidence to take a case to the jury.
Finally, this approach should allay the Supreme Court's worry that juries
might have trouble distinguishing legitimate non-price concerns from illegal
price-fixing because both may involve concerns over low price levels.5 35
Under the proposed approach, the court will specifically instruct the jury that
price-fixing is allowed where the supplier has an appropriate motive. The
defendants can present to the jury evidence of any procompetitive logic behind their actions. Compared to the per se rule, where the court simply tells
the jury that price-fixing is illegal, the instructions and defense presentation
available here should legitimate the idea that some attempts to control price
are acceptable. The jury's focus will be placed narrowly on what the supplier
was attempting to accomplish, thus minimizing the possibility that they will
5 36
confuse procompetitive and anticompetitive behavior.
The solution proposed here is not ideal. Those convinced that most vertical price-fixing is malignant will worry that suppliers may be able to create
533. See O.S.C. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274, 1280-84 (C.D. Cal. 1985)
(describing extensive evidence that manufacturer analyzed and identified genuine free-rider
problems), aff'd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986); Sample, Inc. v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 704
F. Supp. 498, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (clothing manufacturer provided evidence that its sales were
"most successful in stores that were willing to carry a full array of its products, educate its salespeople about [its] products, and display [its] line separately from those of other manufacturers");
see also Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 751-52 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that if supplier terminates distributor for service-related reasons, it should
be able to provide admissible evidence to prove its motivation).
534. See Piraino, supra note 86, at 28 (noting suppliers could bring summary judgment motions on free-riding defense).
535. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 727-28; see also Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1440
(7th Cir. 1986) ("antitrust liability should not turn on a court's guess as to which motive may
have predominated" in termination decision following distributor complaints about pricecutting).
536. One commentator has proposed that liability for coercion cases be determined based
on whether the coercing dealer had an acceptable motivation, informing the dealer that it could
not profitably continue to sell under existing market conditions, or an unacceptable motivation,
eliminating a competitor in a market in which it can afford to remain a participant. Barlas, supra
note 339, at 2356-59. However, distinguishing the two situations runs square into the traditional
problems with separating good from bad motivation for excluding rivals. See supra text accompanying notes 504-11. In the alternative, this test would require the factfinder to analyze complex cost information to determine if the coercing dealer was justified in its actions. See Barlas,
supra note 339, at 2358 n.104 (explaining inquiry into coerciveness of conduct). Focusing on the
supplier's actions seems easier and more in keeping with the reasons coerced terminations might
be allowed.
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plausible paper records that free them from liability despite some anticompetitive effects. This undoubtedly will happen on occasion. Those convinced
that most price restraints are benign will find the rebuttable presumption too
ready a weapon for grumpy terminated dealers, who will bring extortionate
lawsuits.537 Undoubtedly, this too will happen on occasion. Yet both per se
legality and per se illegality are simply too heavy-handed to measure restraints that have both good and bad uses. Until market research can confirm the actual frequency of free-riding and related problems, we have to
employ some mechanism to try to assess vertical price restraints. Focusing on
the supplier's motive has at least two virtues. It bears a clear relation to the
question of what sort of effects the restraint is likely to have and it does not
require that the judicial system undertake costly and complex analysis.
D. DistinguishingPrice from Non-Price Restraints: Eliminating the Sharp
Distinction
As long as we retain some distinction between price and non-price restraints, the question will remain where to draw the line between them. This
brings us back to Sharp, which held that in order to constitute price-fixing, a
vertical agreement must contain an understanding as to a specific price or
price level. 538 A non-terminated distributor's general complaint about low
prices is insufficient to meet this standard.
The line drawn by the Court in Sharp is somewhat arbitrary in practice.
Under its approach, a court's choice between the per se rule or the rule of
reason turns on the precise wording of the price complaints and threats made
by the non-terminated distributor. The threat, "Dammit, Louise, if you don't
get Cheap-Mart to raise their prices, I'll never do business with you again!"
contains no explicit price agreement, and is evidence only of a restraint that
will be judged under the rule of reason. The threat, "Dammit, Louise, if you
don't get Cheap-Mart to start charging your MSRP, I'll never do business
with you again!" contains an explicit price term, and may well be evidence of
a per se violation. The choice between the per se rule and rule of reason
analysis makes an enormous difference to the way a case proceeds and to its
likely outcome. Making this important determination turn on the particular
537. Cynically, those convinced that these restraints are mostly benign may be better off
acceding to some middle position than allowing resale price maintenance to fall fully into the
rule of reason. An intermediate position is less likely to tempt Congress to codify the per se rule
for vertical price-fixing, a step both houses have been leaning toward since the Supreme Court
decided Monsanto. See, e.g., RPM and Telemarketing Fraud Bills Reach Top of Antitrust/Consumer Agenda on Hill, 62 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 29 (1992) (House and Senate
to confer on bills addressing RPM); Metzenbaum Reintroduces Legislation on Resale PriceMaintenance Standards, 60 ANTTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 275 (1991) (Senate bill explicitly
codifies per se illegality rule); House Passes Vertical Price-FixingBill to Overturn Tw'o Supreme
Court Decisions, 58 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 577 (1990) (House bill overturning
Monsanto and Sharp); Brooks offers Bill on Standards in Resale Price Maintenance Suits, 56
ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 363 (1989) (House bill explicitly codifying per se illegality rule).
538. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 735-36.
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language the parties employed seems a bit bizarre, especially given the fortuities of the discovery process and the possibly faulty, and always self-inter539
ested, memories of the participants.
The Court justified the line it drew in Sharp by arguing that the potential
competitive danger from vertical price-fixing is the facilitation of cartels at
either the dealer or the supplier level. 540 It stated that, absent some agree-

ment on price or price levels, either the supplier or the distributor would find
it too difficult to organize and maintain a cartel. 54 1 The Court seemed to
believe that, faced only with a vague agreement to keep prices higher, some
cartel members would lower their prices just a bit to attract more customers
and would eventually eliminate the efficacy of the cartel. Thus, according to
the Court, agreements lacking specific price terms do not "almost always
tend[ ]to restrict competition and reduce output," and should not be subject
to per se scrutiny,542 particularly since the supplier may be terminating the
543
dealer in order to resolve a free-rider problem.
However, if the Court adopts the burden-shifting approach outlined
here, some of the concerns it expressed in Sharp would be eliminated. The
dire consequences of per se treatment are ameliorated and, if in fact the supplier is terminating the price-cutter because of free-riding, it can prove that.
In addition, Sharp assumes that the only thing to fear when a supplier
terminates a price-cutter distributor is a cartel based on specific price-agreements. This assumption is incorrect. It is based on a model of fungible products in which price is the only mechanism for competition. In complex
differentiated retail markets, where multiple prices for the same goods are to
be expected, the insistence that a unitary price is needed to prove harm to
competition seems overstated. "If information is poor, price dispersion for
identical products also occurs, even in unconcentrated markets." 544 The
elimination of particular classes of competitors may have effects similar to
classic cartels by ensuring that a whole group of low-price alternatives are
unavailable. Focusing on specific price levels ignores the possibility that a
full-price retailer may not want to keep its prices at a high level forever.
Rather, it may want a chance to reap high profit margins when it first puts a
product on the shelves, then to lower the price as sales warrant. Thus, it does
not want a price fixed in stone by the supplier. Rather, it wants protection
from price competition during the period it first puts the product on the
shelves when its profit margins are likely to be the largest. Thus, to maximize
its profits, the retailer may not want a price-fixing agreement, but simply the
elimination of particular rivals that put its pricing in a bad light.
539. See Bums, supra note 95, at 28 n.192 (noting possibility of supplier manipulation of
price negotiations to evade Sharp distinction).
540. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 725-26.
541. Id. at 727; see Ben Elfman & Son, Inc. v. Criterion Mills, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 683, 686 &
n.7 (D. Mass. 1991) (describing this as justification for Sharp holding).
542. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 726-27.
543. Id. at 728.
544. Beales et al., supra note 394, at 510.
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In addition, the Court's analysis does not take into account the targeted
upward coercion scenario described above. Sharp is a classic upward coercion case. Indeed, the problem Sharp addresses-agreements to terminate
those whose prices are "too low"-should occur mainly in upward coercion
cases. It is hard to imagine a supplier trying to orchestrate a joint agreement
not to price "too low" among all its dealers. As noted, in upward coercion
cases a large dealer may have good reason to try to eliminate a rival whose
low prices and proximity cast the dealer in an unfavorable light.5 45 Unless
the result is to eliminate a free-rider problem, the successful implementation
of this form of upward coercion means that some consumers will have less
choices and may pay higher prices, and output may be reduced, 54 6 with no
resulting efficiency gains. 547 Thus, courts should use the burden-shifting ap548
proach for upward coercion cases as well as for other price-fixing cases.
Obviously, the threatening dealer could achieve results similar to those
in upward coercion cases by insisting on an exclusive dealing arrangement,
thus effectively eliminating the discounter from the market. However, exclusive dealing arrangements necessarily entail a wide range of procompetitive
advantages that justify rule of reason treatment. 54 9 By contrast, the procompetitive effects of the upward coercion scenario-the elimination of freerider problems-are covered by the proposed narrow defense. If a dealer
wants to obtain the more favorable antitrust status of an exclusive dealership,
it should have to bargain for it and provide the concomitant efficiencies that
550
justify the more lenient treatment.
Thus, the Supreme Court or Congress should eliminate the Sharp distinction as the basis for differentiating price from non-price restraints in vertical cases. Where price is any part of the agreement between the supplier
and distributors, or is part of the full-price dealer's threats in an upward coercion case, the courts should treat the conspiracy as a price restraint. Evidence that meets this test in upward coercion cases might include attempts by
a dealer to influence a supplier to raise the prices of competing dealers or
price complaints incorporated into threats to the supplier.
Although this opens up more cases to more thorough scrutiny, defendants retain two strong protections for their procompetitive activities. First,
the Monsanto screen ensures that no case will survive summary judgment
absent some evidence that the supplier sought to fix prices or that it succumbed to a dealer's price-based coercion.55 1 Price complaints by other
545. See supra text accompanying notes 419-26.
546. See supra text accompanying note 426.
547. Gerla, supra note 69, at 11-12.
548. Phillip Areeda has argued that successful upward coercion by a large dealer constitutes

a harmful restriction on intrabrand competition. Areeda, supra note 38, at 575.
549. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.

550. See BoRK, supra note 16, at 304-05 (discussing these efficiencies and noting that party
getting exclusive rights should have to bargain for them).

551. See White, supra note 356, at 33-34 (stating Monsanto's high standard for showing
price-fixing eliminates danger of unduly deterring procompetitive restraints).
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dealers, standing alone, still will not trigger the rebuttable presumption. 552
Second, the defense for suppliers addressing genuine free-rider concerns will
allow the supplier to terminate a free-rider even if a full-price dealer has
engaged in coercion. 55 3 The legitimate uses of price agreements will not be
penalized. Thus, sufficient protection of the competitive
process will exist to
4
address the concerns the Court raised in Sharp.55
VII. CONCLUSION

The cases I have called the wayward children of Sylvania and Monsanto
largely represent the attempts of the lower federal courts to cope with the
somewhat Delphic pronouncements of the Supreme Court suggesting that
only limited antitrust scrutiny of vertical restraints is appropriate. These
courts apparently have learned from the Chicago School that too much antitrust regulation can deter efficient business conduct. However, the courts
have gone too far in immunizing from liability conduct that historical evidence suggests can be used for anticompetitive purposes.
552. For examples of cases finding that a terminated price-cutter provided insufficient evidence of a price-fixing conspiracy under Monsanto, see Lomar Wholesale Grocery v. Dieter's
Gourmet Foods, 824 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988); McCabe's Furniture v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988);
Adams Parker Furniture v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,606 (D. Kan. 1987);
Computer Connection, Inc. v. Apple Computer Corp., 621 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. La. 1985); Pink
Supply Corp. v. Hebert, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Minn. 1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir.
1986). In addition, at least one court has granted summary judgment because of insufficient
evidence of a causal link between an alleged conspiracy and the complaining dealer's termination. O.K. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 819 F. Supp. 771, 795-96 (S.D. Ind.
1992).
553. Justice Stevens' dissent in Sharp suggests that where the agreement to terminate a
price-cutter comes at the behest of a competing distributor, there can be no procompetitive
justification. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 754-56 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This approach fails to consider that the competing distributor, even with
price complaints, might succeed in pointing out to its supplier genuine free-rider problems that
led to its price complaints. 8 AREEDA, supra note 10,
1604; Allison, supra note 1, at 133
(supplier concern about dealer non-price behavior may arise from price complaints by other
dealers). As Monsanto suggests, the supplier should not be foreclosed from acting merely because it received information from a self-interested distributor, but once price becomes part of
the termination agreement, it should have to show clear evidence that it believed the termination
would increase competition.
554. One recent article argues that the supplier should not be held liable in upward coercion cases. Barlas, supra note 339, at 2336-37. The argument is that, faced with a coercive
choice between dealers, a supplier makes a rational decision to choose the larger. Given the
coercive scenario, this decision benefits consumers by maximizing output. Id. at 2352-54. However, making suppliers liable encourages them to resist anticompetitive dealer coercion, which
should make dealers less likely to attempt coercion in the first instance. Holding coerced suppliers liable also is consistent with the law of horizontal boycotts. Participants in boycotts are liable
even if they are on a different level of distribution than the target of the boycott and, apparently,
even if their participation was coerced by the target firm's rivals. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 210-14 (1959) (although evidence suggests boycott of retailer
arose out of "private quarrel" with competitior, participating suppliers treated as equally liable).
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Today, the challenge for those interested in antitrust jurisprudence is to
devise modes of analysis that attack genuinely anticompetitive conduct and
take into account the fears of overdeterrence expressed by Bork, Easterbrook, and others, but do not involve such complexity that the judicial system
cannot reasonably undertake them.
This article has attempted to provide such a mode of analysis for vertical
price-fixing. It demonstrated that the concerted action requirement in vertical cases can best be seen as a substantive screen that provides a minimum
level of evidence that a plaintiff needs to take a price-fixing case to the jury.
The effect of this screen is to insure that suppliers can terminate price-cutting
dealers for valid reasons without automatically risking protracted litigation.
When measured against this rationale, many of the lower court concerted
action cases make little sense and tend to immunize restraints that may not
be efficient. This article suggested ways in which the Supreme Court could
clarify its holding in Monsanto to insure that the concerted action requirement was properly applied in vertical restraint cases.
The overuse of the concerted action requirement might represent an attempt by the lower courts to subvert the per se rule for vertical price-fixing.
Thus, this article next examined the continued viability of that rule. Because
the retail markets that form the setting for many vertical restraints are often
very complex, the traditional modes of analysis are inappropriate. The per se
rule does not take into account possible efficient uses of price-fixing, and the
rule of reason is simply inadministrable in complex markets.
This article proposed the creation of a presumption of illegality for vertical price-fixing. This presumption could be overcome if the supplier shows
that it genuinely and reasonably employed the price restraint to further a
competitive goal such as the elimination of free-riders. This approach is narrowly focused on the appropriate issue, the purpose of the restraint, and is
much simpler for the courts to administer than analyses that rely on determinations of market power or competitive impact. Although the solution is not
ideal, it is preferable to using an unrelated screen, like a broad concerted
action requirement, or an unadministrable one, like the rule of reason.
Almost all commentators concede that vertical price-fixing has both anticompetitive and procompetitive uses. However, scholars disagree about the
frequency of either. The complexity of analyzing the effects of these restraints without much empirical guidance can easily lead to a desire to abandon examining them at all. Perhaps this is the motivation behind the broad
readings of Sylvania and Monsanto that the "wayward children" employ.
This article has attempted to find a manageable approach to allow real judges
and juries to deal with the genuine competitive concerns raised by vertical
price-fixing, despite their complexity and uncertain frequency. If the legal
system does not adopt the solutions suggested here, perhaps it at least will
adopt the aspiration of focused and manageable antitrust analysis.

